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Attack Tree Analysis for magicalpanda/magicalrecord

Objective: To gain unauthorized access to sensitive data managed by Core Data through vulnerabilities introduced or facilitated by MagicalRecord, or to disrupt the application's data operations.

Attack Tree Visualization

High-Risk Attack Sub-Tree: Compromise Application via MagicalRecord (High-Risk Paths)

└── **[HIGH RISK PATH]** 1. Exploit Data Access Controls (Authorization/Authentication related to Data) **[CRITICAL NODE: Data Access Controls]**
    └── **[HIGH RISK PATH]** 1.1. Predicate Injection **[CRITICAL NODE: Predicate Injection]**
        └── **[HIGH RISK PATH]** 1.1.1. Manipulate Predicates via User Input **[CRITICAL NODE: User Input Predicates]**
            ├── **[HIGH RISK]** 1.1.1.1. Bypass Data Access Restrictions
            └── **[HIGH RISK]** 1.1.1.2. Retrieve Unauthorized Data

└── **[HIGH RISK PATH]** 2. Exploit Data Integrity **[CRITICAL NODE: Data Integrity]**
    └── **[HIGH RISK PATH]** 2.1. Data Corruption via Malicious Input **[CRITICAL NODE: Malicious Input Data Corruption]**
        └── **[HIGH RISK PATH]** 2.1.1. Inject Malicious Data through MagicalRecord APIs **[CRITICAL NODE: API Data Injection]**
            ├── **[HIGH RISK]** 2.1.1.1. Modify Sensitive Data Fields
            └── **[HIGH RISK]** 2.1.1.2. Introduce Invalid Data Causing Application Errors

└── **[HIGH RISK PATH]** 3. Exploit Data Confidentiality **[CRITICAL NODE: Data Confidentiality]**
    ├── **[HIGH RISK PATH]** 3.1. Data Leakage via Query Manipulation (Overlapping with Predicate Injection) **[CRITICAL NODE: Query Manipulation Leakage]**
    │   └── **[HIGH RISK PATH]** 3.1.1. Craft Queries to Expose Sensitive Data **[CRITICAL NODE: Sensitive Data Exposure Queries]**
    │       └── **[HIGH RISK]** 3.1.1.1. Retrieve Data Not Intended for User
    └── **[HIGH RISK PATH]** 3.2. Data Export/Backup Vulnerabilities (If MagicalRecord facilitates these) **[CRITICAL NODE: Backup/Export Vulnerabilities]**
        └── **[HIGH RISK PATH]** 3.2.1. Unauthorized Data Export **[CRITICAL NODE: Unauthorized Export]**
            └── **[HIGH RISK]** 3.2.1.1. Access Backup Files or Exported Data

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Data Access Controls (Authorization/Authentication related to Data) [CRITICAL NODE: Data Access Controls]

  • High-Risk Path: This path focuses on attacks that bypass intended data access restrictions, leading to unauthorized data access or manipulation.

  • Critical Node: Data Access Controls: This node represents the overall security mechanisms intended to control who can access and modify data. Weaknesses here are critical.

    • 1.1. Predicate Injection [CRITICAL NODE: Predicate Injection]

      • High-Risk Path: Predicate injection is a direct attack vector exploiting vulnerabilities in how predicates are constructed, especially when user input is involved.

      • Critical Node: Predicate Injection: This node highlights the vulnerability arising from the dynamic construction of predicates, a core feature used with MagicalRecord for data querying.

      • 1.1.1. Manipulate Predicates via User Input [CRITICAL NODE: User Input Predicates]

        • High-Risk Path: This is the most common and easily exploitable form of predicate injection, where attackers directly manipulate user-provided input that is used to build predicates.

        • Critical Node: User Input Predicates: This node emphasizes the danger of directly incorporating unsanitized user input into predicate construction.

          • [HIGH RISK] 1.1.1.1. Bypass Data Access Restrictions

            • Attack Vector: An attacker crafts malicious input that, when incorporated into a predicate, modifies the query logic to bypass intended access controls. For example, if a query is designed to only return data belonging to the current user, a malicious predicate could be injected to remove this restriction and return all data.
            • Example: Imagine a search feature where users can filter data. If the filter criteria are directly used to build a predicate without sanitization, an attacker could input a malicious filter string like "TRUEPREDICATE" or manipulate logical operators to bypass intended filtering and access all records, regardless of authorization.

          • [HIGH RISK] 1.1.1.2. Retrieve Unauthorized Data

            • Attack Vector: Similar to bypassing restrictions, an attacker crafts a predicate to directly query and retrieve data they are not authorized to access. This could involve manipulating conditions to access data belonging to other users, administrators, or sensitive categories.
            • Example: In a user profile application, if predicates are built using user-provided IDs without validation, an attacker could input another user's ID to retrieve their profile data, even if they should only be able to access their own profile.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Data Integrity [CRITICAL NODE: Data Integrity]

  • High-Risk Path: This path focuses on attacks that compromise the integrity of the data stored in the application's Core Data store.

