attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for mamaral/onboard

Objective: Gain unauthorized access to user accounts or application data via onboard

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Gain unauthorized access to user accounts or application data via onboard

├── 1. Bypass Authentication/Authorization [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 1.1 Exploit onboard's Token Handling [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 1.1.1 Predictable Token Generation │ │ │ └── 1.1.1.1 Weak Randomness in Token Secret [CRITICAL] │ │ ├── 1.1.2 Token Replay Attack │ │ │ └── 1.1.2.2 Insufficient Validation of Expiration [CRITICAL] │ │ ├── 1.1.3 Token Tampering [HIGH RISK] │ │ │ └── 1.1.3.1 Weak or No Signature Verification [CRITICAL] │ │ └── 1.1.4 Token Leakage [HIGH RISK] │ │ └── 1.1.4.1 Insecure Storage [CRITICAL] │ ├── 1.2 Exploit onboard's User Management │ │ ├── 1.2.1 Weak Password Reset Functionality │ │ │ └── 1.2.1.2 Lack of Rate Limiting on Reset Requests [CRITICAL] │ │ ├── 1.2.2 Account Enumeration │ │ │ └── 1.2.2.1 Different Responses for Existing/Non-Existing Users [CRITICAL] │ ├── 2. Denial of Service (DoS) against onboard │ ├── 2.1 Resource Exhaustion [HIGH RISK] │ │ └── 2.1.2 Flood of Authentication Requests [CRITICAL] │ └── 2.2 Exploit Vulnerabilities in Dependencies │ └── 2.2.1 Known Vulnerabilities in jsonwebtoken or other dependencies [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Bypass Authentication/Authorization [HIGH RISK]

This is the primary attack path, aiming to circumvent the authentication mechanisms provided by onboard.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1 Exploit onboard's Token Handling [HIGH RISK]

This focuses on vulnerabilities related to how onboard generates, handles, and validates tokens.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1 Predictable Token Generation

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.1 Weak Randomness in Token Secret [CRITICAL]

Description: The attacker exploits a weak or predictable method used to generate the secret key for signing tokens. This allows them to forge valid tokens. Likelihood: Low (if best practices are followed) Impact: Very High (full account compromise) Effort: Low (if the secret is easily guessable) to High (if brute-forcing a strong secret) Skill Level: Intermediate to Expert Detection Difficulty: Hard

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2 Token Replay Attack

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2.2 Insufficient Validation of Expiration [CRITICAL]

Description: The application fails to properly validate the expiration time of a token, allowing an attacker to reuse an intercepted token even after it should have expired. Likelihood: Low (application-level error) Impact: High Effort: Low Skill Level: Intermediate Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.3 Token Tampering [HIGH RISK]

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.3.1 Weak or No Signature Verification [CRITICAL]

Description: The application fails to properly verify the digital signature of the JWT, allowing an attacker to modify the token's payload (e.g., change the user ID) without detection. Likelihood: Very Low (core functionality of JWT) Impact: Very High Effort: Medium Skill Level: Advanced Detection Difficulty: Hard

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.4 Token Leakage [HIGH RISK]

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.4.1 Insecure Storage [CRITICAL]

Description: Tokens are stored in an insecure location (e.g., client-side JavaScript, browser local storage, easily accessible logs) where an attacker can easily obtain them. Likelihood: Medium (depends on application implementation) Impact: High Effort: Low Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 1.2 Exploit onboard's User Management

This focuses on vulnerabilities in user management features, such as password reset and account creation.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1 Weak Password Reset Functionality

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1.2 Lack of Rate Limiting on Reset Requests [CRITICAL]

Description: The application doesn't limit the number of password reset requests an attacker can make, allowing them to brute-force reset tokens or flood the system. Likelihood: Medium (common oversight) Impact: Medium (DoS or potential for brute-forcing reset tokens) Effort: Low Skill Level: Novice Detection Difficulty: Easy

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.2 Account Enumeration

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.2.1 Different Responses for Existing/Non-Existing Users [CRITICAL]

Description: The application provides different responses (error messages, timing differences) when a user tries to register or reset a password for an existing vs. non-existing account. This allows an attacker to determine which usernames or email addresses are valid. Likelihood: Medium (common vulnerability) Impact: Low (information disclosure) Effort: Low Skill Level: Novice Detection Difficulty: Easy

Attack Tree Path: 2. Denial of Service (DoS) against onboard [HIGH RISK]

This attack path aims to make the application unavailable to legitimate users.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1 Resource Exhaustion [HIGH RISK]

This involves overwhelming the server with requests, consuming resources and preventing legitimate users from accessing the service.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.2 Flood of Authentication Requests [CRITICAL]

Description: The attacker sends a large number of authentication requests to the server, overwhelming the authentication endpoints and potentially causing the service to become unavailable. Likelihood: Medium (if rate limiting is not implemented) Impact: Medium Effort: Low Skill Level: Novice Detection Difficulty: Easy

Attack Tree Path: 2.2 Exploit Vulnerabilities in Dependencies

This focuses on leveraging known vulnerabilities in the libraries that onboard depends on.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2.1 Known Vulnerabilities in jsonwebtoken or other dependencies [CRITICAL]

Description: The attacker exploits a known vulnerability in a dependency of onboard, such as jsonwebtoken. This could lead to various consequences, depending on the specific vulnerability. Likelihood: Low (if dependencies are kept up-to-date) Impact: Variable (depends on the vulnerability) Effort: Variable (depends on the vulnerability) Skill Level: Variable (depends on the vulnerability) Detection Difficulty: Medium