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Attack Tree Analysis for square/workflow-kotlin

Objective: To gain unauthorized control over the application's workflow execution and/or access sensitive data managed by the workflow system.

Attack Tree Visualization

  • Root Goal: Gain Unauthorized Control of Workflow Execution and/or Access Workflow Data [CRITICAL NODE]
    • OR
        1. Exploit Workflow Logic Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
        • OR
          • 1.1. Insecure Workflow Code Implementation [CRITICAL NODE]
            • OR
              • 1.1.2. Injection Flaws in Workflow Logic (e.g., Command Injection, SQL Injection if workflows interact with external systems) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
          • 1.2. Workflow State Manipulation [CRITICAL NODE]
            • OR
              • 1.2.1. Direct State Data Tampering (if state persistence is insecure) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
              • 1.2.3. State Corruption via External Systems (if workflows interact with vulnerable external systems) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        1. Exploit Event Handling Mechanisms [CRITICAL NODE]
        • OR
          • 2.1. Malicious Event Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
          • 2.3. Event Source Spoofing [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
        1. Exploit Workflow-Kotlin Library Specific Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
        • OR
          • 3.1. Bugs in Workflow-Kotlin Library Itself [CRITICAL NODE]
          • 3.2. Misconfiguration of Workflow-Kotlin Features [HIGH-RISK PATH]
          • 3.3. Dependency Vulnerabilities in Workflow-Kotlin's Dependencies [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        1. Exploit External Integrations Orchestrated by Workflows [CRITICAL NODE]
        • OR
          • 4.1. Integration Point Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
          • 4.2. Data Injection via Integrations [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        1. Social Engineering and Insider Threats [CRITICAL NODE]
        • OR
          • 5.1. Compromise Developer/Operator Accounts [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
          • 5.3. Phishing/Social Engineering against Workflow Users/Administrators [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: Root Goal: Gain Unauthorized Control of Workflow Execution and/or Access Workflow Data [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: The ultimate objective of the attacker. Success here means complete compromise of the workflow system and potentially the application.
  • Estimations:
    • Likelihood: Varies depending on specific attack path
    • Impact: Critical
    • Effort: Varies depending on specific attack path
    • Skill Level: Varies depending on specific attack path
    • Detection Difficulty: Varies depending on specific attack path

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Workflow Logic Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: Targeting weaknesses in the design and implementation of workflow logic itself.
  • Estimations:

    • Likelihood: Medium

    • Impact: Medium - High

    • Effort: Low - High (depending on vulnerability type)

    • Skill Level: Low - High (depending on vulnerability type)

    • Detection Difficulty: Medium - High

    • 2.1. 1.1. Insecure Workflow Code Implementation [CRITICAL NODE]

      • Description: Vulnerabilities arising from coding errors within workflow definitions.
      • Estimations:

        • Likelihood: Medium

        • Impact: Medium - Critical

        • Effort: Low - High (depending on vulnerability type)

        • Skill Level: Low - High (depending on vulnerability type)

        • Detection Difficulty: Medium - High

        • 2.1.1. 1.1.2. Injection Flaws in Workflow Logic (e.g., Command Injection, SQL Injection if workflows interact with external systems) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

          • Attack Vector: Injecting malicious commands or queries through workflow inputs or state data that are processed without proper sanitization.
          • Estimations:
            • Likelihood: Medium
            • Impact: Medium - High
            • Effort: Low - Medium
            • Skill Level: Medium
            • Detection Difficulty: Medium

    • 2.2. 1.2. Workflow State Manipulation [CRITICAL NODE]

      • Description: Exploiting weaknesses in how workflow state is managed and persisted.
      • Estimations:

        • Likelihood: Low - Medium

        • Impact: High

        • Effort: Medium

        • Skill Level: Medium

        • Detection Difficulty: Medium

        • 2.2.1. 1.2.1. Direct State Data Tampering (if state persistence is insecure) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

          • Attack Vector: Directly modifying the persisted workflow state data (e.g., database manipulation, file system access) to alter workflow behavior.
          • Estimations:
            • Likelihood: Low - Medium
            • Impact: High
            • Effort: Medium
            • Skill Level: Medium
            • Detection Difficulty: Medium

        • 2.2.2. 1.2.3. State Corruption via External Systems (if workflows interact with vulnerable external systems) [HIGH-RISK PATH]

