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Attack Tree Analysis for square/okio

Objective: DoS, Data Leak, or Arbitrary Code Execution via Okio

Attack Tree Visualization

Attacker Goal: DoS, Data Leak, or Arbitrary Code Execution via Okio

└── 1. Denial of Service (DoS) [HIGH-RISK] ├── 1.1 Resource Exhaustion [HIGH-RISK] │ ├── 1.1.1 Unbounded Buffer Allocation [HIGH-RISK] │ │ ├── 1.1.1.1 Exploit Buffer class to allocate excessive memory. [CRITICAL] │ │ └── 1.1.1.2 Abuse BufferedSource or BufferedSink with extremely large or infinite streams. [CRITICAL] │ ├── 1.1.2 Slowloris-style Attacks (if Okio is used for network I/O) [HIGH-RISK] │ │ ├── 1.1.2.1 Send data very slowly, keeping connections open and consuming resources. [CRITICAL] │ │ └── 1.1.2.2 Incomplete requests: Send partial data, never completing the request. [CRITICAL] └── 1.3 Timeout Misconfiguration [HIGH-RISK] └── 1.3.1 Set excessively long or infinite timeouts on Source or Sink operations. [CRITICAL]

└── 2. Data Leak └── 2.2 Unintentional Data Exposure └── 2.2.3 Logging sensitive data read/written through Okio. [CRITICAL]

└── 3. Arbitrary Code Execution └── 3.2 Deserialization Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK] └── 3.2.1 If the application uses Okio to read serialized objects from an untrusted source. [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Denial of Service (DoS) [HIGH-RISK]

  • 1.1 Resource Exhaustion [HIGH-RISK]

    • 1.1.1 Unbounded Buffer Allocation [HIGH-RISK]

      • 1.1.1.1 Exploit Buffer class to allocate excessive memory. [CRITICAL]
        • Description: The attacker provides input that causes the application to allocate an extremely large Buffer in Okio, consuming all available memory and leading to an OutOfMemoryError (OOM). This crashes the application or makes it unresponsive.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: High
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Novice
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • 1.1.1.2 Abuse BufferedSource or BufferedSink with extremely large or infinite streams. [CRITICAL]
        • Description: Similar to 1.1.1.1, but the attacker exploits BufferedSource or BufferedSink to read or write a massive amount of data without limits, leading to OOM.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: High
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Novice
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium

    • 1.1.2 Slowloris-style Attacks (if Okio is used for network I/O) [HIGH-RISK]

      • 1.1.2.1 Send data very slowly, keeping connections open and consuming resources. [CRITICAL]
        • Description: The attacker establishes a connection to the application (if it uses Okio for network I/O) and sends data very slowly. This keeps the connection open for an extended period, consuming server resources (threads, memory) and preventing legitimate clients from connecting.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: High
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Intermediate
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • 1.1.2.2 Incomplete requests: Send partial data, never completing the request. [CRITICAL]
        • Description: The attacker sends only part of a request, never sending the final bytes or closing the connection. This ties up server resources waiting for the complete request, leading to resource exhaustion.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: High
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Intermediate
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium

    • 1.3 Timeout Misconfiguration [HIGH-RISK]

      • 1.3.1 Set excessively long or infinite timeouts on Source or Sink operations. [CRITICAL]
        • Description: The application sets very long or infinite timeouts on Okio operations. An attacker can then cause the application to block indefinitely on a read or write operation, making it unresponsive.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: High
        • Effort: Very Low
        • Skill Level: Novice
        • Detection Difficulty: Easy

Attack Tree Path: 2. Data Leak

  • 2.2 Unintentional Data Exposure
    • 2.2.3 Logging sensitive data read/written through Okio. [CRITICAL]
      • Description: The application logs the data being read or written through Okio, and this data contains sensitive information (passwords, API keys, personal data). If the logs are compromised, the sensitive data is exposed.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: Medium to High
      • Effort: Very Low
      • Skill Level: Novice
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy

Attack Tree Path: 3. Arbitrary Code Execution

  • 3.2 Deserialization Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK]
    • 3.2.1 If the application uses Okio to read serialized objects from an untrusted source. [CRITICAL]
      • Description: The application uses Okio to read serialized object data from an untrusted source (e.g., user input, external API). If the attacker can control the serialized data, they can craft a malicious object that, when deserialized, executes arbitrary code on the server. This is a classic Java deserialization vulnerability, and Okio is simply the I/O vector.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: Very High
      • Effort: Medium
      • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium