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Threat Model Analysis for mamaral/onboard

Threat: XSS Vulnerability in Onboard.js Code

Description: An attacker discovers and exploits a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability within the onboard.js library code. They inject malicious JavaScript code, potentially through crafted input data or by exploiting a weakness in the library's code handling. When a user interacts with the application, this malicious script executes in their browser.

  • Impact:
    • Account compromise: Attacker can steal session cookies or tokens, gaining unauthorized access to user accounts.
    • Data theft: Sensitive data displayed or processed by the application, including wallet addresses and potentially transaction details, can be exfiltrated.
    • Website defacement: The application's appearance and functionality can be altered, damaging reputation and user trust.
    • Malware distribution: Users can be redirected to malicious websites or forced to download malware.
  • Onboard Component Affected: Core onboard.js library code, potentially affecting any module that processes user input or renders dynamic content.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Keep onboard.js updated to the latest version to benefit from security patches.
      • Regularly monitor security advisories related to onboard.js.
      • Implement Content Security Policy (CSP) to limit the impact of XSS, although it may not fully protect against library-internal vulnerabilities.
    • Users:
      • Keep browser and browser extensions updated.
      • Be cautious when interacting with websites using onboard.js from untrusted sources.

Threat: Supply Chain Attack on Onboard.js Dependencies

Description: An attacker compromises a dependency of onboard.js (e.g., a package on npm). This could involve injecting malicious code into a dependency package, which is then included when onboard.js is installed or updated. The malicious code becomes part of the application using onboard.js.

  • Impact:
    • Similar to XSS, can lead to account compromise, data theft, website defacement, and malware distribution.
    • The attack can be widespread, affecting many applications using the compromised dependency.
  • Onboard Component Affected: Indirectly affects the entire onboard.js library and any application using it, as the malicious code is injected through dependencies.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Use dependency scanning tools to detect known vulnerabilities in onboard.js dependencies.
      • Regularly update dependencies (indirectly through npm update or similar).
      • Implement Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) to track dependencies.
      • Verify package integrity using checksums or package signing.
      • Consider using a private npm registry or dependency mirroring to control the supply chain.
    • Users:
      • Difficult to mitigate directly as a user. Rely on developers to implement secure dependency management.

Threat: Insecure Wallet Connection State Handling by Onboard.js

Description: onboard.js stores wallet connection state (e.g., connected wallet, account information) in the browser. If this state is stored insecurely (e.g., in local storage without encryption or protection against XSS), an attacker exploiting an XSS vulnerability or with local access to the browser could compromise this state.

  • Impact:
    • Session hijacking: Attacker can reuse the compromised connection state to impersonate the user.
    • Unauthorized access to user wallets if the connection state is misused by the application.
  • Onboard Component Affected: Modules responsible for managing and persisting wallet connection state (e.g., session management, storage mechanisms).
  • Risk Severity: Medium to High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Understand how onboard.js manages and persists wallet connection state.
      • If client-side storage is used, ensure it is done securely or consider additional encryption at the application level.
      • Implement robust session management on the application backend to control access and authorization after wallet connection.
      • Consider using short-lived session tokens and regularly re-authenticate users.
    • Users:
      • Log out of the application when finished.
      • Clear browser data regularly.