          • Attack Vector: Compromising an external system that the workflow relies on to corrupt or manipulate workflow state indirectly.
          • Estimations:
            • Likelihood: Low - Medium
            • Impact: Medium - High
            • Effort: Medium - High
            • Skill Level: Medium - High
            • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Event Handling Mechanisms [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: Targeting vulnerabilities in the event-driven nature of Workflow-Kotlin, specifically how events are processed and validated.
  • Estimations:

    • Likelihood: Medium

    • Impact: Medium - High

    • Effort: Low - Medium

    • Skill Level: Medium

    • Detection Difficulty: Medium

    • 3.1. 2.1. Malicious Event Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

      • Attack Vector: Injecting crafted events into the workflow system that are not properly validated or authorized, leading to unintended workflow transitions or actions.
      • Estimations:
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: Medium - High
        • Effort: Low - Medium
        • Skill Level: Medium
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium

    • 3.2. 2.3. Event Source Spoofing [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

      • Attack Vector: Spoofing the source of events to impersonate legitimate event producers and inject malicious events.
      • Estimations:
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: Medium - High
        • Effort: Low - Medium
        • Skill Level: Medium
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Workflow-Kotlin Library Specific Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: Focusing on vulnerabilities directly related to the Workflow-Kotlin library or its configuration and dependencies.
  • Estimations:

    • Likelihood: Medium

    • Impact: Medium - Critical

    • Effort: Low - High (depending on vulnerability type)

    • Skill Level: Medium - High (depending on vulnerability type)

    • Detection Difficulty: Medium - High

    • 4.1. 3.1. Bugs in Workflow-Kotlin Library Itself [CRITICAL NODE]

      • Attack Vector: Discovering and exploiting undiscovered vulnerabilities within the Workflow-Kotlin library code.
      • Estimations:
        • Likelihood: Low
        • Impact: Critical
        • Effort: High
        • Skill Level: High
        • Detection Difficulty: High

    • 4.2. 3.2. Misconfiguration of Workflow-Kotlin Features [HIGH-RISK PATH]

      • Attack Vector: Exploiting insecure configurations of Workflow-Kotlin, such as weak state persistence settings or insecure event handling setup.
      • Estimations:
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: Medium - High
        • Effort: Low - Medium
        • Skill Level: Medium
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium

    • 4.3. 3.3. Dependency Vulnerabilities in Workflow-Kotlin's Dependencies [HIGH-RISK PATH]

      • Attack Vector: Exploiting known vulnerabilities in libraries that Workflow-Kotlin depends on.
      • Estimations:
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: Medium - High
        • Effort: Low - Medium
        • Skill Level: Medium
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 4. Exploit External Integrations Orchestrated by Workflows [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: Targeting vulnerabilities arising from the workflow's interactions with external systems.
  • Estimations:

    • Likelihood: Medium

    • Impact: Medium - High

    • Effort: Medium - High

    • Skill Level: Medium - High

    • Detection Difficulty: Medium

    • 5.1. 4.1. Integration Point Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

      • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in external systems that workflows interact with, using the workflow as a conduit.
      • Estimations:
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: Medium - High
        • Effort: Medium - High
        • Skill Level: Medium - High
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium

    • 5.2. 4.2. Data Injection via Integrations [HIGH-RISK PATH]

      • Attack Vector: Injecting malicious data into external systems through workflow interactions, which can then affect workflow logic or other parts of the application.
      • Estimations:
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: Medium
        • Effort: Low - Medium
        • Skill Level: Medium
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 5. Social Engineering and Insider Threats [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: Exploiting human factors to compromise the workflow system.
  • Estimations:

    • Likelihood: Medium

    • Impact: Medium - Critical

    • Effort: Low - Medium

    • Skill Level: Low - Medium

    • Detection Difficulty: Medium - High

    • 6.1. 5.1. Compromise Developer/Operator Accounts [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

      • Attack Vector: Gaining access to accounts with permissions to modify workflows, state, or event systems.
      • Estimations:
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: Critical
        • Effort: Low - Medium
        • Skill Level: Low - Medium
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium

    • 6.2. 5.3. Phishing/Social Engineering against Workflow Users/Administrators [HIGH-RISK PATH]

      • Attack Vector: Tricking users or administrators into revealing credentials or performing actions that compromise the workflow system.
      • Estimations:
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: Medium - Critical
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Low - Medium
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium