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Attack Tree Analysis for uber/ribs

Objective: Compromise RIBs Application

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Compromise RIBs Application

    └── Exploit RIBs Architecture Weaknesses

        ├── **1. Exploit Routing Logic Flaws**
        │   ├── **1.1. Bypass Routing Checks**
        │   │   ├── **1.1.1. Manipulate Routing Parameters**
        │   └── **1.2. Redirect Routing to Unauthorized RIBs/States**
        │       ├── *1.2.1. Force Routing to Admin/Debug RIBs*
        │       └── *1.2.2. Bypass Authentication/Authorization RIBs*
        │   └── **1.3. Denial of Service via Routing**
        │       └── **1.3.2. Overload Routing System with Malformed Requests**

        ├── **2. Exploit Vulnerabilities in RIBs Component Logic (Interactors/Presenters/Views)**
        │   ├── **2.1. Vulnerabilities in Interactor Business Logic**
        │   │   ├── *2.1.1. Injection Flaws (if Interactor handles external input)*
        │   │   └── *2.1.2. Business Logic Errors leading to privilege escalation*
        │   ├── **2.2. Vulnerabilities in Presenter/View Logic (UI related)**
        │   │   ├── **2.2.1. UI Injection (if Presenter/View handles user input unsafely)**

        ├── **3. Exploit Inter-RIB Communication Weaknesses**
        │   └── **3.3. Information Leakage via Inter-RIB Communication**
        │       ├── **3.3.1. Sensitive data exposed in inter-RIB messages (logging, debugging)**

        ├── **4. Exploit Dependency Management (Builders) Issues**
        │   └── **4.2. Dependency Poisoning (Indirectly related to Builders)**
        │       ├── **4.2.1. Exploiting vulnerabilities in dependencies injected by Builders (general dependency management issue, but relevant in RIBs context)**

        └── 5. Exploit Hierarchy and State Inconsistencies across RIBs
            ├── 4.1. Builder Logic Vulnerabilities
                ├── *4.1.1. Manipulation of Builder configuration (if externally configurable - unlikely but consider edge cases)*

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Routing Logic Flaws -> Bypass Routing Checks -> Manipulate Routing Parameters

  • Attack Vector Description: Attackers manipulate parameters used in routing decisions (e.g., URL parameters, intent data, deep link parameters) to bypass intended routing logic.
  • Risk Estimations:
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Thoroughly validate and sanitize all routing parameters.
    • Implement robust input validation for routing decisions.
    • Use parameterized routing where possible to avoid direct string manipulation.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Routing Logic Flaws -> Redirect Routing to Unauthorized RIBs/States -> Force Routing to Admin/Debug RIBs

  • Attack Vector Description: Attackers attempt to force routing to administrative or debugging RIBs that are not intended for regular users, potentially exposing sensitive functionalities or data.
  • Risk Estimations:
    • Likelihood: Low
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Medium
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Ensure admin/debug RIBs are strictly protected and not accessible through regular routing paths.
    • Implement strong authentication and authorization for sensitive RIBs.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Routing Logic Flaws -> Redirect Routing to Unauthorized RIBs/States -> Bypass Authentication/Authorization RIBs

  • Attack Vector Description: Attackers attempt to bypass RIBs responsible for authentication and authorization, gaining unauthorized access to protected parts of the application.
  • Risk Estimations:
    • Likelihood: Low
    • Impact: Critical
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Medium
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Centralize authentication and authorization logic within dedicated RIBs and enforce them rigorously at routing entry points.
    • Ensure proper session management and token validation.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Exploit Routing Logic Flaws -> Denial of Service via Routing -> Overload Routing System with Malformed Requests

  • Attack Vector Description: Sending a large number of malformed or complex routing requests could overload the routing system, causing performance degradation or denial of service.
  • Risk Estimations:
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Low
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Implement rate limiting and input validation for routing requests to prevent abuse and overload.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Exploit Vulnerabilities in RIBs Component Logic -> Vulnerabilities in Interactor Business Logic -> Injection Flaws (if Interactor handles external input)

  • Attack Vector Description: If interactors directly handle external input without proper sanitization, they could be vulnerable to injection attacks (e.g., command injection, code injection).
  • Risk Estimations:
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: Low to Medium
    • Skill Level: Medium
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Apply secure coding practices within interactors.
    • Sanitize and validate all external inputs.
    • Avoid dynamic code execution based on user input.

Attack Tree Path: 6. Exploit Vulnerabilities in RIBs Component Logic -> Vulnerabilities in Interactor Business Logic -> Business Logic Errors leading to privilege escalation

  • Attack Vector Description: Flaws in the business logic within interactors could be exploited to bypass intended access controls or gain elevated privileges.
  • Risk Estimations:
    • Likelihood: Low
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Medium
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Thoroughly test and review interactor business logic for potential flaws.
    • Implement principle of least privilege and robust authorization checks within interactors.

Attack Tree Path: 7. Exploit Vulnerabilities in RIBs Component Logic -> Vulnerabilities in Presenter/View Logic -> UI Injection (if Presenter/View handles user input unsafely)

  • Attack Vector Description: If presenters or views handle user input and dynamically render UI without proper encoding, they could be vulnerable to UI injection attacks (e.g., XSS in web views, UI element injection in native apps).
  • Risk Estimations:
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Properly encode and sanitize user input when rendering UI elements.
    • Use UI frameworks that provide built-in protection against UI injection.

Attack Tree Path: 8. Exploit Inter-RIB Communication Weaknesses -> Information Leakage via Inter-RIB Communication -> Sensitive data exposed in inter-RIB messages (logging, debugging)

  • Attack Vector Description: Sensitive data might be unintentionally exposed in inter-RIB communication, especially in logging or debugging messages.
  • Risk Estimations:
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Low to Medium
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Avoid logging sensitive data in inter-RIB communication.
    • Implement proper logging and debugging practices that minimize information leakage in production environments.

Attack Tree Path: 9. Exploit Dependency Management (Builders) Issues -> Dependency Poisoning -> Exploiting vulnerabilities in dependencies injected by Builders (general dependency management issue, but relevant in RIBs context)

  • Attack Vector Description: If builders inject dependencies that have known vulnerabilities, the application becomes vulnerable through these dependencies.
  • Risk Estimations:
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: Medium to High
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Low (if vulnerability is public) / Medium (if zero-day)
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Maintain an inventory of dependencies used by the application.
    • Regularly scan dependencies for known vulnerabilities.
    • Use dependency management tools to update and patch vulnerable dependencies.

Attack Tree Path: 10. Exploit Dependency Management (Builders) Issues -> Builder Logic Vulnerabilities -> Manipulation of Builder configuration (if externally configurable - unlikely but consider edge cases)

  • Attack Vector Description: In rare cases, if builder configurations are externally modifiable or derived from untrusted sources, attackers might manipulate them to inject malicious components or dependencies.
  • Risk Estimations:
    • Likelihood: Very Low
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: High
    • Skill Level: High
    • Detection Difficulty: High
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Ensure builder configurations are securely managed and not derived from untrusted sources.
    • Implement integrity checks for builder configurations.