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Attack Tree Analysis for realm/realm-kotlin

Objective: Compromise Realm-Kotlin Application by exploiting high-risk vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Realm-Kotlin Application
├───(OR)─ [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Data Storage Vulnerabilities
│   ├───(OR)─ [HIGH-RISK PATH] Unencrypted Data Access
│   │   ├───(AND)─ [HIGH-RISK PATH] Physical Device Access
│   │   │   ├─── [CRITICAL NODE] Gain physical access to device (Stolen, lost, compromised device)
│   │   │   └─── [CRITICAL NODE] Device is not encrypted (Full disk encryption disabled)
│   │   └─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Backup mechanisms expose unencrypted data (e.g., cloud backups without Realm encryption)
│   ├───(OR)─ [HIGH-RISK PATH] Weak Encryption or Key Management
│   │   ├─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Insecure Key Storage
│   │   │   ├─── [CRITICAL NODE] Hardcoded Encryption Key in Application Code
│   │   │   ├─── [CRITICAL NODE] Key Stored in Shared Preferences/Unsecured Storage
│   │   │   ├─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Key Derivation from Weak Secret (e.g., predictable user input)
│   │   └─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Data Leakage through Logs or Caching
│   │   │   ├─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Sensitive Data Logged in Plaintext
│   │   │   │   ├─── [CRITICAL NODE] Application logs sensitive Realm data without proper sanitization
│   ├───(OR)─ [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Realm-Kotlin API Vulnerabilities
│   │   ├───(OR)─ [HIGH-RISK PATH] Query Injection (Realm Query Language - RQL)
│   │   │   ├─── [CRITICAL NODE] Crafted Malicious RQL Queries
│   │   └───(OR)─ [HIGH-RISK PATH] Authentication/Authorization Bypass (related to Realm usage in application)
│   │   │   ├─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Insecure Application-Level Access Control to Realm Data
│   │   │   │   ├─── [CRITICAL NODE] Insecure Application-Level Access Control to Realm Data
│   │   │   ├─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Authentication Bypass leading to Realm Access
│   │   │   │   ├─── [CRITICAL NODE] Authentication Bypass leading to Realm Access
│   └───(OR)─ [HIGH-RISK PATH] Social Engineering to Obtain Credentials/Access
│   │   ├─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] Social Engineering to Obtain Credentials/Access

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Data Storage Vulnerabilities -> Unencrypted Data Access -> Physical Device Access

  • [CRITICAL NODE] Gain physical access to device (Stolen, lost, compromised device):

    • Attack Vector: An attacker physically obtains the user's device through theft, loss, or social engineering.
    • Exploitation: If the device is not encrypted or the application data is accessible without device unlock, the attacker can directly access the Realm database file on the device's storage.
    • Impact: Full access to all data stored within the Realm database, potentially including sensitive user information, application secrets, and business-critical data.

  • [CRITICAL NODE] Device is not encrypted (Full disk encryption disabled):

    • Attack Vector: The user has disabled full disk encryption on their device, or is using an older device without default encryption.
    • Exploitation: If physical access is gained (as above), the attacker can bypass device-level encryption and directly access the file system, including the Realm database.
    • Impact: Critical data exposure as device-level security is absent.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Data Storage Vulnerabilities -> Unencrypted Data Access -> Backup mechanisms expose unencrypted data (e.g., cloud backups without Realm encryption)

  • Attack Vector: The application's backup mechanisms (e.g., cloud backups, local backups) do not encrypt the Realm database before backing it up.
    • Exploitation: An attacker gains access to the user's backups (e.g., compromised cloud account, access to local backup storage). If the Realm data in the backup is unencrypted, the attacker can extract and access the database.
    • Impact: Data breach through compromised backups, even if the application itself uses encryption.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Data Storage Vulnerabilities -> Weak Encryption or Key Management -> Insecure Key Storage -> Hardcoded Encryption Key in Application Code

  • [CRITICAL NODE] Hardcoded Encryption Key in Application Code:
    • Attack Vector: Developers mistakenly embed the Realm encryption key directly into the application's source code.
    • Exploitation: An attacker reverse engineers or decompiles the application (which is often straightforward for mobile apps) and extracts the hardcoded encryption key from the code.
    • Impact: Complete compromise of Realm encryption. The attacker can decrypt the database with the extracted key, rendering encryption useless.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Data Storage Vulnerabilities -> Weak Encryption or Key Management -> Insecure Key Storage -> Key Stored in Shared Preferences/Unsecured Storage

