Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
44 lines (37 loc) · 4.48 KB

File metadata and controls

44 lines (37 loc) · 4.48 KB

Attack Surface Analysis for flipboard/flanimatedimage

  • Description: Writing data beyond allocated memory during GIF or APNG image parsing within flanimatedimage. This memory corruption can lead to crashes or arbitrary code execution.
  • flanimatedimage contribution: Vulnerabilities in flanimatedimage's parsing logic for GIF and APNG formats, specifically in handling image dimensions, frame sizes, or chunk lengths, can cause buffer overflows.
  • Example: A maliciously crafted GIF with an oversized frame is loaded by flanimatedimage. Parsing code in flanimatedimage incorrectly calculates buffer size, leading to memory corruption when processing frame data.
  • Impact:
    • Denial of Service (DoS) - Application crash.
    • Remote Code Execution (RCE) - Potential to execute arbitrary code on the device.
  • Risk Severity: Critical (potential RCE), High (DoS).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Update flanimatedimage: Immediately update to the latest version. Security updates often patch parsing vulnerabilities.
    • Input Source Restriction (Application Level): Limit image loading to trusted sources to reduce the likelihood of encountering malicious images.
    • Sandboxing (OS Level): Utilize OS-level sandboxing to contain potential exploits within the application's sandbox.
  • Description: Arithmetic errors in flanimatedimage's image processing due to integer overflows or underflows. This can lead to incorrect memory allocation and subsequent buffer overflows or logic errors.
  • flanimatedimage contribution: flanimatedimage performs calculations on image metadata during parsing. Integer overflow/underflow in these calculations within flanimatedimage can cause memory corruption or unexpected behavior.
  • Example: A malicious APNG with extremely large dimensions in its header is processed by flanimatedimage. Integer overflow occurs when flanimatedimage calculates buffer size based on these dimensions, resulting in a smaller-than-needed buffer and a later buffer overflow.
  • Impact:
    • Denial of Service (DoS) - Application crash due to memory corruption.
    • Potential for incorrect rendering.
  • Risk Severity: High (potential DoS and memory corruption).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Update flanimatedimage: Use the latest version of flanimatedimage with potential fixes for integer handling issues.
    • Resource Limits (Application Level): Impose limits on maximum image dimensions processed by your application to prevent triggering integer overflows related to size.
  • Description: If flanimatedimage uses string formatting functions with unsanitized input from image files (like GIF comments), attackers could inject format specifiers to read memory, write memory, or cause crashes.
  • flanimatedimage contribution: Potentially, if flanimatedimage processes and logs or uses data from image metadata (like GIF comments) in string formatting functions without proper sanitization, it could be vulnerable.
  • Example: A GIF comment field is crafted with format string specifiers (e.g., %s, %n). If flanimatedimage processes this comment using a vulnerable string formatting function without sanitizing the input, it could lead to memory corruption or information disclosure.
  • Impact:
    • Denial of Service (DoS) - Application crash.
    • Information Disclosure - Reading sensitive memory data.
    • Remote Code Execution (RCE) - Potential to write to arbitrary memory locations.
  • Risk Severity: High (potential RCE or information disclosure).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Code Review (Library Level): Review flanimatedimage source code for usage of string formatting functions with external input.
    • Update flanimatedimage: Update to the latest version if format string vulnerabilities are identified and patched.
    • Secure Coding Practices (Library Development - if contributing): Avoid using string formatting functions with user-controlled input or sanitize input rigorously.