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Attack Tree Analysis for johnezang/jsonkit

Objective: Achieve RCE or DoS via jsonkit Exploitation

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Achieve RCE or DoS via jsonkit Exploitation ├── 1. Achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) │ ├── 1.1 Exploit Type Confusion/Unsafe Deserialization [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 1.1.1 Craft JSON with unexpected types (e.g., object instead of string) │ │ │ └── 1.1.1.1 Trigger unexpected code paths in jsonkit's parsing logic [CRITICAL] │ │ │ └── 1.1.1.1.1 IF jsonkit uses reflection/dynamic dispatch AND has unsafe type handling: [CRITICAL] │ │ │ └── 1.1.1.1.1.1 THEN: Potentially call arbitrary functions or methods. │ │ │ └── 1.1.1.1.1.1.1 IF application logic uses the parsed data in a way that executes code based on the type: [CRITICAL] │ │ │ └── 1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1 THEN: Achieve RCE. │ ├── 1.3 Exploit Logic Errors in Parsing [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 1.3.1 Craft JSON that triggers edge cases or unexpected behavior in the parser. │ │ │ └── 1.3.1.1 IF jsonkit has logic errors that lead to incorrect parsing or state: [CRITICAL] │ │ │ └── 1.3.1.1.1 THEN: Potentially expose vulnerabilities. │ │ │ └── 1.3.1.1.1.1 IF these vulnerabilities can be chained with application logic flaws: [CRITICAL] │ │ │ └── 1.3.1.1.1.1.1 THEN: Potentially achieve RCE (or DoS). │ │ └── 2. Achieve Denial of Service (DoS) ├── 2.1 Resource Exhaustion [HIGH RISK] ├── 2.1.1 Craft JSON with extremely large arrays or objects │ └── 2.1.1.1 IF jsonkit doesn't have limits on input size or recursion depth: [CRITICAL] │ └── 2.1.1.1.1 THEN: Consume excessive memory or CPU, leading to DoS. ├── 2.1.2 Craft JSON with deeply nested structures (e.g., "Billion Laughs" attack) │ └── 2.1.2.1 IF jsonkit doesn't have limits on nesting depth: [CRITICAL] │ └── 2.1.2.1.1 THEN: Consume excessive stack space, leading to a stack overflow and DoS.

Attack Tree Path: 1. RCE via Type Confusion/Unsafe Deserialization (1.1)

  • Overall Description: This attack path exploits vulnerabilities in how jsonkit handles different JSON data types during deserialization. If jsonkit uses reflection or dynamic dispatch without proper type validation, an attacker can craft malicious JSON input to trick the application into executing arbitrary code.

  • 1.1.1 Craft JSON with unexpected types:

    • The attacker creates JSON input where the data types don't match what the application expects. For example, sending an object where a string is expected, or an array where a number is expected.

  • 1.1.1.1 Trigger unexpected code paths in jsonkit's parsing logic [CRITICAL]:

    • This is the first critical step. The attacker's malformed JSON input causes jsonkit to deviate from its normal parsing flow. This might involve entering error handling routines, taking different branches in conditional statements, or triggering unexpected function calls.

  • 1.1.1.1.1 IF jsonkit uses reflection/dynamic dispatch AND has unsafe type handling: [CRITICAL]

    • This is the core vulnerability. If jsonkit uses reflection (dynamically determining which code to execute based on type information) or dynamic dispatch (choosing a method implementation at runtime) and it doesn't properly validate the types provided in the JSON, the attacker can potentially control which code gets executed.

  • 1.1.1.1.1.1 THEN: Potentially call arbitrary functions or methods.

    • As a result of the unsafe type handling, jsonkit might call functions or methods that the attacker controls, either directly or indirectly.

  • 1.1.1.1.1.1.1 IF application logic uses the parsed data in a way that executes code based on the type: [CRITICAL]

    • This is the final critical step. Even if jsonkit calls an unexpected function, it might not lead to RCE unless the application itself uses the parsed data in a way that executes code. For example, if the application uses the parsed type information to look up a function pointer and then calls that function, the attacker can gain control.

  • 1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1 THEN: Achieve RCE.

    • The attacker successfully achieves Remote Code Execution.

Attack Tree Path: 2. RCE via Logic Errors in Parsing (1.3)

  • Overall Description: This attack path exploits any flaws in the jsonkit's parsing logic. These could be subtle bugs, edge cases, or inconsistencies that lead to unexpected behavior, which can then be leveraged for RCE or DoS.

  • 1.3.1 Craft JSON that triggers edge cases or unexpected behavior:

    • The attacker crafts JSON input that is designed to hit edge cases or unusual conditions in the parser. This might involve using unusual characters, combining different data types in unexpected ways, or exploiting boundary conditions.

  • 1.3.1.1 IF jsonkit has logic errors that lead to incorrect parsing or state: [CRITICAL]

    • This is the core vulnerability. The parser contains a bug that causes it to misinterpret the JSON input or enter an inconsistent state.

  • 1.3.1.1.1 THEN: Potentially expose vulnerabilities.

    • The incorrect parsing or inconsistent state might expose further vulnerabilities, such as memory corruption, information disclosure, or the ability to bypass security checks.

  • 1.3.1.1.1.1 IF these vulnerabilities can be chained with application logic flaws: [CRITICAL]

    • This is often a crucial step. The attacker needs to find a way to combine the vulnerability exposed by jsonkit with a flaw in the application's own logic to achieve a significant impact (like RCE).

  • 1.3.1.1.1.1.1 THEN: Potentially achieve RCE (or DoS).

    • The attacker successfully achieves RCE or DoS.

Attack Tree Path: 3. DoS via Resource Exhaustion (2.1)

  • Overall Description: This attack path aims to make the application unavailable by consuming excessive resources (CPU, memory, or stack space).

  • 2.1.1 Craft JSON with extremely large arrays or objects:

    • The attacker sends JSON input containing very large arrays or objects.

  • 2.1.1.1 IF jsonkit doesn't have limits on input size or recursion depth: [CRITICAL]

    • This is the core vulnerability. If jsonkit doesn't limit the size of the JSON it processes, it can be forced to allocate large amounts of memory.

  • 2.1.1.1.1 THEN: Consume excessive memory or CPU, leading to DoS.

    • The application becomes unresponsive or crashes due to excessive resource consumption.

  • 2.1.2 Craft JSON with deeply nested structures (e.g., "Billion Laughs" attack):

    • The attacker sends JSON input with many levels of nested objects or arrays.

  • 2.1.2.1 IF jsonkit doesn't have limits on nesting depth: [CRITICAL]

    • This is the core vulnerability. If jsonkit doesn't limit the nesting depth, it can be forced to use excessive stack space, leading to a stack overflow.

  • 2.1.2.1.1 THEN: Consume excessive stack space, leading to a stack overflow and DoS.

    • The application crashes due to a stack overflow.