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Attack Surface Analysis for touchlab/kermit

Attack Surface: Sensitive Data Exposure

  • Description: Unintentional logging of sensitive information due to developer choices in how they use Kermit's logging functions.
    • Kermit Contribution: Kermit provides the mechanism for logging; the developer's code determines what data is passed to Kermit, and thus, what is logged. Kermit's flexibility, if misused, directly enables this vulnerability.
    • Example: A developer uses kermit.i { "User data: $userData" }, where $userData is a complex object containing sensitive fields like passwords or API keys. The entire object, including the sensitive data, is logged.
    • Impact:
      • Compromise of user accounts.
      • Data breaches and regulatory fines (GDPR, CCPA, etc.).
      • Reputational damage.
      • Financial loss.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict Logging Policies: A "deny-by-default" policy for what cannot be logged. Explicitly prohibit logging of PII, credentials, etc. This is a policy and process mitigation, enforced through training and code review.
      • Code Reviews: Mandatory code reviews with a specific focus on all uses of Kermit's logging functions. Reviewers must be trained to identify potential sensitive data exposure.
      • Automated Scanning (SAST): Integrate static analysis tools into the CI/CD pipeline. Configure custom rules to detect patterns indicative of sensitive data (e.g., variable names like password, token, regular expressions for credit card numbers).
      • Data Masking/Sanitization (Custom LogWriter): Implement a custom LogWriter that intercepts log messages before they are written. This LogWriter should automatically mask or redact sensitive data using regular expressions, string manipulation, or other techniques. This is a critical defense-in-depth measure, as it provides a safety net even if developers make mistakes.
      • Log Level Discipline: Use log levels appropriately. Debug and Verbose should never contain sensitive information and should be disabled in production. This reduces the likelihood of accidental exposure.
      • Developer Training: Mandatory training for all developers on secure logging practices, emphasizing the risks of sensitive data exposure and the proper use of Kermit.

Attack Surface: Log Injection

  • Description: Attackers inject malicious content into log messages by exploiting how developers use Kermit to log unsanitized user input.
    • Kermit Contribution: Kermit accepts strings as input for log messages. If these strings contain unsanitized user-provided data, injection is possible. Kermit's API allows this, making it a direct contributor.
    • Example: kermit.w { "User input: ${userInput}" } where userInput is directly from a web form without any validation or sanitization. An attacker could inject control characters, excessively long strings, or even HTML/JavaScript (if the log viewer is web-based).
    • Impact:
      • Log Forgery: Creation of fake log entries to mislead investigations.
      • Denial of Service (DoS): Injection of large strings or control characters to overwhelm the logging system or storage.
      • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): If the log viewing tool doesn't properly escape log entries, injected HTML/JavaScript could be executed in the viewer's browser. This is a major risk if logs are viewed through a web interface.
    • Risk Severity: High (can be Critical if XSS is exploitable and allows access to sensitive data or actions)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Input Validation and Sanitization: Never directly include raw user input in log messages passed to Kermit. Validate and sanitize all user-provided data before logging. This is the most important mitigation.
      • Encoding: Encode potentially dangerous characters (e.g., HTML entities) before passing them to Kermit's logging functions. The specific encoding depends on the log storage and viewing mechanism.
      • Custom LogWriter for Sanitization: Implement a custom LogWriter that automatically sanitizes log messages before they are written. This provides a centralized and consistent sanitization layer, acting as a second line of defense.
      • Secure Log Viewers: Ensure that any tools used to view logs properly handle and escape potentially malicious content to prevent XSS. This is not directly related to Kermit, but it's crucial for mitigating the impact of log injection.
  • Description: Security vulnerabilities within the Kermit library itself or in custom/third-party LogWriter implementations.
    • Kermit Contribution: Direct dependency on Kermit; any vulnerabilities in Kermit or chosen LogWriters become part of the application's attack surface.
    • Example: A hypothetical vulnerability in Kermit's string formatting logic could allow for code injection if exploited. Or, a custom LogWriter that sends logs to a remote server might have an authentication bypass vulnerability.
    • Impact: Varies widely depending on the specific vulnerability; could range from information disclosure to remote code execution.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the vulnerability)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Keep Kermit Updated: Regularly update Kermit to the latest version to benefit from security patches.
      • Dependency Scanning: Use dependency scanning tools (e.g., Dependabot, Snyk) to automatically detect and alert on known vulnerabilities in Kermit and its dependencies, including any third-party LogWriters.
      • Code Review (Custom LogWriters): Thoroughly review the code of any custom LogWriter implementations for security vulnerabilities. Apply the same security principles as you would to the main application code.
      • Vulnerability Disclosure Programs: If you develop a custom LogWriter for public use, consider establishing a vulnerability disclosure program to encourage responsible reporting of security issues.