Objective: Gain unauthorized access to sensitive information or disrupt the application's functionality by exploiting vulnerabilities introduced or exposed by LeakCanary, focusing on the most probable and impactful attack vectors.
Attack: Compromise Application using LeakCanary [CRITICAL]
└─── AND 1: LeakCanary Enabled/Present in Vulnerable Context [CRITICAL]
├─── OR 1.1: LeakCanary Enabled in Production Build [CRITICAL]
│ └─── AND 1.1.1: Accidental Inclusion in Production [CRITICAL]
│ └─── Leaf 1.1.1.1: Developer Mistake during Build Configuration [CRITICAL]
└─── OR 1.2: LeakCanary Functionality Exploited in Debug/Test Builds
└─── AND 1.2.1: Heap Dump Access
└─── OR 1.2.1.1: Local Device Access (Physical or ADB) [CRITICAL for Debug Exploitation]
└─── Leaf 1.2.1.1.2: Attacker Uses ADB Debugging Bridge [CRITICAL for Debug Exploitation]
└─── AND 1.2.2: Heap Dump Analysis for Sensitive Information [CRITICAL]
└─── Leaf 1.2.2.1: Attacker Analyzes Heap Dump to Extract Secrets, API Keys, User Data, Business Logic, etc. [CRITICAL]
Attack Tree Path: 1. Attack: Compromise Application using LeakCanary [CRITICAL]
- Description: The ultimate goal of the attacker is to successfully compromise the application by exploiting weaknesses related to LeakCanary.
- Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities stemming from the presence and functionality of LeakCanary in vulnerable contexts, leading to information disclosure or disruption.
Attack Tree Path: 2. AND 1: LeakCanary Enabled/Present in Vulnerable Context [CRITICAL]
- Description: LeakCanary must be active or its artifacts accessible for any related attack to succeed. This node represents the necessary precondition for exploitation.
- Attack Vector: The application is built and deployed in a configuration where LeakCanary is either actively running or has left behind exploitable artifacts (like heap dumps).
Attack Tree Path: 3. OR 1.1: LeakCanary Enabled in Production Build [CRITICAL]
- Description: The most critical vulnerability point. LeakCanary in production exposes the application to significant information disclosure risks.
- Attack Vector: The application is mistakenly or intentionally built and released to production environments with LeakCanary enabled and functional.
Attack Tree Path: 4. AND 1.1.1: Accidental Inclusion in Production [CRITICAL]
- Description: The most common scenario leading to LeakCanary in production.
- Attack Vector: Due to errors in build configuration or oversight, LeakCanary dependencies and initialization code are not properly excluded from the production build process.
Attack Tree Path: 5. Leaf 1.1.1.1: Developer Mistake during Build Configuration [CRITICAL]
- Description: The root cause of accidental production inclusion. Human error during the build setup process.
- Attack Vector: Developers fail to correctly configure build variants, flavors, or dependency management in Gradle (or other build systems) to exclude LeakCanary from release/production builds. This can be due to:
- Lack of awareness of the security implications.
- Complexity of build configurations.
- Simple oversight or human error during rushed releases.
Attack Tree Path: 6. OR 1.2.1.1: Local Device Access (Physical or ADB) [CRITICAL for Debug Exploitation]
- Description: A primary method for attackers to access heap dumps in debug/test environments.
- Attack Vectors:
- Leaf 1.2.1.1.2: Attacker Uses ADB Debugging Bridge [CRITICAL for Debug Exploitation]:
- Attack Vector: The attacker leverages the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) to connect to a device running a debug build of the application. This can be achieved through:
- Network ADB: If ADB debugging over network is enabled and accessible (e.g., in a shared testing environment or if port forwarding is misconfigured).
- USB ADB: If the attacker gains physical access to a device with USB debugging enabled and authorized their attacking machine.
- Exploitation: Once connected via ADB, the attacker can use ADB commands to:
- List files on the device and locate heap dumps generated by LeakCanary.
- Pull heap dump files from the device to their local machine for analysis.
- Attack Vector: The attacker leverages the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) to connect to a device running a debug build of the application. This can be achieved through:
- Leaf 1.2.1.1.2: Attacker Uses ADB Debugging Bridge [CRITICAL for Debug Exploitation]:
Attack Tree Path: 7. AND 1.2.2: Heap Dump Analysis for Sensitive Information [CRITICAL]
- Description: The crucial step after obtaining a heap dump, regardless of how it was acquired.
- Attack Vector: The attacker analyzes the obtained heap dump file to extract sensitive information present in the application's memory at the time of the dump.
Attack Tree Path: 8. Leaf 1.2.2.1: Attacker Analyzes Heap Dump to Extract Secrets, API Keys, User Data, Business Logic, etc. [CRITICAL]
- Description: The specific goal of heap dump analysis - to find and extract valuable information.
- Attack Vectors: Using heap analysis tools (like Android Studio's Memory Analyzer or dedicated heap dump analysis software), the attacker examines the heap dump for:
- Hardcoded Secrets: API keys, encryption keys, passwords, or other credentials mistakenly hardcoded in the application's code and present in memory.
- User Data: Personal Identifiable Information (PII), session tokens, authentication credentials, or other user-specific data that might be temporarily stored in memory.
- Business Logic and Algorithms: Object structures, data flows, and code snippets that reveal proprietary algorithms or business logic, potentially leading to reverse engineering or circumvention of security measures.
- Database Credentials: If the application maintains database connections in memory, database usernames and passwords might be exposed in the heap dump.
- Other Sensitive Information: Any other data considered confidential or valuable that happens to be present in the application's memory at the time of the heap dump.