  • [CRITICAL NODE] Key Stored in Shared Preferences/Unsecured Storage:
    • Attack Vector: Developers store the Realm encryption key in insecure storage mechanisms like Android Shared Preferences or iOS UserDefaults without proper protection.
    • Exploitation: An attacker can access the application's sandbox (e.g., on a rooted device or through vulnerabilities) and retrieve the encryption key from the unsecured storage.
    • Impact: Encryption key compromise, allowing decryption of the Realm database.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Data Storage Vulnerabilities -> Weak Encryption or Key Management -> Insecure Key Storage -> Key Derivation from Weak Secret (e.g., predictable user input)

  • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Key Derivation from Weak Secret (e.g., predictable user input):
    • Attack Vector: The Realm encryption key is derived from a weak or predictable secret, such as a user's PIN, a default password, or easily guessable information.
    • Exploitation: An attacker can guess or brute-force the weak secret. Once the secret is compromised, they can derive the encryption key and decrypt the Realm database.
    • Impact: Encryption key compromise due to weak key derivation, leading to data exposure.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH-RISK PATH] Data Leakage through Logs or Caching -> Sensitive Data Logged in Plaintext -> Application logs sensitive Realm data without proper sanitization

  • [CRITICAL NODE] Application logs sensitive Realm data without proper sanitization:
    • Attack Vector: Developers inadvertently log sensitive data from the Realm database in plaintext in application logs (e.g., for debugging purposes, or due to poor logging practices).
    • Exploitation: An attacker gains access to application logs (e.g., through log aggregation services, compromised servers, or by accessing device logs if permissions are weak). The attacker can then extract sensitive data directly from the logs.
    • Impact: Data leakage through logs, potentially exposing sensitive user information or application secrets.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Realm-Kotlin API Vulnerabilities -> Query Injection (RQL) -> Crafted Malicious RQL Queries

  • [CRITICAL NODE] Crafted Malicious RQL Queries:
    • Attack Vector: The application dynamically constructs Realm Query Language (RQL) queries using user-supplied input without proper sanitization or parameterization.
    • Exploitation: An attacker injects malicious RQL code into user input fields. When the application executes the crafted query, the injected code is executed within the Realm database context. This can allow the attacker to bypass access controls, extract unauthorized data, or even modify data.
    • Impact: Data breach, unauthorized data access, data manipulation, and potentially application compromise depending on the severity of the injection vulnerability.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Realm-Kotlin API Vulnerabilities -> Authentication/Authorization Bypass -> Insecure Application-Level Access Control to Realm Data

  • [CRITICAL NODE] Insecure Application-Level Access Control to Realm Data:
    • Attack Vector: The application's logic for controlling access to Realm data is flawed or improperly implemented.
    • Exploitation: An attacker exploits weaknesses in the application's access control mechanisms to bypass intended restrictions and gain unauthorized access to Realm data. This could involve manipulating application state, exploiting logic errors, or bypassing authorization checks.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive Realm data, potentially leading to data breaches, privilege escalation, and data manipulation.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Realm-Kotlin API Vulnerabilities -> Authentication/Authorization Bypass -> Authentication Bypass leading to Realm Access

  • [CRITICAL NODE] Authentication Bypass leading to Realm Access:
    • Attack Vector: The application's authentication mechanisms are vulnerable, allowing an attacker to bypass authentication and gain access to the application as an authorized user.
    • Exploitation: An attacker exploits authentication vulnerabilities (e.g., insecure session management, password reset flaws, or vulnerabilities in authentication protocols) to bypass login procedures. Once authenticated (or falsely authenticated), they can access Realm data as if they were a legitimate user.
    • Impact: Complete application compromise, including full access to Realm data and application functionalities intended for authenticated users.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH-RISK PATH] Social Engineering to Obtain Credentials/Access -> Social Engineering to Obtain Credentials/Access

  • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Social Engineering to Obtain Credentials/Access:
    • Attack Vector: An attacker uses social engineering techniques (e.g., phishing, pretexting, baiting) to trick users into revealing their credentials or granting unauthorized access to the application or device.
    • Exploitation: The attacker manipulates users into divulging login credentials, device unlock codes, or other information that can be used to access the application and its Realm data.
    • Impact: Account compromise, unauthorized access to Realm data, and potential further compromise of user accounts and sensitive information.