attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for zetbaitsu/compressor

Objective: Compromise Application via zetbaitsu/compressor Vulnerabilities

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Application via zetbaitsu/compressor Vulnerabilities

• Attack Vectors: This is the overarching goal. Attackers aim to leverage any weakness in zetbaitsu/compressor or its usage to compromise the application. This can be achieved through various means detailed below.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Input Handling Vulnerabilities

• Attack Vectors:
  • Malicious Image Upload (Image Parsing Exploits):
    • Attackers upload specially crafted image files (e.g., JPEG, PNG, GIF) designed to trigger vulnerabilities in the image parsing libraries used by zetbaitsu/compressor or its dependencies.
    • These vulnerabilities can include:
      • Buffer Overflows: Overloading buffers during image processing, potentially overwriting memory and leading to code execution.
      • Integer Overflows: Causing integer overflows during size calculations, leading to unexpected behavior or memory corruption.
      • Heap Overflows: Corrupting the heap memory during image processing, potentially leading to code execution.
  • Use of Vulnerable Image Parsing Libraries (Dependencies):
    • Attackers exploit known vulnerabilities (CVEs) in the image parsing libraries that zetbaitsu/compressor depends on (e.g., libraries for JPEG, PNG, GIF processing).
    • They leverage publicly available exploits or develop their own to target these CVEs.
    • Attack vectors involve uploading images that trigger the specific vulnerable code paths in these libraries.

Attack Tree Path: Malicious Image Upload (Image Parsing Exploits) [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: Achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • Successful exploitation of input handling vulnerabilities like buffer overflows, heap overflows, or known CVEs in image parsing libraries can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE).
  • Attackers can inject and execute arbitrary code on the server by carefully crafting malicious images that exploit these memory corruption vulnerabilities.
  • RCE allows attackers to gain full control over the server, potentially leading to data breaches, system compromise, and further attacks.

Attack Tree Path: Use of Vulnerable Image Parsing Libraries (Dependencies) [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: Identify and Exploit Known CVEs in Dependencies (e.g., libjpeg, libpng, etc.) [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: Achieve RCE [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: Image Bomb/Zip Bomb Style Attacks (DoS) [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • Attackers upload extremely large or complex image files (Image Bombs) that are designed to consume excessive server resources (CPU, memory, disk I/O) during the compression process.
  • These images are often crafted to have a very high compression ratio or require intensive processing, leading to resource exhaustion.
  • This can cause Denial of Service (DoS) by making the application unresponsive or unavailable to legitimate users.

Attack Tree Path: Exhaust Server Resources (CPU, Memory, Disk I/O) [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • The attack vector here is the crafted Image Bomb itself.
  • When the application attempts to process and compress the Image Bomb using zetbaitsu/compressor, the library will consume excessive resources trying to handle the complex or large image.
  • This resource exhaustion is the direct mechanism that leads to the DoS condition.

Attack Tree Path: Cause Application Unavailability [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • As server resources (CPU, memory, disk I/O) are exhausted by processing Image Bombs, the application's performance degrades significantly.
  • Eventually, the application may become unresponsive, crash, or be unable to handle legitimate user requests, resulting in application unavailability.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Dependency Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • zetbaitsu/compressor relies on external libraries (dependencies) for image processing tasks.
  • These dependencies may contain known security vulnerabilities (CVEs).
  • Attackers can identify outdated or vulnerable dependencies used by zetbaitsu/compressor by using dependency scanning tools or checking public vulnerability databases.
  • Once vulnerable dependencies are identified, attackers can exploit known CVEs in these libraries to compromise the application.

Attack Tree Path: Vulnerable Dependencies Used by zetbaitsu/compressor [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • The attack vector is the presence of vulnerable libraries within the dependency tree of zetbaitsu/compressor.
  • Common vulnerable dependencies in image processing contexts are often related to libraries like libjpeg, libpng, giflib, etc.
  • Attackers focus on exploiting vulnerabilities within these specific libraries.

Attack Tree Path: Identify Outdated or Vulnerable Dependencies [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • Attackers use automated tools (dependency scanners) or manual methods to analyze the dependencies of zetbaitsu/compressor.
  • They compare the versions of used libraries against public vulnerability databases (like CVE databases) to identify outdated or vulnerable components.
  • This identification step is crucial for targeting known vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Known CVEs in Dependencies [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • Once vulnerable dependencies and their CVEs are identified, attackers search for publicly available exploits or develop their own.
  • They craft attacks that leverage these known CVEs to target the application.
  • This often involves sending specific inputs (e.g., malicious images) that trigger the vulnerable code paths in the outdated dependencies.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Misconfiguration/Misuse of Compressor in Application

• Attack Vectors:
  • Even if zetbaitsu/compressor itself is secure, misconfigurations or improper usage within the application can introduce vulnerabilities.
  • This category focuses on how the application uses the compressor, rather than vulnerabilities within the compressor code itself.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure File Storage of Compressed Images [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • If the application stores compressed images in a publicly accessible location (e.g., a publicly accessible cloud storage bucket or web directory), attackers can directly access these images without authorization.
  • This leads to information disclosure if the compressed images contain sensitive data.

Attack Tree Path: Publicly Accessible Storage Location [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • The misconfiguration of the storage location itself is the attack vector.
  • This can be due to incorrect permissions settings on cloud storage, misconfigured web server directories, or other access control failures.

Attack Tree Path: Unauthorized Access to Compressed Images (Information Disclosure) [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • Attackers simply access the publicly accessible storage location using standard web browsers or tools.
  • They can list directory contents or directly request image files if they know the file names or paths.
  • This results in unauthorized access and potential information disclosure.

Attack Tree Path: Lack of Input Validation Before Compressor [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • If the application fails to validate user-provided input (e.g., uploaded image files) before passing it to zetbaitsu/compressor, it becomes vulnerable to all input handling attacks that the compressor or its dependencies might be susceptible to.
  • This lack of validation acts as a multiplier, amplifying the risk of all input-related vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: Application Passes Unvalidated User Input Directly to Compressor [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • The application code directly takes user-provided image data and feeds it into the zetbaitsu/compressor library without performing any checks or sanitization.
  • This direct passthrough of unvalidated input is the core attack vector, exposing the compressor to potentially malicious data.

Attack Tree Path: Expose Application to all Input Handling Vulnerabilities (above) [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vectors:
  • By passing unvalidated input, the application becomes vulnerable to all the input handling attack vectors described earlier (Malicious Image Upload, Image Parsing Exploits, etc.).
  • The lack of input validation essentially removes a crucial security layer, making the application directly susceptible to these attacks.