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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for facebookincubator/socketrocket

Attack Surface: Malformed WebSocket Frame Handling

  • Description: Vulnerabilities arising from SocketRocket's improper parsing of invalid or malformed WebSocket frames sent by a malicious server. This can lead to unexpected behavior or memory corruption within the library.
  • SocketRocket Contribution: SocketRocket is directly responsible for parsing and processing incoming WebSocket frames. Vulnerabilities in its parsing logic are inherent to the library.
  • Example: A malicious server sends a WebSocket frame with an invalid opcode or an incorrect payload length. SocketRocket's parsing logic contains a buffer overflow vulnerability when handling this malformed frame, potentially allowing an attacker to overwrite memory.
  • Impact: Denial of Service (DoS), Remote Code Execution (RCE) if memory corruption is exploitable.
  • Risk Severity: Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Keep SocketRocket Updated: Regularly update to the latest version of SocketRocket. Security patches often address frame parsing vulnerabilities.
    • Fuzz Testing (SocketRocket Team/Advanced Users): For maintainers or advanced users, fuzz testing SocketRocket's frame parsing logic can proactively identify potential vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: WebSocket Handshake Downgrade Attacks

  • Description: Vulnerabilities where a malicious server attempts to manipulate the WebSocket handshake process to force a downgrade to an insecure or vulnerable protocol version, potentially bypassing security features.
  • SocketRocket Contribution: SocketRocket handles the client-side WebSocket handshake negotiation. If not implemented strictly according to specifications, it might be susceptible to downgrade attempts.
  • Example: A malicious server attempts to negotiate an older, less secure WebSocket protocol version during the handshake, which SocketRocket incorrectly accepts, leading to a connection with weaker security.
  • Impact: Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks become easier due to weakened security, potentially leading to data interception and manipulation.
  • Risk Severity: High.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enforce Secure Protocol Versions (SocketRocket Configuration/Underlying Platform): Ensure SocketRocket and the underlying platform it relies on are configured to prioritize and enforce the latest secure WebSocket protocol versions (e.g., RFC 6455) and reject negotiation of older, vulnerable versions if possible.
    • TLS/SSL is Mandatory (Application Level): Always use WebSocket over TLS/SSL (wss://). This is a general application security practice, but crucial when using SocketRocket to protect the handshake and subsequent communication from downgrade attempts.

Attack Surface: Insufficient TLS/SSL Certificate Validation (SocketRocket Configuration)

  • Description: While primarily a configuration issue, if SocketRocket or the application using it is configured in a way that bypasses or weakens TLS/SSL certificate validation, it creates a critical vulnerability. This is about how SocketRocket uses TLS/SSL.
  • SocketRocket Contribution: SocketRocket relies on the underlying platform's TLS/SSL implementation. Misconfiguration in how SocketRocket or the application utilizes this can lead to bypassed certificate validation.
  • Example: An application using SocketRocket is configured to explicitly trust all certificates, or ignores certificate validation errors reported by the underlying TLS/SSL library. This allows an attacker with a fraudulent certificate to perform a MITM attack.
  • Impact: Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks, complete compromise of confidentiality and integrity of WebSocket communication.
  • Risk Severity: Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Default to Strict Certificate Validation (Application Configuration): Ensure the application using SocketRocket relies on the platform's default, secure certificate validation mechanisms without explicitly disabling or weakening them.
    • Avoid Custom, Insecure Certificate Handling (Application Development): Refrain from implementing custom certificate validation logic that might introduce vulnerabilities, such as blindly trusting all certificates or ignoring validation errors.
    • Certificate Pinning (Advanced & Application Level): For highly sensitive applications, consider certificate pinning at the application level to enforce a specific set of trusted certificates, further reducing the risk of MITM attacks.

Attack Surface: Memory Management Errors (Use-After-Free, Double-Free) within SocketRocket

  • Description: Critical memory management bugs within SocketRocket's code, such as use-after-free or double-free vulnerabilities. These can lead to memory corruption and potentially arbitrary code execution.
  • SocketRocket Contribution: SocketRocket manages memory for WebSocket connections, frame buffers, and internal data structures. Bugs in its memory management logic are direct vulnerabilities within the library.
  • Example: A use-after-free vulnerability is triggered in SocketRocket when a WebSocket connection is closed under specific conditions, allowing an attacker to potentially overwrite freed memory and gain control of program execution.
  • Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), Denial of Service (DoS) due to crashes.
  • Risk Severity: Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Keep SocketRocket Updated: Regularly update to the latest version of SocketRocket. Memory management bugs are critical and are often prioritized for fixes in library updates.
    • Memory Profiling and Testing (SocketRocket Team/Advanced Users): For maintainers or advanced users, rigorous memory profiling and testing of SocketRocket, especially under stress and various connection scenarios, can help identify and prevent memory management issues.

Attack Surface: Denial of Service (DoS) through Resource Exhaustion in SocketRocket

  • Description: Vulnerabilities in SocketRocket that allow a malicious server or attacker to exhaust client-side resources (CPU, memory) by sending a flood of messages or large frames, leading to a Denial of Service.
  • SocketRocket Contribution: SocketRocket's handling of incoming messages and resource allocation directly impacts its susceptibility to resource exhaustion DoS attacks. Inefficient handling or lack of proper limits within SocketRocket can be exploited.
  • Example: A malicious server sends an extremely large number of small messages or excessively large frames to the client. SocketRocket's processing of these messages consumes excessive CPU or memory, causing the client application to become unresponsive or crash.
  • Impact: Denial of Service (DoS), making the application unusable.
  • Risk Severity: High.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Keep SocketRocket Updated: Updates may include improvements in resource management and DoS protection.
    • Rate Limiting/Message Size Limits (Application Level): While not directly in SocketRocket, the application using it can implement higher-level rate limiting or message size limits to mitigate DoS attacks. However, efficient resource handling within SocketRocket is the first line of defense.
    • Resource Monitoring (Application/System Level): Monitor resource usage (CPU, memory) of applications using SocketRocket to detect and respond to potential DoS attacks.