Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
57 lines (48 loc) · 6.29 KB

attack-surface.md

File metadata and controls

57 lines (48 loc) · 6.29 KB

Attack Surface Analysis for mamaral/onboard

Attack Surface: 1. Client-Side State Manipulation

  • Description: Attackers tamper with the client-side state (cookies, local storage, etc.) that onboard uses to track onboarding progress.
  • How onboard Contributes: onboard directly relies on client-side state to manage the flow; this is a core part of its design.
  • Example: An attacker modifies a cookie value named onboarding_step from "2" to "5" to skip steps 3 and 4, which might involve setting a strong password or configuring security settings.
  • Impact: Bypass of security measures, unauthorized access to features, potential account compromise.
  • Risk Severity: Critical (if server-side validation is lacking) / High (if some server-side validation exists but is incomplete).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Server-Side Validation (Essential): The server must independently verify the user's onboarding status on every action that depends on onboarding completion. Do not rely solely on client-side state.
    • Signed/Encrypted Client-Side State: If sensitive data must be stored client-side, use signed or encrypted cookies/storage to prevent tampering and eavesdropping. Use strong cryptographic keys and algorithms.
    • Input Validation: Treat any data derived from client-side state as untrusted input. Validate it rigorously before using it in any server-side logic.
    • Short-Lived State: Minimize the lifespan of client-side state. Expire cookies/storage entries as soon as they are no longer needed.

Attack Surface: 2. Configuration Tampering

  • Description: Attackers modify the onboard configuration (e.g., JSON file defining steps) to alter the onboarding flow.
  • How onboard Contributes: The library's behavior is directly driven by its configuration; the configuration is the definition of the onboarding process.
  • Example: An attacker changes the configuration to remove a step that requires email verification, allowing them to create accounts with unverified email addresses. Or, they add a step that redirects the user to a phishing site.
  • Impact: Bypass of security measures, introduction of malicious steps, data theft, account compromise.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Storage: Store the configuration file in a secure location with restricted access. Avoid storing it in publicly accessible directories.
    • Integrity Checks: Use checksums (e.g., SHA-256) or digital signatures to verify the integrity of the configuration file. Detect and prevent unauthorized modifications.
    • Secure Configuration Management: Use a secure configuration management system (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager) to manage and distribute the configuration securely.
    • Code Reviews: Thoroughly review any changes to the configuration file before deployment.
    • Least Privilege: Ensure that the application has only the necessary permissions to read the configuration file, not write to it.

Attack Surface: 3. Callback Function Exploitation

  • Description: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in the callback functions that onboard triggers within the main application.
  • How onboard Contributes: onboard directly uses callbacks to integrate with the application; these callbacks are the mechanism by which onboard interacts with the rest of the system.
  • Example: An attacker crafts a malicious input during onboarding that, when processed by a callback function, triggers an SQL injection vulnerability in the application's database. Or, a callback designed to grant "basic" user privileges is manipulated to grant "admin" privileges.
  • Impact: Code execution, data breaches, privilege escalation, complete system compromise.
  • Risk Severity: Critical / High (depending on the functionality exposed by the callbacks).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Input Validation: Treat all data passed to callback functions as untrusted input. Validate and sanitize it rigorously.
    • Authentication/Authorization: If callbacks perform sensitive actions, authenticate the request (if applicable) and authorize the action based on the user's role and onboarding status.
    • Secure Coding Practices: Apply secure coding principles (e.g., parameterized queries to prevent SQL injection, output encoding to prevent XSS) within callback functions.
    • Least Privilege: Ensure that callback functions have only the minimum necessary permissions to perform their intended tasks.
    • Code Reviews: Thoroughly review callback functions for security vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: 4. Dependency Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Vulnerabilities in onboard's dependencies are exploited to compromise the application.
  • How onboard Contributes: onboard directly introduces these dependencies into the application's dependency tree.
  • Example: A dependency of onboard has a known remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability. An attacker exploits this vulnerability to gain control of the application server.
  • Impact: Code execution, data breaches, complete system compromise.
  • Risk Severity: Critical / High (depending on the vulnerability in the dependency).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Dependency Management: Use a dependency management tool (e.g., npm, yarn) to track dependencies and their versions.
    • Vulnerability Scanning: Use a vulnerability scanning tool (e.g., Snyk, OWASP Dependency-Check) to identify known vulnerabilities in dependencies.
    • Regular Updates: Regularly update onboard and its dependencies to the latest secure versions.
    • Pin Dependencies: Pin dependencies to specific versions to prevent unexpected updates that might introduce vulnerabilities or break compatibility. However, balance this with the need to apply security updates.
    • Dependency Auditing: Periodically audit dependencies to understand their security posture and potential risks.