Mitigation Strategy: Code Signing and Integrity Verification of the Patch Script
- Mitigation Strategy: Cryptographic Verification of JSPatch Script
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Description:
- Generation: Before deploying a JSPatch script, generate a cryptographic signature using a strong algorithm (e.g., ECDSA with SHA-256 or better). This uses a private key (kept extremely secure) to create a signature unique to the script's content.
- Distribution: Distribute the script and its signature.
- Verification (App Side):
- Before executing any code from the downloaded JSPatch script, the application retrieves the corresponding public key (securely embedded within the app).
- The app uses the public key and the downloaded signature to verify the integrity of the downloaded script.
- If verification fails, the script is immediately rejected. An error should be logged.
- If verification succeeds, proceed (with other checks).
- Hashing (Recommended): Calculate a SHA-256 hash of the original script. Store this hash securely within the app. Before signature verification, calculate the hash of the downloaded script. Compare. Reject if they don't match.
- Secure Storage: After successful verification, store the script securely (e.g., encrypted storage, Keychain).
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Threats Mitigated:
- Threat: Malicious Script Injection (Severity: Critical) - Attacker modifies the script to inject malicious code.
- Threat: Script Tampering (Severity: Critical) - Attacker alters the script's behavior.
- Threat: Unauthorized Code Execution (Severity: Critical) - Unverified code runs within the app.
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Impact:
- Malicious Script Injection: Risk significantly reduced.
- Script Tampering: Risk significantly reduced.
- Unauthorized Code Execution: Risk significantly reduced.
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Currently Implemented:
- Hashing is implemented in
NetworkManager.downloadPatch()
. Expected hash inSecurityConstants.swift
. - Basic HTTPS is used.
- Hashing is implemented in
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Missing Implementation:
- Full digital signature verification is not implemented.
- Secure storage after verification is not implemented.
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Mitigation Strategy: Secure Delivery of the Patch Script
- Mitigation Strategy: HTTPS with Certificate Pinning for JSPatch Downloads
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Description:
- HTTPS: All communication with the server hosting the JSPatch script must use HTTPS.
- Certificate Pinning:
- Identify: Get the server's SSL/TLS certificate (or its public key).
- Embed: Embed the certificate/public key in the app.
- Verification: During HTTPS connection:
- Get the server's certificate.
- Compare it to the embedded pin.
- If they match, proceed.
- If they don't match, terminate the connection and log an error.
- Regular Updates: Update the pinned certificate/key in the app when the server's certificate is renewed.
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Threats Mitigated:
- Threat: Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attack (Severity: Critical) - Attacker intercepts and modifies the JSPatch script.
- Threat: Eavesdropping (Severity: High) - Attacker listens to the communication (less critical for JSPatch than modification).
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Impact:
- MitM Attack: Risk significantly reduced.
- Eavesdropping: Risk reduced (HTTPS provides encryption).
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Currently Implemented:
- Basic HTTPS is used.
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Missing Implementation:
- Certificate pinning is not implemented.
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Mitigation Strategy: Strict Input Validation and Sanitization (within the JavaScript)
- Mitigation Strategy: Defensive JavaScript Programming within JSPatch Scripts
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Description:
- Minimize API Surface (Objective-C): Carefully design the Objective-C interface exposed to JSPatch. Only expose the absolute minimum needed.
- Input Validation (Whitelist - in JavaScript): In the JavaScript code, strictly validate all input from:
- User interaction.
- External sources.
- Arguments from Objective-C.
- Use whitelisting: define allowed values and reject anything else.
- Output Encoding (in JavaScript): If the JavaScript interacts with the UI, use proper output encoding to prevent injection attacks (e.g., HTML escaping for
UIWebView
). - Type Checking (in JavaScript): Use strict type checking.
- Regular Expressions (Careful Use - in JavaScript): If using regex, avoid ReDoS vulnerabilities.
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Threats Mitigated:
- Threat: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) (Severity: High) - If the script interacts with a
UIWebView
. - Threat: Code Injection (Severity: High) - Through unvalidated input.
- Threat: Logic Errors (Severity: Variable) - Due to improper input handling.
- Threat: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) (Severity: High) - If the script interacts with a
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Impact:
- XSS: Risk reduced.
- Code Injection: Risk reduced.
- Logic Errors: Risk reduced.
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Currently Implemented:
- Some basic input validation exists.
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Missing Implementation:
- Comprehensive, consistent whitelisting is not used.
- Output encoding is not consistently used.
- The Objective-C interface is too broad.
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Mitigation Strategy: Principle of Least Privilege (Objective-C Side)
- Mitigation Strategy: Minimize Exposed Objective-C Interface for JSPatch
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Description:
- Review: Review all Objective-C methods/properties exposed to JSPatch.
- Restrict: Remove access to anything not absolutely essential.
- Refactor: If needed, refactor Objective-C to create a limited, secure interface specifically for JSPatch.
- Documentation: Document the purpose and security of each exposed item.
- Regular Audits: Re-review the interface periodically.
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Threats Mitigated:
- Threat: Privilege Escalation (Severity: High) - Compromised script accesses sensitive data/functions.
- Threat: Unauthorized Access (Severity: High) - Through exposed methods.
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Impact:
- Privilege Escalation: Risk significantly reduced.
- Unauthorized Access: Risk significantly reduced.
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Currently Implemented:
- None. Wide range of methods exposed.
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Missing Implementation:
- Complete review and restriction needed.
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