Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
49 lines (42 loc) · 5.77 KB

attack-surface.md

File metadata and controls

49 lines (42 loc) · 5.77 KB

Attack Surface Analysis for yiiguxing/translationplugin

Attack Surface: Insecure Communication with Translation Services (Man-in-the-Middle - MitM)

  • Description: Communication between the plugin and external translation APIs occurs over unencrypted channels (HTTP), allowing attackers to intercept and manipulate data in transit.
  • Translationplugin Contribution: The plugin initiates requests to external translation services. If it doesn't enforce HTTPS, it directly creates this vulnerability by design.
  • Example: An attacker on a shared network (e.g., public Wi-Fi) intercepts the HTTP request sent by the plugin to a translation API. They can read the text being translated, or modify the translated response to inject malicious content into the application.
  • Impact: Confidentiality breach (exposure of translated text), integrity compromise (modification of translations), potential for further attacks via injected malicious content.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Enforce HTTPS: The plugin must be designed to strictly enforce HTTPS for all communication with translation APIs. Configure the plugin to only use HTTPS endpoints.
      • Certificate Validation: Implement proper TLS certificate validation within the plugin to prevent downgrade attacks and ensure connection to legitimate translation services.
    • Users:
      • Use Secure Networks: Users should be educated to avoid using untrusted or public Wi-Fi networks when using the plugin for sensitive translations.
      • Verify Plugin Configuration: If the plugin offers configuration options related to communication protocols, users should verify and ensure HTTPS is enforced.

Attack Surface: API Key Exposure and Mismanagement

  • Description: API keys required to access translation services are stored insecurely by the plugin, making them accessible to unauthorized parties.
  • Translationplugin Contribution: The plugin is responsible for handling and storing API keys for translation service authentication. Insecure handling within the plugin's code directly leads to this vulnerability.
  • Example: API keys are hardcoded in the plugin's source code or stored in plain text configuration files by the plugin. An attacker gains access to the plugin's files and extracts the API keys.
  • Impact: Financial loss (unauthorized API usage costs), service disruption (quota exhaustion), potential misuse of translation service features by attackers.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Avoid Hardcoding Keys: The plugin's code must never hardcode API keys directly.
      • Secure Storage: The plugin should utilize platform-specific secure storage mechanisms (e.g., operating system's credential manager, secure keystore) to store API keys securely.
      • Encryption at Rest and in Transit: The plugin should encrypt API keys when stored and during any necessary transmission within the plugin's internal processes.
      • Secure Configuration Handling: If configuration files are used, the plugin must ensure they are stored securely with restricted access and consider encryption of sensitive data within them.
    • Users:
      • Secure Key Management Practices: Users should follow best practices for managing API keys provided by translation services, ensuring they are not exposed in insecure ways due to plugin usage.
      • Restrict File System Access: Users should ensure proper file system permissions to prevent unauthorized access to plugin configuration files where keys might be stored by the plugin.

Attack Surface: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in Translated Text Display

  • Description: Translated text, if not properly sanitized or encoded by the plugin before display, can contain malicious scripts that execute in the user's browser or application context.
  • Translationplugin Contribution: The plugin retrieves translated text from external services and is responsible for displaying it. Failure to sanitize the output within the plugin directly introduces the XSS vulnerability.
  • Example: A compromised translation service or a MitM attacker injects malicious JavaScript code into the translated text. When the plugin displays this text in a web view without proper encoding, the JavaScript code executes, potentially stealing user credentials, redirecting to malicious sites, or performing other malicious actions.
  • Impact: Client-side attacks (XSS), data theft, session hijacking, website defacement, malware distribution.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Output Encoding/Sanitization: The plugin must implement robust output encoding and sanitization for all translated text before displaying it. Use context-appropriate encoding (e.g., HTML encoding for web views, URL encoding for URLs). This is a critical responsibility of the plugin.
      • Content Security Policy (CSP): If the plugin operates in a web environment, it should implement Content Security Policy to further mitigate XSS risks.
    • Users:
      • Keep Plugin Updated: Users should ensure the plugin is updated to the latest version, as updates often include security fixes, especially for output handling.
      • Report Suspicious Translations: Users should be encouraged to report any unusual or suspicious content in translations, as this could indicate a potential security issue or compromise.