attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for apache/incubator-apisix

Objective: Compromise Application via Apache APISIX

Attack Tree Visualization

1.0 Compromise Application via Apache APISIX [HIGH RISK PATH]
    ├── 1.1 Exploit Vulnerabilities in APISIX Core [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   ├── 1.1.1 Code Injection Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │   └── 1.1.1.1 Lua Injection in Route Configuration [CRITICAL NODE]
    │   ├── 1.1.3 Logic Bugs and Authentication/Authorization Flaws in APISIX Core [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   │   └── 1.1.3.1 Authentication Bypass in Admin API [CRITICAL NODE]
    │   └── 1.1.4 Dependency Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │       └── 1.1.4.1 Outdated Nginx or LuaJIT Versions [CRITICAL NODE]
    ├── 1.2 Exploit Vulnerabilities in APISIX Plugins [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   └── 1.2.1 Plugin Code Injection Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │       └── 1.2.1.1 Lua Injection in Plugin Configuration [CRITICAL NODE]
    ├── 1.3 Configuration Manipulation [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │   ├── 1.3.1 Unauthorized Access to Admin API [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    │   │   ├── 1.3.1.1 Weak or Default Admin API Credentials [CRITICAL NODE]
    │   │   ├── 1.3.1.2 Admin API Authentication Bypass [CRITICAL NODE]
    │   │   └── 1.3.1.3 Lack of Network Segmentation for Admin API [CRITICAL NODE]
    │   └── 1.3.2 Unauthorized Access to etcd (Configuration Backend) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
    │       ├── 1.3.2.1 Weak etcd Authentication/Authorization [CRITICAL NODE]
    │       └── 1.3.2.2 etcd Exposure to Untrusted Networks [CRITICAL NODE]
    └── 1.4 Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks via APISIX [HIGH RISK PATH]
        └── 1.4.1 Resource Exhaustion Attacks on APISIX [HIGH RISK PATH]
            └── 1.4.1.1 HTTP Flood Attacks [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: 1.0 Compromise Application via Apache APISIX [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Description: This is the overall goal of the attacker. It encompasses all potential attack vectors targeting Apache APISIX to ultimately compromise the application it protects.
• Attack Vectors (Summarized by Sub-Paths):
  • Exploiting vulnerabilities in APISIX core components.
  • Exploiting vulnerabilities in APISIX plugins.
  • Manipulating APISIX configuration.
  • Launching Denial of Service attacks via APISIX.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1 Exploit Vulnerabilities in APISIX Core [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Description: Attackers target vulnerabilities within the core APISIX codebase, including Nginx and LuaJIT, to gain unauthorized access or control.
• Attack Vectors (Summarized by Sub-Nodes):
  • Code Injection Vulnerabilities (Lua Injection, Nginx Config Injection, Server-Side Template Injection).
  • Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities (Buffer Overflow, Use-After-Free, Integer Overflow).
  • Logic Bugs and Authentication/Authorization Flaws in Core Logic.
  • Dependency Vulnerabilities (Outdated Nginx/LuaJIT, Vulnerable Lua Libraries, etcd Client Library).

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1 Code Injection Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Description: Attackers attempt to inject malicious code into APISIX configurations or components that will be executed by the system.
  • Attack Vectors (Summarized by Sub-Nodes):
    • 1.1.1.1 Lua Injection in Route Configuration [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Injecting malicious Lua code within route configurations, typically via the Admin API or configuration files. This code is then executed by the Lua engine during request processing.
      • Potential Impact: Arbitrary code execution on the APISIX server, potentially leading to full system compromise, data exfiltration, or service disruption.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.3 Logic Bugs and Authentication/Authorization Flaws in APISIX Core [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Description: Attackers exploit flaws in the core logic of APISIX, particularly in authentication and authorization mechanisms, to bypass security controls.
  • Attack Vectors (Summarized by Sub-Nodes):
    • 1.1.3.1 Authentication Bypass in Admin API [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Circumventing the authentication mechanisms protecting the Admin API. This could be due to vulnerabilities in the authentication logic itself.
      • Potential Impact: Unauthorized access to the Admin API, allowing attackers to fully control APISIX configuration, routes, plugins, and potentially backend services.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.4 Dependency Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Description: Attackers exploit known vulnerabilities in the software dependencies used by APISIX, such as Nginx, LuaJIT, and Lua libraries.
  • Attack Vectors (Summarized by Sub-Nodes):
    • 1.1.4.1 Outdated Nginx or LuaJIT Versions [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Exploiting known security vulnerabilities present in outdated versions of Nginx or LuaJIT that APISIX relies upon.
      • Potential Impact: Depending on the specific vulnerability, this could lead to remote code execution, denial of service, or other forms of compromise.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2 Exploit Vulnerabilities in APISIX Plugins [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Description: Attackers target vulnerabilities within APISIX plugins, either built-in or custom, to compromise APISIX or the application.
• Attack Vectors (Summarized by Sub-Nodes):
  • Plugin Code Injection Vulnerabilities (Lua Injection, Command Injection, SQL Injection).
  • Plugin Logic Bugs and Authentication/Authorization Flaws.
  • Plugin Dependency Vulnerabilities (Vulnerable Lua Libraries, Vulnerabilities in External Services).