  • Critical Node: Data Integrity: This node represents the overall assurance that data is accurate, consistent, and reliable. Attacks here directly undermine the trustworthiness of the application's data.

    • 2.1. Data Corruption via Malicious Input [CRITICAL NODE: Malicious Input Data Corruption]

      • High-Risk Path: This path describes attacks where malicious or invalid data is injected into the application, leading to data corruption within the Core Data store.

      • Critical Node: Malicious Input Data Corruption: This node highlights the vulnerability arising from insufficient validation of data received from external sources before being saved using MagicalRecord APIs.

      • 2.1.1. Inject Malicious Data through MagicalRecord APIs [CRITICAL NODE: API Data Injection]

        • High-Risk Path: This is the direct method of corrupting data by injecting malicious input through the application's data saving mechanisms, often exposed through APIs.

        • Critical Node: API Data Injection: This node emphasizes the vulnerability of APIs that allow data to be saved without proper validation.

          • [HIGH RISK] 2.1.1.1. Modify Sensitive Data Fields

            • Attack Vector: An attacker exploits APIs or data input points to inject malicious data that modifies sensitive fields in the Core Data store. This could involve changing user permissions, financial information, or other critical data.
            • Example: In an e-commerce application, if product prices are saved without proper validation, an attacker could inject a negative price or an extremely low price, leading to financial loss for the business.

          • [HIGH RISK] 2.1.1.2. Introduce Invalid Data Causing Application Errors

            • Attack Vector: An attacker injects data that violates data type constraints, length limits, or other validation rules, causing errors within the application when it attempts to process this invalid data. This can lead to application crashes, unexpected behavior, or denial of service.
            • Example: If a user registration form doesn't properly validate email addresses, an attacker could inject invalid email formats that, when saved to Core Data and later processed by the application (e.g., for sending notifications), could cause errors or crashes.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Data Confidentiality [CRITICAL NODE: Data Confidentiality]

  • High-Risk Path: This path focuses on attacks that compromise the confidentiality of sensitive data, leading to unauthorized disclosure of information.

  • Critical Node: Data Confidentiality: This node represents the fundamental security principle of protecting sensitive information from unauthorized access.

    • 3.1. Data Leakage via Query Manipulation (Overlapping with Predicate Injection) [CRITICAL NODE: Query Manipulation Leakage]

      • High-Risk Path: As previously discussed, predicate injection directly leads to data leakage, making this a high-risk path for confidentiality breaches.

      • Critical Node: Query Manipulation Leakage: This node highlights the data leakage risk specifically arising from manipulating queries, primarily through predicate injection.

      • 3.1.1. Craft Queries to Expose Sensitive Data [CRITICAL NODE: Sensitive Data Exposure Queries]

        • High-Risk Path: This is the specific action of crafting malicious queries to extract sensitive data that should not be accessible to the attacker.

        • Critical Node: Sensitive Data Exposure Queries: This node emphasizes the direct goal of attackers to create queries that expose confidential information.

          • [HIGH RISK] 3.1.1.1. Retrieve Data Not Intended for User
            • Attack Vector: Attackers leverage predicate injection or similar query manipulation techniques to construct queries that retrieve data they are not authorized to see. This is the direct outcome of successful predicate injection attacks focused on confidentiality.
            • Example: In a healthcare application, an attacker could use predicate injection to retrieve patient records beyond their authorized access level, violating patient privacy and confidentiality regulations.

    • 3.2. Data Export/Backup Vulnerabilities (If MagicalRecord facilitates these) [CRITICAL NODE: Backup/Export Vulnerabilities]

      • High-Risk Path: This path focuses on vulnerabilities related to data export or backup functionalities, if the application uses MagicalRecord to facilitate these. Insecure handling of backups or exports can lead to significant data breaches.

      • Critical Node: Backup/Export Vulnerabilities: This node highlights the security risks associated with data export and backup processes, which often contain complete or substantial portions of the application's data.

      • 3.2.1. Unauthorized Data Export [CRITICAL NODE: Unauthorized Export]

        • High-Risk Path: This path describes scenarios where attackers gain unauthorized access to data export or backup functionalities, allowing them to extract sensitive data.

        • Critical Node: Unauthorized Export: This node emphasizes the risk of unauthorized access to data export mechanisms.

          • [HIGH RISK] 3.2.1.1. Access Backup Files or Exported Data
            • Attack Vector: Attackers target backup files or exported data if they are stored in insecure locations, lack proper access controls, or are not encrypted. If successful, they can gain access to a large volume of potentially sensitive data contained within the backups or exports.
            • Example: If application backups are stored on a publicly accessible server or cloud storage without proper authentication or encryption, an attacker could discover and download these backups, gaining access to all the data within them.