attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for forkingdog/uitableview-fdtemplatelayoutcell

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code OR Cause Denial of Service (DoS)

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Execute Arbitrary Code OR Cause Denial of Service (DoS) ├── 1. Exploit Caching Mechanism [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 1.1 Cache Poisoning (DoS or Code Execution) [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 1.1.1 Manipulate Cache Key Generation (DoS) │ │ │ └── 1.1.1.1 Inject excessively long or complex data into fields used for key generation. [CRITICAL] │ │ ├── 1.1.2 Overwrite Valid Cache Entries with Malicious Data (Code Execution) [HIGH RISK] │ │ │ ├── 1.1.2.1 Bypass cache validation checks (if any). [CRITICAL] │ │ │ └── 1.1.2.2 Craft malicious data that, when rendered, executes code (e.g., via a template injection). [CRITICAL] │ └── 1.3 Bypass intended caching behavior │ └── 1.3.1.1 Manipulate input data to bypass caching logic. [CRITICAL] ├── 2. Exploit Template Rendering (Code Execution) [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 2.1 Template Injection [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 2.1.1 Inject malicious code into data that is rendered by the template engine (if a template engine is used internally). [CRITICAL] │ │ └── 2.1.2 Bypass input sanitization or escaping mechanisms. [CRITICAL] ├── 3. Exploit Layout Calculation (DoS) │ ├── 3.1 Trigger Excessive Layout Calculations │ │ └── 3.1.1 Provide deeply nested or complex views that require exponential calculation time. [CRITICAL] │ └── 3.2 Memory Exhaustion │ └── 3.2.1 Provide data that leads to the creation of an extremely large number of UI elements. [CRITICAL] └── 4. Exploit Dependencies └── 4.1 Vulnerability in a third-party library used by UITableView-FDTemplateLayoutCell. [HIGH RISK] └── 4.1.1 Identify and exploit known vulnerabilities in the dependency. [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Caching Mechanism

• 1. Exploit Caching Mechanism [HIGH RISK]

  • 1.1 Cache Poisoning (DoS or Code Execution) [HIGH RISK]: The attacker attempts to insert malicious data into the cache, which is then served to other users or used by the application itself. This can lead to either a denial-of-service (if the cached data causes crashes or excessive resource consumption) or arbitrary code execution (if the cached data contains executable code).

    • 1.1.1 Manipulate Cache Key Generation (DoS)

      • 1.1.1.1 Inject excessively long or complex data into fields used for key generation. [CRITICAL]:
        • Description: The attacker provides input data that, when used to generate the cache key, results in an excessively long key, a hash collision, or some other undesirable outcome that disrupts the caching mechanism.
        • Example: If the cache key is based on a user-provided string, the attacker might provide a string that is thousands of characters long.
        • Mitigation: Strictly validate and limit the size and complexity of all input used for cache key generation. Use a robust hashing algorithm.

    • 1.1.2 Overwrite Valid Cache Entries with Malicious Data (Code Execution) [HIGH RISK]: This is the core of a cache poisoning attack aimed at code execution.

      • 1.1.2.1 Bypass cache validation checks (if any). [CRITICAL]:
        • Description: The attacker finds a way to circumvent any checks that are in place to ensure the integrity of cached data.
        • Example: If the cache uses a checksum to validate entries, the attacker might find a way to calculate a valid checksum for their malicious data.
        • Mitigation: Implement strong cache validation using cryptographic techniques (e.g., digital signatures or HMACs).
      • 1.1.2.2 Craft malicious data that, when rendered, executes code (e.g., via a template injection). [CRITICAL]:
        • Description: The attacker crafts data that, when processed by the application (e.g., during rendering), will execute arbitrary code. This often involves exploiting a template injection vulnerability.
        • Example: If the cached data is used in a template, the attacker might inject template directives that execute code.
        • Mitigation: Ensure that all data retrieved from the cache is treated as untrusted and is properly sanitized/escaped before being used.

    • 1.3 Bypass intended caching behavior

      • 1.3.1.1 Manipulate input data to bypass caching logic. [CRITICAL]:
        • Description: The attacker provides input that is designed to make the application believe that a cache entry is invalid or does not exist, forcing a recalculation.
        • Example: If the caching logic depends on certain input parameters, the attacker might manipulate those parameters to force a cache miss.
        • Mitigation: Ensure that the caching logic is robust and cannot be easily bypassed by manipulating input data. Thoroughly test the caching mechanism with various input combinations.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Template Rendering

• 2. Exploit Template Rendering (Code Execution) [HIGH RISK]: This attack vector is relevant if the library uses any form of template engine to render cell content.

  • 2.1 Template Injection [HIGH RISK]: The attacker injects malicious code into the template, which is then executed by the template engine.

    • 2.1.1 Inject malicious code into data that is rendered by the template engine (if a template engine is used internally). [CRITICAL]:

      • Description: The attacker provides input data that contains code that the template engine will execute.
      • Example: If the template engine uses {{ ... }} for expressions, the attacker might inject {{ system('rm -rf /') }}.
      • Mitigation: Use a secure template engine that automatically escapes output. If a custom template engine is used, implement rigorous escaping.

    • 2.1.2 Bypass input sanitization or escaping mechanisms. [CRITICAL]:

      • Description: The attacker finds a way to circumvent any input sanitization or escaping that is in place, allowing their malicious code to reach the template engine.
      • Example: The attacker might use double encoding or other techniques to bypass filters.
      • Mitigation: Use a well-vetted sanitization library and ensure that it's configured correctly. Test the sanitization thoroughly with various attack payloads.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Layout Calculation

• 3. Exploit Layout Calculation (DoS)

  • 3.1 Trigger Excessive Layout Calculations

    • 3.1.1 Provide deeply nested or complex views that require exponential calculation time. [CRITICAL]:
      • Description: The attacker provides input that describes a view hierarchy that is so complex that it takes an extremely long time to calculate the layout.
      • Example: The attacker might create a deeply nested hierarchy of views, where each level depends on the layout of the previous level.
      • Mitigation: Limit the depth and complexity of view hierarchies that can be created from user input.

  • 3.2 Memory Exhaustion

    • 3.2.1 Provide data that leads to the creation of an extremely large number of UI elements. [CRITICAL]:
      • Description: The attacker provides input that causes the application to create a huge number of UI elements, consuming all available memory.
      • Example: The attacker might provide data that represents a list with millions of items.
      • Mitigation: Limit the number of UI elements that can be created from user input.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Dependencies

• 4. Exploit Dependencies [HIGH RISK]

  • 4.1 Vulnerability in a third-party library used by UITableView-FDTemplateLayoutCell. [HIGH RISK]: The library itself might be secure, but a dependency could have vulnerabilities.

    • 4.1.1 Identify and exploit known vulnerabilities in the dependency. [CRITICAL]:
      • Description: The attacker researches known vulnerabilities in the library's dependencies and exploits them.
      • Example: The attacker finds a known vulnerability in a library used for image processing and uses it to execute code.
      • Mitigation: Keep all dependencies up-to-date. Use a dependency vulnerability scanner.