attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for ibireme/yytext

Objective: RCE, Data Exfiltration, or DoS via YYText Exploitation

Attack Tree Visualization

Attacker Goal: RCE, Data Exfiltration, or DoS via YYText Exploitation

├── 1.  Remote Code Execution (RCE)  [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├── 1.1  Exploit Buffer Overflow in YYText Core  [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├── 1.1.1  Craft Malicious Input (e.g., extremely long text, specially crafted Unicode) [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   └── 1.1.1.1.2  Bypass input validation in the *application* using YYText. [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├── 1.2  Exploit Logic Errors in YYText Parsing/Rendering [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├── 1.2.1  Craft Malicious Input to Trigger Unexpected Behavior [CRITICAL NODE]
│   └── 1.3 Exploit Deserialization Vulnerabilities (if applicable)
│       └── 1.3.1 If YYText uses any form of deserialization for attributed strings or configurations. [CRITICAL NODE - IF APPLICABLE]
├── 2.  Data Exfiltration
│   └── 2.2  Exfiltrate Data Through Application Using YYText  [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│       └── 2.2.1  If the application displays YYText output without proper sanitization. [CRITICAL NODE]
└── 3.  Denial of Service (DoS)
    ├── 3.1  Crash YYText (and thus the Application) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    │   ├── 3.1.1  Craft Input to Trigger Segmentation Faults/Exceptions [CRITICAL NODE]
    └── 3.1.2  Cause Infinite Loops or Resource Exhaustion [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        └── 3.1.2.1  Provide input that triggers excessive memory allocation. [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Remote Code Execution (RCE)

• 1.1 Exploit Buffer Overflow in YYText Core [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Description: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in YYText's memory management by providing input that exceeds buffer boundaries, potentially overwriting critical memory regions and gaining control of program execution.
  • Critical Nodes:
    • 1.1.1 Craft Malicious Input: The attacker creates specially crafted input, such as extremely long strings or unusual Unicode sequences, designed to trigger a buffer overflow.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Medium
      • Skill Level: Medium
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • 1.1.1.1.2 Bypass input validation in the application using YYText: The attacker circumvents any input validation implemented by the application, allowing the malicious input to reach YYText. This highlights the application's responsibility.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Medium
      • Detection Difficulty: Low

• 1.2 Exploit Logic Errors in YYText Parsing/Rendering [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Description: Attackers exploit flaws in YYText's parsing or rendering logic to cause unexpected behavior, potentially leading to code execution in unintended contexts.
  • Critical Nodes:
    • 1.2.1 Craft Malicious Input to Trigger Unexpected Behavior: The attacker creates input that, while not necessarily overflowing buffers, exploits inconsistencies or edge cases in YYText's logic to trigger unintended code paths.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Medium
      • Skill Level: Medium
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium

• 1.3 Exploit Deserialization Vulnerabilities (if applicable) [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Description: If YYText uses deserialization of data (e.g., to load configurations or attributed strings), attackers can craft malicious serialized data to execute arbitrary code.
  • Critical Nodes:
    • 1.3.1 If YYText uses any form of deserialization for attributed strings or configurations. [CRITICAL NODE - IF APPLICABLE]: This node's criticality depends entirely on whether YYText uses deserialization. If it does, this is a very high-risk area.
      • Likelihood: Low (conditional on deserialization being used)
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Medium
      • Skill Level: Medium
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 2. Data Exfiltration

• 2.2 Exfiltrate Data Through Application Using YYText [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Description: Attackers leverage vulnerabilities in how the application handles YYText output to exfiltrate data. This often involves injecting malicious content (e.g., JavaScript in a web application) that steals data.
  • Critical Nodes:
    • 2.2.1 If the application displays YYText output without proper sanitization. [CRITICAL NODE]: This highlights the application's responsibility to sanitize output and prevent injection attacks.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: Medium
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Medium
      • Detection Difficulty: Low

Attack Tree Path: 3. Denial of Service (DoS)

• 3.1 Crash YYText (and thus the Application) [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Description: Attackers provide input designed to cause YYText (and consequently, the application) to crash, resulting in a denial of service.
  • Critical Nodes:
    • 3.1.1 Craft Input to Trigger Segmentation Faults/Exceptions [CRITICAL NODE]: The attacker creates input that causes a segmentation fault or unhandled exception within YYText, leading to a crash.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: Medium
      • Effort: Low
      • Skill Level: Low
      • Detection Difficulty: Low

• 3.1.2 Cause Infinite Loops or Resource Exhaustion [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Description: Attackers provide input that causes YYText to consume excessive resources (CPU, memory), leading to a denial of service.
  • Critical Nodes:
    • 3.1.2.1 Provide input that triggers excessive memory allocation. [CRITICAL NODE]: The attacker crafts input that forces YYText to allocate a large amount of memory, potentially exhausting available resources.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: Medium
      • Effort: Medium
      • Skill Level: Medium
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium