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Attack Tree Analysis for jdg/mbprogresshud

Objective: Degrade UX or Mislead User via MBProgressHUD Manipulation (leading to DoS or Phishing-like attack)

Attack Tree Visualization

Attacker's Goal: Degrade UX or Mislead User via MBProgressHUD Manipulation (leading to DoS or Phishing-like attack)

├── 1. Manipulate HUD Display (OR) │ ├── 1.3 Cause HUD to Persist Indefinitely (Denial of Service - UI Blocking) (AND) [HIGH-RISK] │ │ ├── 1.3.1 Gain Code Execution within the Application [CRITICAL] │ │ ├── 1.3.2 Access and Modify MBProgressHUD Instance │ │ │ ├── 1.3.2.1 Find a reference to the HUD object. │ │ │ ├── 1.3.2.2 Prevent calls to hideAnimated: or similar methods. │ │ │ │ ├── 1.3.2.2.2 Continuously calling showAnimated: or preventing the completion block from executing. [HIGH-RISK] │ │ ├── 1.3.3 (Optional) Disable User Interaction with the Underlying View (AND) │ │ │ ├── 1.3.3.1 Ensure MBProgressHUD is added to a high-level view. │ │ │ ├── 1.3.3.2 Set userInteractionEnabled to YES on the HUD. │ ├── 1.5 Exploit Potential Memory Management Issues (Unlikely, but worth considering) (OR) │ │ ├── 1.5.2 Trigger Use-After-Free or Double-Free (Highly Unlikely without a specific bug) │ │ │ ├── 1.5.2.1 Requires a specific vulnerability in MBProgressHUD's memory management. [CRITICAL] │ │ │ ├── 1.5.2.2 Gain Code Execution to precisely control the timing. [CRITICAL]

├── 2. Facilitate a Phishing-like Attack (AND) ├── 2.2 Trick User into Entering Sensitive Information (AND) │ ├── 2.2.2 The application (or another compromised component) must be able to capture the user's input. [CRITICAL] ├── 2.1 Manipulate HUD to Mimic a Legitimate System Prompt or Another Application's UI (AND) │ ├── 2.1.1 Gain Code Execution [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: Gain Code Execution within the Application [CRITICAL]

  • Description: This is the foundational step for almost all attacks. The attacker needs to find a way to execute arbitrary code within the context of the iOS application. This is not specific to MBProgressHUD; it's a general application security concern.
  • How it's Exploited:
    • Exploiting a buffer overflow vulnerability in the application or a linked library.
    • Exploiting a format string vulnerability.
    • Exploiting an injection vulnerability (e.g., code injection, command injection).
    • Exploiting a deserialization vulnerability.
    • Leveraging a compromised third-party library.
    • Exploiting a vulnerability in the iOS operating system itself (less likely, but possible).
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: High
  • Skill Level: Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: Cause HUD to Persist Indefinitely (Denial of Service - UI Blocking) [HIGH-RISK]

  • Description: After gaining code execution, the attacker manipulates the MBProgressHUD to remain visible indefinitely, blocking the user interface and preventing interaction with the application.
  • How it's Exploited:
    • Find a reference to the HUD object (1.3.2.1): The attacker needs to locate the MBProgressHUD instance in memory. This might involve traversing the view hierarchy or inspecting object references.
    • Prevent calls to hideAnimated: (1.3.2.2): The core of the DoS attack. The attacker prevents the application from dismissing the HUD.
      • Continuously calling showAnimated: (1.3.2.2.2) [HIGH-RISK]: This is a simple and effective method. The attacker repeatedly calls showAnimated:, ensuring the HUD remains visible. They might also interfere with any completion blocks that would normally hide the HUD.
      • (Less likely) Swizzling hideAnimated: (1.3.2.2.1): A more advanced technique where the attacker replaces the implementation of hideAnimated: (or related methods) with a no-op (a function that does nothing).
    • (Optional) Disable User Interaction (1.3.3): This makes the DoS more effective.
      • Ensure HUD is added to a high-level view (1.3.3.1): Adding the HUD to the main window or a top-level view ensures it covers the entire screen.
      • Set userInteractionEnabled to YES (1.3.3.2): This prevents touches from passing through the HUD to the underlying views.
  • Likelihood: Medium (overall path), High (for showAnimated: loop)
  • Impact: Medium (UI blocking, but not data compromise)
  • Effort: Low to Medium (depending on the specific method used)
  • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: Trigger Use-After-Free or Double-Free (1.5.2) [CRITICAL for this specific, unlikely attack]

  • Description: This is a highly unlikely scenario that would require a specific, undiscovered bug in MBProgressHUD's memory management. The attacker would need to trigger a use-after-free or double-free vulnerability to potentially gain control of the application's execution flow.
  • How it's Exploited:
    • Requires a specific vulnerability (1.5.2.1) [CRITICAL]: This is the fundamental requirement. There's no known vulnerability of this type in MBProgressHUD, so this is purely theoretical.
    • Gain Code Execution (1.5.2.2) [CRITICAL]: Precise control over memory allocation and deallocation is needed, typically requiring existing code execution.
  • Likelihood: Very Low
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Very High
  • Skill Level: Expert
  • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard

Attack Tree Path: The application (or another compromised component) must be able to capture the user's input. (2.2.2) [CRITICAL for Phishing]

  • Description: This is the essential element for a successful phishing attack. MBProgressHUD can display a deceptive prompt, but it cannot capture user input. This step relies entirely on a separate vulnerability in the application or a compromised component.
  • How it's Exploited: This depends entirely on the other vulnerability. It could involve:
    • A compromised text field that sends input to the attacker.
    • A malicious keyboard extension.
    • A compromised web view that captures input.
    • Any other mechanism that allows the attacker to intercept user input.
  • Likelihood: Low (depends on the presence of another vulnerability)
  • Impact: High (potential for credential theft, etc.)
  • Effort: High (requires exploiting a separate vulnerability)
  • Skill Level: Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (depends on the specific input capture method)

Attack Tree Path: Gain Code Execution (2.1.1) [CRITICAL]

  • This is the same as point 1.