Attack Surface: Denial of Service (DoS) via Animation Overload
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Denial of Service (DoS) via Animation Overload (Potentially High in specific scenarios)
- Description: An attacker overwhelms the application with requests or configurations that trigger excessive or complex Shimmer animations, leading to resource exhaustion.
- Shimmer's Contribution: Shimmer's core function is to create animations. Its flexibility in configuring these animations (number of layers, gradients, speed) creates the potential for abuse. This is the direct contribution.
- Example: An attacker repeatedly triggers a network request that causes the Shimmer effect to start and stop rapidly, or they manipulate input parameters (if any are exposed) to create an extremely complex shimmer animation with many layers and a long duration. This is particularly impactful on low-end devices or if Shimmer is used very extensively throughout the UI.
- Impact: Application slowdown, unresponsiveness, or crashes, particularly on lower-powered devices. User experience is severely degraded. If the application relies heavily on Shimmer for many UI elements, the impact is amplified.
- Risk Severity: Medium (Potentially High on low-end devices or in applications with pervasive Shimmer usage). The "High" rating is conditional.
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Developer:
- Rate Limiting: Implement strict rate limiting on any actions that trigger the Shimmer animation. This is crucial.
- Complexity Limits: Enforce hard limits on the complexity of the Shimmer effect (e.g., maximum number of layers, gradient stops, animation duration). These limits should be conservative.
- Resource Monitoring: Monitor CPU/GPU usage associated with Shimmer. Implement circuit breakers to disable or simplify the effect if thresholds are exceeded. This provides a safety net.
- Debouncing: Debounce calls to start/stop the shimmer effect to prevent rapid, repeated triggering.
- User:
- Device Settings (Limited): Users have very limited control; this is not a reliable mitigation.
- Developer: