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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for uber/ribs

Attack Surface: Unintended RIB Activation/Deactivation

  • 1. Unintended RIB Activation/Deactivation

    • Description: Attackers manipulate application state to trigger the attachment or detachment of RIBs in an unintended sequence, leading to unexpected behavior or exposure of sensitive data/functionality.
    • How RIBs Contributes: RIBs' core mechanic is the dynamic attachment and detachment of RIBs based on application logic and user interaction. This dynamic nature, fundamental to RIBs, creates opportunities for manipulation.
    • Example: An attacker crafts a malicious deep link that forces the application to detach a currently active "UserProfileRIB" (displaying sensitive user data) and attach a "LoginRIB," potentially bypassing authentication checks if the LoginRIB doesn't properly re-validate the user session. This leverages the RIB lifecycle directly.
    • Impact: Exposure of sensitive data, unauthorized access to functionality, application instability, potential for privilege escalation.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the sensitivity of the data/functionality exposed).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer:
        • Strict Input Validation: Thoroughly validate all inputs that influence RIB lifecycle, including deep links, URL parameters, and data passed through streams (RxJava, etc.). Use whitelisting where possible. This is crucial because RIB attachment/detachment is often driven by these inputs.
        • Robust State Management: Implement strong state validation within each RIB's Interactor to prevent invalid state transitions, even if triggered by unexpected attach/detach calls. This directly addresses the statefulness of RIBs.
        • Defensive Router Logic: Routers (a core RIBs component) should handle unexpected attach/detach calls gracefully, preventing crashes or unintended state changes. Consider adding preconditions to attach/detach.
        • Fuzz Testing: Employ fuzz testing to identify potential race conditions and unexpected RIB lifecycle behavior. This is particularly important for the dynamic nature of RIBs.
        • Session Management: Ensure proper session management that is independent of RIB attachment/detachment. RIBs should not be solely responsible for authentication.
      • User: (Limited direct user mitigation, primarily relies on developer-side fixes)
        • Be cautious about clicking on links from untrusted sources.

Attack Surface: Unauthorized Inter-RIB Messaging

  • 2. Unauthorized Inter-RIB Messaging

    • Description: Attackers intercept, modify, or inject messages between RIBs to gain access to sensitive data or influence application behavior.
    • How RIBs Contributes: RIBs communicate through Listeners, shared services, or streams. This inter-RIB communication pattern is a defining characteristic of RIBs and creates potential interception points.
    • Example: If Listeners (a core RIBs concept) are improperly scoped, a malicious RIB could register itself to receive messages intended for another RIB, eavesdropping on sensitive data. This directly exploits the RIBs communication model.
    • Impact: Data leakage, unauthorized access to functionality, application manipulation, potential for privilege escalation.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the sensitivity of the data and the level of control gained).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer:
        • Narrowly Scoped Listeners: Use interfaces with the minimum necessary methods for Listeners (a key RIBs component). Avoid broad interfaces.
        • Sender/Receiver Validation: Validate the sender and intended receiver of all inter-RIB messages. Ensure they are authorized to communicate. This is crucial within the RIBs communication framework.
        • Secure Shared Services: If shared services are used within the RIBs context, implement strict access controls and consider encryption.
        • Dependency Injection Audits: Regularly review the dependency injection configuration (used extensively in RIBs) to prevent malicious component replacement.
      • User: (Limited direct user mitigation)
        • Install apps only from trusted sources.

Attack Surface: Malicious Component Injection (via Dependency Injection)

  • 3. Malicious Component Injection (via Dependency Injection)

    • Description: Attackers inject malicious components (Interactors, Presenters, Routers, Listeners) into the RIB tree, hijacking application control.
    • How RIBs Contributes: RIBs fundamentally relies on dependency injection for component management. This heavy reliance on DI is a core aspect of the RIBs architecture.
    • Example: An attacker exploits a vulnerability to replace a legitimate PaymentInteractor (a core RIBs component) with a malicious one. This directly targets the RIBs component structure.
    • Impact: Complete application compromise, data theft, financial loss, reputational damage.
    • Risk Severity: Critical.
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer:
        • Secure Dependency Injection Framework: Use a well-established and secure DI framework (e.g., Dagger 2) and keep it up-to-date. This is essential given RIBs' reliance on DI.
        • Static Dependency Definition: Define dependencies statically whenever possible. Avoid dynamic loading, which is riskier within the RIBs context.
        • Code Signing and Integrity Checks: Prevent loading of unauthorized code. This is crucial for protecting the integrity of RIBs components.
        • Secure Build Process: Ensure the build process is secure.
        • Regular Dependency Audits: Regularly review the dependency injection configuration (central to RIBs) to ensure only legitimate components are used.
      • User: (Limited direct user mitigation)
        • Install apps only from trusted sources.

Attack Surface: RIB State Manipulation

  • 4. RIB State Manipulation

    • Description: Attackers directly modify a RIB's internal state to cause unexpected behavior, bypass security checks, or gain unauthorized access.
    • How RIBs Contributes: Each RIB inherently manages its own state, which is crucial for its operation. This statefulness is a core property of RIBs.
    • Example: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in the UserProfileInteractor (a core RIBs component) to directly modify a state variable. This directly targets the internal state management of a RIB.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to functionality, privilege escalation, data corruption, application instability.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the privileges gained).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer:
        • Robust State Validation: Implement comprehensive state validation within the Interactor (a core RIBs component) to prevent invalid state transitions.
        • Immutable State: Use immutable data structures for the RIB's state. This makes direct modification much harder, protecting the RIB's internal state.
        • Encapsulation: Encapsulate the RIB's state and provide access only through well-defined methods (getters and setters) that include validation. Do not expose state variables directly. This is crucial for protecting the integrity of a RIB.
        • Input Validation: Validate all inputs that can affect the RIB's state.
      • User: (No direct user mitigation).