attack-surface.md

Attack Surface Analysis for cocoanetics/dtcoretext

Attack Surface: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via HTML Injection

• Description: Execution of arbitrary JavaScript code within the user's browser by injecting malicious HTML content processed by dtcoretext.
• dtcoretext Contribution: dtcoretext parses and renders HTML. If the application allows untrusted HTML input to be processed by dtcoretext, it becomes a direct vector for XSS due to the library's HTML rendering capabilities.
• Example: An attacker injects the following HTML code as user input: <img src='x' onerror='alert("XSS Vulnerability!")'>. When dtcoretext renders this, the JavaScript alert("XSS Vulnerability!") will execute in the user's browser.
• Impact: Account takeover, session hijacking, data theft, defacement of the application, redirection to malicious websites.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Input Sanitization: Strictly sanitize all user-provided or untrusted HTML input before passing it to dtcoretext. Use a robust HTML sanitization library to remove or neutralize potentially malicious HTML tags and attributes.
  • Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement and enforce a strong Content Security Policy to control the resources the browser is allowed to load. This can significantly reduce the impact of XSS by restricting the execution of inline scripts and the sources from which scripts can be loaded.

Attack Surface: HTML/CSS Parser Bugs - Memory Corruption

• Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in dtcoretext's HTML or CSS parsing logic to corrupt memory, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution.
• dtcoretext Contribution: dtcoretext's core functionality relies on parsing HTML and CSS, often implemented in memory-unsafe languages like C++. Bugs in this parsing logic within dtcoretext can lead to memory corruption.
• Example: A crafted HTML input triggers a buffer overflow or use-after-free vulnerability in the C++ parsing code within dtcoretext. This could allow an attacker to overwrite memory and potentially execute arbitrary code on the server or client device.
• Impact: Arbitrary code execution, complete system compromise, data breach, denial of service.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Regular Updates: Prioritize keeping dtcoretext updated to the latest version. Security patches often address memory corruption vulnerabilities within the library itself.
  • Memory Safety Testing and Analysis: Conduct thorough memory safety testing and static/dynamic analysis of the application and dtcoretext integration to identify potential memory corruption issues. While direct code audit of dtcoretext might be less feasible, focus on how your application uses it and handles input.
  • Sandboxing and Isolation: If feasible, run the part of the application that processes dtcoretext in a sandboxed environment with limited privileges to contain the impact of potential memory corruption exploits originating from the library.

Attack Surface: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via Remote Resources

• Description: Exploiting dtcoretext to make requests to internal network resources or external services on behalf of the attacker by manipulating URLs for remote resources loaded by the library.
• dtcoretext Contribution: If dtcoretext is configured or used in a way that it fetches remote resources (images, stylesheets, etc.) based on URLs in the HTML, it becomes the component making the potentially malicious requests.
• Example: An attacker injects HTML like <img src="http://internal-server/sensitive-data">. If dtcoretext attempts to load this image, it could expose internal resources or services that are not intended to be publicly accessible.
• Impact: Unauthorized access to internal resources, data leakage, potential for further attacks on internal systems, denial of service of internal services.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Restrict Remote Resource Loading: Ideally, disable or severely restrict the loading of remote resources by dtcoretext if your application's functionality allows it.
  • URL Whitelisting: If remote resources are necessary, implement a strict whitelist of allowed domains or URL patterns for remote resources before passing URLs to dtcoretext for loading. Only allow loading resources from trusted and necessary sources.
  • Network Segmentation: Isolate the application server from internal networks and sensitive resources. Use firewalls and network access controls to limit the application's ability to access internal systems, even if dtcoretext is exploited for SSRF.

Attack Surface: Dependency Vulnerabilities

• Description: Vulnerabilities present in the external libraries or frameworks that dtcoretext depends on, which can be exploited through dtcoretext.
• dtcoretext Contribution: dtcoretext relies on underlying libraries for various functionalities. Vulnerabilities in these dependencies become relevant attack surfaces because they can be triggered through the normal operation of dtcoretext.
• Example: dtcoretext might depend on a specific version of a C++ library that has a known buffer overflow vulnerability. This vulnerability could be exploitable when dtcoretext processes certain types of HTML/CSS input that then trigger the vulnerable code path in the dependency.
• Impact: Varies depending on the nature of the dependency vulnerability. Could range from denial of service to arbitrary code execution, data breaches, etc.
• Risk Severity: Varies (High to Critical depending on the dependency and vulnerability)
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Dependency Scanning: Regularly scan dtcoretext and its dependencies for known vulnerabilities using security scanning tools.
  • Regular Updates: Keep dtcoretext and all its dependencies updated to the latest versions. Patch management is crucial for addressing known vulnerabilities in the entire dependency chain.
  • Vulnerability Monitoring: Subscribe to security advisories and vulnerability databases related to dtcoretext and its ecosystem to stay informed about newly discovered vulnerabilities in its dependencies.