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Attack Tree Analysis for magicalpanda/magicalrecord

Objective: Unauthorized Data Access/Modification/Deletion via MagicalRecord Misuse

Attack Tree Visualization

                                  Attacker's Goal:
                                  Unauthorized Data Access/Modification/Deletion
                                  /

| 1. Bypass MagicalRecord's Intended Data Access Controls [HIGH RISK] /

| 1a. Incorrect Predicate Construction (e.g., using string-based predicates incorrectly) [HIGH RISK] CRITICAL NODE

Attack Tree Path: 1. Bypass MagicalRecord's Intended Data Access Controls [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: This represents the overall high-risk area where attackers exploit how developers use MagicalRecord, rather than inherent flaws in the library itself. It focuses on bypassing the intended data access restrictions put in place by the application. The primary vulnerability lies in how user-provided data is incorporated into queries (predicates) that interact with the Core Data store.

  • Why it's High Risk:

    • Relies on common developer errors: Insecure coding practices are prevalent, making this a likely attack vector.
    • High impact potential: Successful exploitation can lead to unauthorized access, modification, or deletion of sensitive data.
    • Relatively low effort for attackers: Exploiting these vulnerabilities often requires only basic knowledge of predicate syntax.

  • Mitigation Strategies (General for this branch):

    • Thorough developer training on secure coding practices with MagicalRecord and Core Data.
    • Mandatory code reviews focusing on data access logic.
    • Use of static analysis tools to detect potential vulnerabilities.
    • Implementation of robust input validation and sanitization.

Attack Tree Path: 1a. Incorrect Predicate Construction [HIGH RISK] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: This is the most critical and likely attack vector. It involves attackers crafting malicious NSPredicate strings to bypass intended data filters. This is analogous to SQL injection, but within the context of Core Data. If developers use user-supplied data directly within string-based predicates (e.g., predicateWithFormat:) without proper sanitization or escaping, attackers can inject their own predicate logic.

  • Example:

    • Vulnerable Code: [NSPredicate predicateWithFormat:@"name == %@", userInput]
    • Attacker Input: userInput = @"' OR '1'='1"
    • Resulting Predicate: name == '' OR '1'='1' (This will always evaluate to true, returning all records.)

  • Why it's High Risk and Critical:

    • High Likelihood: This is a very common mistake, especially for developers unfamiliar with secure coding practices for data access.
    • High Impact: Successful exploitation can grant the attacker complete access to the data managed by MagicalRecord, allowing them to read, modify, or delete any record.
    • Low Effort: Crafting malicious predicate strings is relatively simple, requiring only basic understanding of NSPredicate syntax.
    • Intermediate Skill Level: While basic attacks are easy, more sophisticated attacks might require a deeper understanding of the application's data model.
    • Medium Detection Difficulty: Requires careful code review or dynamic analysis; might not be immediately obvious from application behavior.

  • Mitigation Strategies (Specific to this node):

    1. Avoid predicateWithFormat: with User Input: Never directly incorporate unsanitized user input into predicateWithFormat:. This is the most crucial preventative measure.
    2. Use Parameterized Predicates: Always prefer parameterized predicates (e.g., [NSPredicate predicateWithFormat:@"name == %@", userName]). Core Data handles the necessary escaping when using parameterized predicates, preventing injection attacks.
    3. Strict Input Validation: Implement rigorous input validation before any data is used in a predicate, even with parameterized predicates. Define clear rules for what constitutes valid input for each field (e.g., length limits, allowed characters, data type).
    4. Input Sanitization: If you must use string-based predicates (which is strongly discouraged), sanitize user input to remove or escape any potentially dangerous characters. However, this is less reliable than parameterized predicates.
    5. Code Reviews: Mandatory code reviews should specifically check for any use of predicateWithFormat: with user input and ensure that parameterized predicates and input validation are used correctly.
    6. Static Analysis: Utilize static analysis tools that can detect potentially unsafe predicate construction. Many modern static analyzers can identify this type of vulnerability.
    7. Dynamic Analysis/Testing: Use dynamic analysis tools or penetration testing techniques to attempt to inject malicious predicate strings and verify that the application is not vulnerable.
    8. Least Privilege: Design database access with the principle of least privilege. The application should only have the minimum necessary permissions to access and modify data.