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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for realm/realm-kotlin

Attack Surface: Unencrypted Local Data Storage

  • Description: Realm database files stored on the device without encryption are vulnerable to unauthorized access.
  • How realm-kotlin Contributes: Realm provides the capability to store data locally, but encryption is an opt-in feature. The default behavior (no encryption) increases the attack surface if developers don't explicitly enable it. This is a direct responsibility of how the developer uses the library.
  • Example: An attacker gains access to a lost or stolen phone and uses Realm Studio to open the unencrypted .realm file, extracting sensitive user data.
  • Impact: Direct exposure of sensitive data, potentially leading to identity theft, financial loss, or privacy violations.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer: Always enable Realm encryption using RealmConfiguration.Builder.encryptionKey(). Use a strong, 64-byte key generated securely.
    • Developer: Store the encryption key securely using platform-specific key management (Android Keystore, iOS Keychain). Never hardcode the key.
    • Developer: Consider using a Key Derivation Function (KDF) like Argon2id.

Attack Surface: Weak Encryption Key Management

  • Description: Even with encryption enabled, a weak or improperly managed encryption key compromises the security.
  • How realm-kotlin Contributes: Realm relies on the developer to provide and manage the encryption key correctly. The library provides the mechanism for encryption, but the security hinges on proper key management, a direct developer responsibility.
  • Example: A developer hardcodes a short key in the application code. An attacker reverse-engineers the app, extracts the key, and decrypts the Realm file.
  • Impact: Complete compromise of the encrypted Realm data.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer: Use a strong, randomly generated 64-byte key.
    • Developer: Leverage platform-specific secure key storage (Android Keystore, iOS Keychain).
    • Developer: Implement key rotation policies.
    • Developer: Use a KDF (Argon2id recommended) with a strong salt and high iteration count.

Attack Surface: Compromised Realm Sync Server (if used)

  • Description: If using Realm Sync, a compromised server exposes all synchronized data.
  • How realm-kotlin Contributes: The realm-kotlin library provides the client-side functionality for Realm Sync. While the server itself isn't part of realm-kotlin, the library's purpose is to interact with this server, making the server's security a direct concern for applications using the sync feature.
  • Example: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in the Realm Object Server, gaining access and downloading all user data.
  • Impact: Massive data breach affecting all users.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer (Self-hosted ROS): Keep the server software up-to-date, implement strong access controls, monitor logs, and use strong passwords/MFA.
    • Developer (Atlas Device Sync): Follow MongoDB Atlas's security best practices, use strong authentication/authorization, and enable auditing.
    • Developer (Both): Consider end-to-end encryption (E2EE) in addition to Realm Sync's transport encryption. (Requires a separate implementation, as Realm Sync doesn't provide E2EE natively).

Attack Surface: Weak Server-Side Authentication/Authorization (Sync)

  • Description: Insufficient authentication/authorization on the Realm Sync server allows unauthorized access.
  • How realm-kotlin Contributes: realm-kotlin handles the client-side authentication process (e.g., passing credentials). However, the enforcement of authentication and authorization rules is a server-side responsibility, directly impacting the security of data accessed via the realm-kotlin sync functionality.
  • Example: An attacker uses a brute-force attack to guess a user's password and gains access to their synchronized Realm data.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to a user's data.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer: Implement strong password policies.
    • Developer: Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA).
    • Developer: Use fine-grained authorization rules (principle of least privilege).
    • Developer: Regularly audit user accounts and permissions.