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1 Plugin Code Injection Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Description: Similar to core code injection, but specifically targeting plugin configurations or code.
  • Attack Vectors (Summarized by Sub-Nodes):
    • 1.2.1.1 Lua Injection in Plugin Configuration [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Injecting malicious Lua code into plugin configurations, which is then executed within the plugin's context.
      • Potential Impact: Arbitrary code execution within the plugin environment, potentially leading to plugin compromise, data manipulation, or further exploitation of APISIX or backend services.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3 Configuration Manipulation [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Description: Attackers aim to gain unauthorized access to APISIX configuration and modify it for malicious purposes.
• Attack Vectors (Summarized by Sub-Nodes):
  • Unauthorized Access to Admin API (Weak Credentials, Authentication Bypass, Lack of Network Segmentation, API Vulnerabilities).
  • Unauthorized Access to etcd (Weak Authentication, etcd Exposure, etcd Vulnerabilities).
  • Configuration File Manipulation (Insecure Storage, Lack of Integrity Checks).

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.1 Unauthorized Access to Admin API [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

• Description: Gaining unauthorized access to the Admin API is a critical attack path as it provides full control over APISIX.
  • Attack Vectors (Summarized by Sub-Nodes):
    • 1.3.1.1 Weak or Default Admin API Credentials [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Using easily guessable or default credentials for the Admin API.
      • Potential Impact: Direct and immediate access to the Admin API, allowing full configuration control.
    • 1.3.1.2 Admin API Authentication Bypass [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the Admin API's authentication mechanism to bypass login requirements.
      • Potential Impact: Unauthorized access to the Admin API, bypassing intended security controls.
    • 1.3.1.3 Lack of Network Segmentation for Admin API [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Making the Admin API accessible from untrusted networks, increasing the attack surface and making it easier for attackers to attempt access.
      • Potential Impact: Increased risk of unauthorized access to the Admin API from external or less trusted networks.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.2 Unauthorized Access to etcd (Configuration Backend) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

• Description: etcd stores APISIX's configuration. Unauthorized access to etcd allows direct manipulation of the entire APISIX setup.
  • Attack Vectors (Summarized by Sub-Nodes):
    • 1.3.2.1 Weak etcd Authentication/Authorization [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Weak or missing authentication and authorization mechanisms protecting access to etcd.
      • Potential Impact: Direct access to etcd, allowing attackers to read and modify APISIX configuration data, potentially bypassing the Admin API entirely.
    • 1.3.2.2 etcd Exposure to Untrusted Networks [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Exposing etcd to untrusted networks, making it directly accessible to potential attackers.
      • Potential Impact: Increased risk of unauthorized access to etcd from external or less trusted networks.

Attack Tree Path: 1.4 Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks via APISIX [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Description: Attackers aim to disrupt the availability of the application by overloading or crashing APISIX.
• Attack Vectors (Summarized by Sub-Nodes):
  • Resource Exhaustion Attacks on APISIX (HTTP Floods, Slowloris, Plugin-Induced Exhaustion, ReDoS).
  • Amplification Attacks via APISIX Misconfiguration (Open Redirects, Reflection Attacks).

Attack Tree Path: 1.4.1 Resource Exhaustion Attacks on APISIX [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Description: Overwhelming APISIX with requests or operations that consume excessive resources, leading to service degradation or outage.
  • Attack Vectors (Summarized by Sub-Nodes):
    • 1.4.1.1 HTTP Flood Attacks [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Sending a large volume of HTTP requests to APISIX, exceeding its capacity to process them and exhausting resources like CPU, memory, and network bandwidth.
      • Potential Impact: Service degradation or complete outage of APISIX and the applications it protects, impacting availability and user experience.