attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for zhanghai/materialfiles

Objective: Gain unauthorized access to files/directories OR execute arbitrary code on the device, leveraging vulnerabilities within the materialfiles library.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                 [Attacker's Goal: Gain unauthorized access to files/directories OR execute arbitrary code]
                                                    /                                                   \
                                                   /                                                     \
            **(High-Risk Path)**[Unauthorized File/Directory Access]          [Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE)]
                                  /                                                               \
                                 /                                                                 \
            **(High-Risk Path)**[Critical Node: Path Traversal]          **(High-Risk Path)**[Critical Node: Native Code Interface (JNI) Vulnerabilities]
                                                                                                /           \
                                                                                               /             \

(High-Risk Path)[Critical Node: Read (High-Risk Path)[Exploit JNI (High-Risk Path)[Exploit JNI Outside Allowed] to Load Arbitrary to Call Arbitrary Library] System Function]

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                                                                                [Critical Node: Unsafe Deserialization of Untrusted Data]

Attack Tree Path: Unauthorized File/Directory Access (High-Risk Path)

• Critical Node: Path Traversal

  • Description: An attacker manipulates file paths provided to the materialfiles library to access files or directories outside of the intended, restricted directory. This is often done by injecting ".." (parent directory) sequences or other special characters into the path.

  • Likelihood: Medium

  • Impact: High

  • Effort: Low

  • Skill Level: Intermediate

  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

  • Mitigation:

    • Strictly validate and sanitize all file paths.
    • Use a whitelist approach for allowed characters in paths.
    • Canonicalize paths before using them.
    • Avoid using user-provided input directly in file paths.
    • Thoroughly test for path traversal vulnerabilities using fuzzing and manual testing.

  • (High-Risk Path) Critical Node: Read Outside Allowed

    • Description: A specific instance of Path Traversal where the attacker successfully reads the content of a file outside the allowed directory.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Mitigation: Same as Path Traversal.

Attack Tree Path: Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE) (High-Risk Path)

• Critical Node: Native Code Interface (JNI) Vulnerabilities (High-Risk Path)

  • Description: If materialfiles uses JNI to interact with native code (C/C++), vulnerabilities in the native code (e.g., buffer overflows, use-after-free, integer overflows) can be exploited to achieve arbitrary code execution. This is a very high-risk area.

  • Likelihood: Medium

  • Impact: Very High

  • Effort: High

  • Skill Level: Expert

  • Detection Difficulty: Hard

  • Mitigation:

    • Thoroughly audit all JNI code.
    • Use memory safety tools (AddressSanitizer, Valgrind).
    • Consider rewriting critical JNI code in a memory-safe language (e.g., Rust).
    • Apply rigorous input validation to data passed to JNI functions.
    • Fuzz test the JNI interface extensively.

  • (High-Risk Path) Exploit JNI to Load Arbitrary Library

    • Description: An attacker leverages a JNI vulnerability to load a malicious shared library (.so file on Android) into the application's process. This gives the attacker full control.
    • Likelihood: Low
    • Impact: Very High
    • Effort: High
    • Skill Level: Expert
    • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard
    • Mitigation: Same as JNI Vulnerabilities, with a focus on preventing library loading.

  • (High-Risk Path) Exploit JNI to Call Arbitrary System Function

    • Description: An attacker uses a JNI vulnerability to directly call a dangerous system function (e.g., system(), execve()) with attacker-controlled arguments. This also leads to complete compromise.
    • Likelihood: Low
    • Impact: Very High
    • Effort: Very High
    • Skill Level: Expert
    • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard
    • Mitigation: Same as JNI Vulnerabilities, with a focus on preventing arbitrary function calls.

• Critical Node: Unsafe Deserialization of Untrusted Data

  • Description: If the library deserializes data from untrusted sources (files, network, user input) without proper validation, an attacker can craft malicious serialized data to execute arbitrary code upon deserialization.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard
  • Mitigation:
    • Avoid unsafe deserialization mechanisms if possible.
    • Use safer alternatives like JSON with schema validation.
    • If using Java's ObjectInputStream, implement strict whitelisting of allowed classes.
    • Thoroughly validate any data before deserialization.