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Threat Model Analysis for tapadoo/alerter

Threat: Malicious Content Injection (XSS/UI Redressing)

  • Description: An attacker injects malicious code (e.g., JavaScript in a web context, or specially crafted text/markup) into the content displayed by Alerter. This is achieved by exploiting an input validation flaw where the application passes unsanitized user-supplied data directly to Alerter's display functions. The attacker crafts a message that, when displayed, executes arbitrary code in the user's browser (XSS) or mimics legitimate UI elements to deceive the user (UI redressing).
    • Impact:
      • XSS: Theft of user cookies, session hijacking, redirection to malicious websites, defacement, execution of arbitrary code in the user's context.
      • UI Redressing: Tricking the user into clicking malicious links, entering credentials on a fake form, or performing unintended actions.
    • Affected Alerter Component:
      • Alerter.show(...) (and related functions that accept text/attributed string input as parameters)
      • Alerter.title (if it accepts and displays unsanitized input)
      • Alerter.text (if it accepts and displays unsanitized input)
      • Any custom views within an Alerter that display user-provided data without proper sanitization.
    • Risk Severity: Critical (if user input is directly displayed) / High (if indirect user input or data from external sources is displayed, and not properly sanitized).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict Input Validation & Sanitization: Rigorously validate and sanitize all input passed to Alerter. Use appropriate escaping (HTML encoding for web, attributed string sanitization for native). This is the primary defense.
      • Content Security Policy (CSP): (Web context) Implement a strict CSP to limit executable content, preventing injected scripts.
      • Output Encoding: Ensure all data displayed by Alerter is correctly encoded for the target context.
      • Template-Based Messages: Prefer pre-defined message templates with placeholders for dynamic data, never constructing messages directly from raw user input.
      • Avoid Rich Text/HTML: If possible, avoid allowing rich text or HTML in alerts. Use plain text.

Threat: Sensitive Information Disclosure

  • Description: The application directly displays sensitive information (API keys, session tokens, PII, internal error details) within Alerter messages due to a coding error or oversight. This is a direct misuse of the Alerter component.
    • Impact: Exposure of sensitive information to unauthorized individuals, leading to account compromise, identity theft, privacy violations, or other breaches.
    • Affected Alerter Component:
      • Alerter.show(...) (and related functions)
      • Alerter.title (if used to display sensitive data)
      • Alerter.text (if used to display sensitive data)
      • Custom views within an Alerter displaying sensitive data.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Code Review: Thoroughly review all code using Alerter to ensure sensitive information is never passed to it. This is the most critical mitigation.
      • Data Masking/Redaction: If sensitive data must be displayed (e.g., for debugging), mask or redact it before passing it to Alerter.
      • Alert Context Awareness: Consider where alerts are displayed. Avoid sensitive information in alerts visible to unauthorized users.
      • Conditional Alert Display: Implement logic to show detailed error messages only to authorized users (e.g., admins) and generic messages to regular users. Never expose internal error details to end-users via Alerter.