Objective: Disrupt Application Functionality or Cause DoS
Attack Goal: Disrupt Application Functionality or Cause DoS [CRITICAL NODE] └───(AND)─ HIGH RISK PATH Exploit Large Number of Files [CRITICAL NODE] ├───(OR)─ HIGH RISK PATH Resource Exhaustion (DoS) [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├─── HIGH RISK PATH Inode Exhaustion [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └─── Action: Application attempts to create more files than inodes available after dataset usage. │ ├─── HIGH RISK PATH Memory Exhaustion [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └─── Action: Application attempts to load file paths or metadata of all files into memory. │ ├─── HIGH RISK PATH CPU Exhaustion │ │ └─── Action: Application performs operations that iterate over all files, consuming CPU (e.g., listing directories, file system traversal). │ └─── HIGH RISK PATH File System Performance Degradation │ └─── Action: Excessive file operations due to large dataset slow down the file system for the application and potentially other processes. └───(OR)─ HIGH RISK PATH Application Logic Vulnerabilities due to Scale [CRITICAL NODE] ├─── HIGH RISK PATH Path Length Issues │ └─── Action: Application's code or libraries cannot handle extremely long file paths generated by the deep directory structure. ├─── HIGH RISK PATH File System Operation Timeouts │ └─── Action: File system operations (listing, opening, etc.) on the large dataset take excessively long, leading to application timeouts or errors. └───(AND)─ HIGH RISK PATH Exploit Deep Directory Structure └───(OR)─ HIGH RISK PATH Recursive Function Vulnerabilities └─── Action: Application uses recursive functions to traverse the directory structure, leading to stack overflow or excessive resource consumption due to the depth.
Attack Tree Path: Disrupt Application Functionality or Cause DoS [CRITICAL NODE]:
- Description: This is the overarching goal of the attacker. Success means the application becomes unusable or severely degraded in performance.
- Likelihood: Medium to High (depending on application design and mitigations).
- Impact: High (Application outage, business disruption).
- Effort: Low to Medium (depending on specific attack vector chosen).
- Skill Level: Low to Medium (depending on specific attack vector chosen).
- Detection Difficulty: Low to Medium (standard monitoring can detect resource exhaustion, but distinguishing intent might require context).
Attack Tree Path: Exploit Large Number of Files [CRITICAL NODE] (High Risk Path):
- Description: Leveraging the sheer volume of files in
dznemptydataset
to overwhelm application resources or expose logic flaws. This is a critical enabler for several DoS attack vectors. - Likelihood: High (inherent characteristic of the dataset).
- Impact: Medium to High (depending on specific exploitation).
- Effort: Low (dataset is readily available).
- Skill Level: Low (basic understanding of file systems and application interaction).
- Detection Difficulty: Medium (detecting high file operation counts is possible, but needs context).
Attack Tree Path: Resource Exhaustion (DoS) [CRITICAL NODE] (High Risk Path):
- Description: Consuming excessive system resources (inodes, memory, CPU, file system I/O) by forcing the application to interact with the large dataset in a resource-intensive way.
- Likelihood: Medium (if application is not designed for large datasets).
- Impact: Medium to High (application slowdown to complete outage).
- Effort: Low (triggering application functionality that processes the dataset).
- Skill Level: Low (basic user interaction).
- Detection Difficulty: Low (standard resource monitoring).
- 3.1. Inode Exhaustion [CRITICAL NODE] (High Risk Path):
- Action: Application attempts to create more files than available inodes after dataset usage.
- Likelihood: Medium (if application creates temporary files or caches related to the dataset).
- Impact: High (prevents file creation, system instability).
- Effort: Low (application's normal operation or triggering file creation).
- Skill Level: Low (basic user interaction).
- Detection Difficulty: Medium (inode monitoring, correlation with application activity).
- 3.2. Memory Exhaustion [CRITICAL NODE] (High Risk Path):
- Action: Application attempts to load file paths or metadata of all files into memory.
- Likelihood: Medium (if application naively processes all file paths).
- Impact: Medium to High (application crash, DoS).
- Effort: Low (triggering dataset processing functionality).
- Skill Level: Low (basic user interaction).
- Detection Difficulty: Low (memory usage monitoring).
- 3.3. CPU Exhaustion (High Risk Path):
- Action: Application iterates over all files, consuming CPU (e.g., listing directories, file system traversal).
- Likelihood: Medium (if application performs frequent or inefficient file traversals).
- Impact: Medium (application slowdown, degraded performance).
- Effort: Low (triggering dataset processing functionality).
- Skill Level: Low (basic user interaction).
- Detection Difficulty: Low (CPU usage monitoring).
- 3.4. File System Performance Degradation (High Risk Path):
- Action: Excessive file operations slow down the file system for the application and potentially other processes.
- Likelihood: Medium (if application performs many concurrent or frequent file operations).
- Impact: Medium (application slowdown, system-wide performance impact).
- Effort: Low (triggering dataset processing functionality).
- Skill Level: Low (basic user interaction).
- Detection Difficulty: Medium (file system I/O monitoring, performance metrics).
- 3.1. Inode Exhaustion [CRITICAL NODE] (High Risk Path):
- Description: Flaws in application logic that are exposed or amplified by the scale of the dataset, leading to errors or DoS.
- Likelihood: Medium (common programming oversights in handling large datasets).
- Impact: Medium (application errors, degraded functionality, DoS).
- Effort: Low (using the dataset as input).
- Skill Level: Low (basic user interaction).
- Detection Difficulty: Low (error logs, application monitoring).
- 4.1. Path Length Issues (High Risk Path):
- Action: Application cannot handle extremely long file paths generated by the deep directory structure.
- Likelihood: Medium (path length limits are common).
- Impact: Medium (application errors, crashes).
- Effort: Low (dataset provides long paths).
- Skill Level: Low (basic user interaction).
- Detection Difficulty: Low (error logs showing path length errors).
- 4.2. File System Operation Timeouts (High Risk Path):
- Action: File system operations on the large dataset take excessively long, leading to application timeouts or errors.
- Likelihood: Medium (if application has short timeouts and processes the entire dataset).
- Impact: Medium (application errors, failures).
- Effort: Low (triggering dataset processing functionality).
- Skill Level: Low (basic user interaction).
- Detection Difficulty: Low (application logs showing timeouts).
- 4.1. Path Length Issues (High Risk Path):
Attack Tree Path: Exploit Deep Directory Structure (High Risk Path):
- Description: Utilizing the deep nesting of directories in
dznemptydataset
to trigger vulnerabilities related to directory traversal or recursion. - Likelihood: Medium (if application uses recursion or is sensitive to directory depth).
- Impact: Medium (application errors, DoS).
- Effort: Low (dataset structure is inherent).
- Skill Level: Low (basic user interaction).
- Detection Difficulty: Low (error logs, stack overflow errors).
- 5.1. Recursive Function Vulnerabilities (High Risk Path):
- Action: Application uses recursive functions to traverse the directory structure, leading to stack overflow or excessive resource consumption.
- Likelihood: Medium (if application uses recursion for deep traversal).
- Impact: Medium (application crash, DoS).
- Effort: Low (triggering dataset traversal functionality).
- Skill Level: Low (basic user interaction).
- Detection Difficulty: Low (application crashes, stack overflow errors in logs).
- 5.1. Recursive Function Vulnerabilities (High Risk Path):