Mitigation Strategy: Encrypt Sensitive Data at Rest
Description: 1. Choose a strong encryption key: Generate a cryptographically secure key (e.g., 256-bit AES). 2. Securely store the encryption key: Utilize platform-specific secure storage (Android Keystore, iOS Keychain). Avoid hardcoding keys. Consider key derivation from user secrets. 3. Enable Realm file encryption: Provide the encryption key during Realm instance configuration. Realm will encrypt the database file on disk. Threats Mitigated: * Data Breach due to physical device theft/loss (High Severity): Unencrypted Realm files expose data if devices are compromised. * Data Breach due to unauthorized file system access (Medium Severity): Malware could access unencrypted Realm files. * Data Leakage during device disposal (Medium Severity): Unencrypted data can be recovered from improperly wiped devices. Impact: * Data Breach due to physical device theft/loss: High Risk Reduction - Encryption renders data unreadable without the key. * Data Breach due to unauthorized file system access: Medium Risk Reduction - Encryption significantly hinders unauthorized access. * Data Leakage during device disposal: Medium Risk Reduction - Encryption protects data even if devices are not properly wiped. Currently Implemented: Realm file encryption is enabled using a key derived from user-specific salt and device-specific secret in secure storage. Missing Implementation: Key rotation strategy is not formally defined and automated.
Mitigation Strategy: Secure Realm File Location
Description: 1. Understand Default Location: Know the default Realm file paths on Android and iOS (application-private directories). 2. Avoid Public Locations: Do not store Realm files in public directories (e.g., SD card root). Use application-private storage. 3. Restrict File System Permissions (Advanced): On platforms allowing it, further restrict access to the Realm file directory using platform APIs. (Often complex and may not be necessary due to OS sandboxing). Threats Mitigated: * Data Breach due to misconfiguration (Low to Medium Severity): Accidental public placement of Realm files increases vulnerability. * Data Breach in rooted/jailbroken environments (Medium Severity): Weakened OS sandboxing in compromised environments could expose files if permissions are lax. Impact: * Data Breach due to misconfiguration: Medium Risk Reduction - Private location significantly reduces accidental public exposure. * Data Breach in rooted/jailbroken environments: Low to Medium Risk Reduction - Adds a minor defense layer even in compromised environments. Currently Implemented: Realm uses default application-private storage on Android and iOS. Missing Implementation: No runtime checks to verify secure file location. No platform-specific file permission hardening beyond default OS sandboxing.
Mitigation Strategy: Enforce Secure Communication (TLS/SSL) for Realm Sync
Description: 1. Enable HTTPS on Realm Object Server (ROS): Configure ROS to use HTTPS for all client-server communication. 2. Use Valid SSL Certificates: Ensure ROS uses valid, properly configured SSL certificates. 3. Disable Insecure Protocols: Disable or restrict insecure communication protocols if possible on ROS. 4. Client-Side Verification: (Realm Kotlin handles this implicitly) Realm Kotlin clients will typically enforce TLS/SSL for connections to ROS. Threats Mitigated: * Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks (High Severity): Without TLS/SSL, attackers can intercept and potentially modify data transmitted between the client and ROS. * Data Eavesdropping (High Severity): Unencrypted communication allows attackers to eavesdrop on sensitive data being synced. Impact: * Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks: High Risk Reduction - TLS/SSL encryption prevents attackers from intercepting and manipulating communication. * Data Eavesdropping: High Risk Reduction - Encryption protects data confidentiality during transmission. Currently Implemented: Realm Sync is configured to use HTTPS with valid SSL certificates for all communication. Missing Implementation: No explicit checks within the application to verify secure connection establishment to ROS.
Mitigation Strategy: Implement Strong Authentication and Authorization for Realm Sync
Description: 1. Utilize Realm Sync Authentication: Use Realm Sync's built-in authentication mechanisms (e.g., username/password, custom authentication providers). 2. Define Authorization Rules on ROS: Configure ROS authorization rules to control user access to specific Realm data based on roles and permissions. 3. Principle of Least Privilege: Grant users only the necessary permissions to access and modify data. 4. Regularly Review Permissions: Periodically review and update ROS authorization rules to reflect changing application needs and security requirements. Threats Mitigated: * Unauthorized Data Access via Sync (High Severity): Weak authentication/authorization allows unauthorized users to access synced data. * Data Modification by Unauthorized Users via Sync (High Severity): Lack of proper authorization can lead to unauthorized data changes through sync. * Account Compromise leading to data breach (High Severity): Weak authentication makes accounts easier to compromise, potentially exposing synced data. Impact: * Unauthorized Data Access via Sync: High Risk Reduction - Strong authentication and authorization prevent unauthorized access. * Data Modification by Unauthorized Users via Sync: High Risk Reduction - Authorization controls who can modify synced data. * Account Compromise leading to data breach: High Risk Reduction - Stronger authentication makes account compromise more difficult. Currently Implemented: Realm Sync uses username/password authentication. Basic role-based authorization is configured on ROS. Missing Implementation: Granular permission control on ROS could be improved. No formal audit logging of sync access attempts.
