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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for uber/ribs

Attack Surface: Insecure Inter-Interactor Communication

  • Description: Unprotected communication channels between RIB Interactors allow injection of malicious data or commands, compromising RIB functionality and data integrity.
  • RIBs Contribution: RIBs architecture inherently relies on Interactors communicating to coordinate application logic. Unsecured inter-interactor communication is a direct consequence of RIBs' modular design if not implemented securely.
  • Example: A compromised child RIB sends a crafted event with malicious SQL injection code within data intended for the parent Interactor. The parent Interactor, assuming data is safe due to origin within the RIBs structure, directly uses this data in a database query without sanitization, leading to SQL injection vulnerability.
  • Impact: Data corruption, unauthorized data access, privilege escalation, potential for remote code execution if vulnerabilities are severe enough (e.g., via command injection through inter-process communication in certain environments).
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict Input Validation: Implement rigorous input validation on all data received by Interactors from other RIBs, regardless of origin within the RIBs hierarchy.
    • Data Sanitization: Sanitize all data exchanged between Interactors to prevent injection attacks (SQL, command, etc.) before processing or using it in sensitive operations.
    • Secure Communication Protocols: If communication involves serialization or network transport (less common within a single application but possible in complex RIBs setups), use secure serialization methods and encrypted channels.
    • Principle of Least Privilege Interfaces: Design Interactor interfaces to be minimal and specific, limiting the data and actions exposed to other RIBs to only what is absolutely necessary.

Attack Surface: Event Bus Vulnerabilities (for RIB Communication)

  • Description: Exploitable vulnerabilities in a shared event bus used for RIB communication, allowing malicious event injection, eavesdropping, or denial-of-service.
  • RIBs Contribution: When RIBs utilize a shared event bus for decoupled communication, the security of this bus directly impacts the overall application security within the RIBs context. A compromised event bus can undermine the intended isolation and control within the RIBs architecture.
  • Example: An attacker injects a malicious event onto the event bus that triggers a critical business logic function in a seemingly unrelated RIB. Due to lack of proper event validation and authorization, the target RIB processes the malicious event, leading to unauthorized fund transfer in a banking application.
  • Impact: Data breaches, unauthorized actions, business logic bypass, denial-of-service, application-wide instability due to event flooding or disruption of critical event flows.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical (Critical if sensitive data or critical operations are managed via the event bus)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Event Bus Implementation: Use a well-vetted, security-focused event bus library or implement robust security measures if building a custom one.
    • Mandatory Event Validation: Implement mandatory validation of all events received from the event bus within subscribing Interactors.
    • Event Authorization: Implement authorization mechanisms to control which RIBs can publish and subscribe to specific event types, limiting potential for malicious event injection.
    • Rate Limiting & Monitoring: Implement rate limiting on event processing and monitor event bus activity for anomalies that could indicate malicious activity or denial-of-service attempts.

Attack Surface: Insecure Routing Logic & Deep Linking Exploits

  • Description: Flaws in RIBs Router's navigation logic, especially when handling external inputs like deep links, can be exploited to bypass security controls and access restricted parts of the application.
  • RIBs Contribution: RIBs Routers are the central navigation control point. Vulnerabilities in routing logic directly translate to vulnerabilities in application access control within the RIBs framework. Deep linking, a common feature in RIBs applications, introduces external input points into the routing process.
  • Example: A mobile application uses deep links to navigate to specific features managed by different RIBs. The Router's deep link handling logic is vulnerable to path traversal. An attacker crafts a malicious deep link that bypasses intended RIB attachment flow and directly navigates to a highly privileged administrative RIB, bypassing authentication checks meant for normal user flows.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive features, bypassing authentication and authorization mechanisms, privilege escalation, potential for arbitrary RIB attachment leading to unexpected application states.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Robust Routing Logic Design: Design routing logic with security as a primary concern, ensuring it is resistant to manipulation and bypass attempts.
    • Strict Input Validation for Routing Parameters: Thoroughly validate all inputs used in routing decisions, especially those originating from external sources like deep links, push notifications, or URL parameters.
    • Secure Deep Link Handling: Implement secure deep link handling practices, including proper validation, sanitization, and URL scheme registration to prevent malicious deep link injection.
    • Principle of Least Privilege in Routing Access: Implement routing access control based on user roles and permissions, ensuring users can only navigate to authorized RIBs based on their privileges.

Attack Surface: Builder Input Validation & Dependency Injection Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Lack of input validation in RIB Builders and insecure dependency injection practices can lead to code injection, malicious dependency injection, and compromised RIB instances.
  • RIBs Contribution: Builders are responsible for creating and configuring RIB instances. If Builders are vulnerable, the security of the entire RIB subtree they create is compromised from the outset. Dependency injection, often used in RIBs, can be an attack vector if not secured.
  • Example: A Builder takes a configuration string from an external source to initialize a RIB. This string is not validated and is directly used to construct a command that is then executed by the RIB during initialization. An attacker injects a malicious command within this configuration string, achieving remote code execution when the RIB is built. Alternatively, an attacker could manipulate the dependency injection mechanism to inject a malicious Service implementation, replacing a legitimate one and gaining control over RIB behavior.
  • Impact: Remote code execution, data corruption, malicious RIB instantiation, potential for persistent compromise if malicious dependencies are injected and reused across the application.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Mandatory Input Validation in Builders: Implement mandatory and rigorous input validation for all parameters accepted by RIB Builders.
    • Input Sanitization for Builders: Sanitize all inputs to Builders to prevent injection attacks before using them to configure RIBs or their dependencies.
    • Secure Dependency Injection Configuration: Carefully configure dependency injection frameworks to prevent injection of untrusted dependencies. Use compile-time dependency injection where possible to reduce runtime vulnerabilities.
    • Code Review of Builder Logic: Conduct thorough code reviews of Builder logic to identify and eliminate potential vulnerabilities related to input handling and dependency management.