Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
96 lines (78 loc) · 6.62 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

96 lines (78 loc) · 6.62 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for square/okio

Objective: Compromise Application using Okio library by exploiting weaknesses or vulnerabilities within Okio itself or its usage.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via Okio ├───[AND] Exploit Okio Vulnerability [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR] Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├───[AND] Buffer Overflow in Buffer/Segment Management [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └───[AND] Double-Free or Use-After-Free in Segment Pool [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR] Denial of Service (DoS) Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├───[AND] Resource Exhaustion via Unbounded Operations [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └───[AND] Infinite Loop/Deadlock in Stream Processing [HIGH RISK PATH] └───[AND] Exploit Application's Misuse of Okio [CRITICAL NODE] ├───[OR] Unsafe Handling of Data Read via Okio [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[AND] Injection Vulnerabilities (SQL Injection, Command Injection, etc.) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ └───[AND] Deserialization Vulnerabilities (if Okio used for handling serialized data) [HIGH RISK PATH] └───[OR] Logic/Algorithm Vulnerabilities ├───[AND] Compression/Decompression Algorithm Exploits (e.g., Zip Bomb, Gzip Bomb) [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: Buffer Overflow in Buffer/Segment Management

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Send crafted input data to the application that is processed by Okio, specifically designed to exceed the allocated buffer size during read or write operations.
    • Exploit vulnerabilities in Okio's internal segment management logic to cause a buffer to overflow when data is being moved or manipulated.
  • Impact:
    • Application crash due to memory access violation.
    • Arbitrary code execution by overwriting return addresses or function pointers in memory.
    • Data corruption by overwriting adjacent memory regions.

Attack Tree Path: Double-Free or Use-After-Free in Segment Pool

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Trigger specific sequences of Okio API calls that lead to a segment in the segment pool being freed twice (double-free).
    • Trigger sequences where a segment is freed and then accessed again later (use-after-free). This often requires deep understanding of Okio's internal memory management.
  • Impact:
    • Application crash due to memory corruption.
    • Memory corruption leading to unpredictable behavior.
    • Potential for arbitrary code execution by manipulating freed memory.

Attack Tree Path: Resource Exhaustion via Unbounded Operations

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Provide extremely large input files or streams to the application that are processed by Okio without proper size limits or buffering. This can lead to excessive memory consumption.
    • Trigger Okio operations that create a large number of internal objects (e.g., segments) without releasing them, leading to memory exhaustion.
    • Initiate a large number of concurrent Okio operations that overwhelm system resources (CPU, file handles).
  • Impact:
    • Application slowdown or unresponsiveness.
    • Application crash due to out-of-memory errors.
    • System-wide resource exhaustion affecting other services on the same machine.

Attack Tree Path: Infinite Loop/Deadlock in Stream Processing

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Send crafted input data that triggers an infinite loop within Okio's stream processing logic (Sources, Sinks, Buffers). This might exploit error handling paths or specific data patterns.
    • Exploit concurrency issues in Okio's stream processing to create a deadlock condition where threads are blocked indefinitely, leading to application hang.
  • Impact:
    • Application hang and unresponsiveness.
    • Denial of service as the application becomes unusable.
    • Potential application crash if watchdog timers or resource limits are exceeded.

Attack Tree Path: Injection Vulnerabilities (SQL Injection, Command Injection, etc.)

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Application reads data from an external source (e.g., file, network) using Okio.
    • This data, without proper sanitization or validation, is then directly used in:
      • SQL queries, leading to SQL Injection.
      • System commands, leading to Command Injection.
      • Other contexts where code or commands are interpreted (e.g., LDAP queries, XPath queries).
  • Impact:
    • Data breach by accessing or modifying sensitive database information (SQL Injection).
    • System compromise by executing arbitrary commands on the server (Command Injection).
    • Various other injection-related impacts depending on the context.

Attack Tree Path: Deserialization Vulnerabilities (if Okio used for handling serialized data)

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Application uses Okio to read serialized data from an untrusted source.
    • The application deserializes this data without proper validation or using insecure deserialization libraries.
    • Crafted serialized data can contain malicious payloads that are executed during deserialization.
  • Impact:
    • Remote Code Execution (RCE) by executing arbitrary code on the server during deserialization.
    • Denial of Service (DoS) by triggering resource-intensive deserialization processes.
    • Other deserialization-related vulnerabilities like data corruption or information disclosure.

Attack Tree Path: Compression/Decompression Algorithm Exploits (e.g., Zip Bomb, Gzip Bomb)

  • Attack Vectors:
    • Provide a specially crafted compressed file (zip bomb, gzip bomb) to the application that uses Okio's decompression capabilities (GzipSource, DeflateSource, ZipFileSystem).
    • These files are designed to decompress to an extremely large size, consuming excessive resources during decompression.
  • Impact:
    • Denial of Service (DoS) due to resource exhaustion (CPU, memory, disk I/O).
    • Application slowdown or unresponsiveness.
    • Potential application crash due to out-of-memory errors or timeouts.