Mitigation Strategy: Input Validation and Sanitization for Synced Data
Description: 1. Treat Synced Data as Untrusted: Assume data received via Realm Sync, especially from other users or external sources, is potentially untrusted. 2. Apply Validation Rules: Implement validation logic for synced data, similar to data validation for local inputs. 3. Sanitize Synced Data: Sanitize synced data before displaying it in UI or using it in sensitive operations (e.g., HTML escaping, input encoding). 4. Server-Side Validation (ROS): Ideally, implement validation on the Realm Object Server as well to prevent invalid data from being synced in the first place. Threats Mitigated: * Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) or similar injection attacks via synced data (Medium Severity): Unsanitized synced data displayed in UI can lead to injection vulnerabilities. * Data Corruption due to malicious synced data (Low to Medium Severity): Malicious or malformed data synced from other sources can corrupt local Realm data. Impact: * Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) or similar injection attacks via synced data: Medium Risk Reduction - Sanitization neutralizes malicious code in synced data. * Data Corruption due to malicious synced data: Low to Medium Risk Reduction - Validation and sanitization reduce the risk of data corruption from synced sources. Currently Implemented: Basic HTML escaping is used in some UI components displaying synced data. No server-side validation on ROS. Missing Implementation: Comprehensive validation and sanitization for all synced data types. Server-side validation on ROS.
Mitigation Strategy: Rate Limiting and DoS Prevention for Realm Sync
Description: 1. Implement Rate Limiting on ROS: Configure rate limiting on the Realm Object Server to restrict the number of sync requests from a single client or IP address within a given time period. 2. Monitor Sync Traffic: Monitor ROS for unusual or excessive sync activity that could indicate a DoS attack. 3. Resource Limits on ROS: Configure appropriate resource limits (e.g., connection limits, memory limits) on ROS to prevent resource exhaustion from malicious sync requests. Threats Mitigated: * Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks via excessive sync requests (Medium to High Severity): Attackers can flood the ROS with sync requests, potentially overwhelming the server and making the application unavailable. Impact: * Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks via excessive sync requests: Medium to High Risk Reduction - Rate limiting and resource limits mitigate the impact of DoS attacks by preventing server overload. Currently Implemented: Basic rate limiting is configured on ROS. Missing Implementation: More sophisticated DoS prevention mechanisms (e.g., anomaly detection, adaptive rate limiting). No automated alerts for suspicious sync traffic patterns.
Mitigation Strategy: Keep Realm Kotlin Library Up-to-Date
Description: 1. Regularly Check for Updates: Monitor Realm Kotlin release notes and update channels for new versions. 2. Apply Updates Promptly: Update the Realm Kotlin library to the latest stable version as soon as reasonably possible after release. 3. Review Release Notes: Carefully review release notes for security patches and bug fixes included in updates. Threats Mitigated: * Exploitation of known vulnerabilities in Realm Kotlin library (Variable Severity): Outdated libraries may contain known security vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit. Impact: * Exploitation of known vulnerabilities in Realm Kotlin library: Variable Risk Reduction - Keeping the library updated ensures that known vulnerabilities are patched, reducing the risk of exploitation. Currently Implemented: We have a process to check for library updates periodically, but updates are not always applied immediately. Missing Implementation: Automated dependency update checks and alerts. Formalized process for prioritizing and applying security updates for Realm Kotlin and other dependencies.
Mitigation Strategy: Avoid Dynamic Queries and String-Based Operations in Realm Kotlin
Description: 1. Use Type-Safe Query API: Utilize Realm Kotlin's type-safe query builder API for constructing queries. 2. Avoid String Concatenation for Queries: Do not construct queries using string concatenation or dynamic string building. 3. Parameterize Queries (If Necessary): If dynamic query parameters are needed, use parameterized queries provided by Realm Kotlin (if available and applicable) or carefully sanitize inputs before incorporating them into queries (though type-safe API is preferred). Threats Mitigated: * Injection Vulnerabilities (e.g., Realm Query Injection - Low to Medium Severity): Constructing queries dynamically using strings can potentially introduce injection vulnerabilities if user inputs or untrusted data are incorporated without proper sanitization (though Realm Kotlin's type-safe API significantly reduces this risk compared to string-based query languages). Impact: * Injection Vulnerabilities: Low to Medium Risk Reduction - Using the type-safe query API largely eliminates the risk of injection vulnerabilities in Realm queries. Currently Implemented: We primarily use the type-safe query API provided by Realm Kotlin. Missing Implementation: Code review processes to specifically check for and prevent dynamic query construction using strings.
Mitigation Strategy: Secure Key Management for Realm Encryption
Description: 1. Do Not Hardcode Keys: Never hardcode encryption keys directly in the application code. 2. Use Secure Storage: Utilize platform-specific secure storage mechanisms (Android Keystore, iOS Keychain) to store and manage encryption keys. 3. Key Derivation (Consider): Derive encryption keys from user secrets or device-specific secrets combined with salts for added security. 4. Key Rotation (Consider): Implement a key rotation strategy to periodically change encryption keys. Threats Mitigated: * Encryption Key Compromise (High Severity): If encryption keys are hardcoded or stored insecurely, attackers can potentially extract them and decrypt the Realm database. Impact: * Encryption Key Compromise: High Risk Reduction - Secure key management significantly reduces the risk of key compromise and unauthorized decryption of data. Currently Implemented: Encryption keys are not hardcoded and are stored in platform-specific secure storage. Key derivation is implemented. Missing Implementation: Formalized and automated key rotation strategy. Regular security audits of key management practices.