mitigations.md

Mitigation Strategies Analysis for mamaral/onboard

Mitigation Strategy: Robust Input Validation and Sanitization (for onboard Configuration and User Input within onboard Flows)

Description:

1. Schema Definition (for onboard Configuration): Create a strict schema (JSON Schema, YAML Schema, etc.) that defines the exact structure and allowed data types for the onboard configuration file. This is crucial because the configuration file dictates the behavior of onboard. The schema should specify:
   • Required fields within the configuration.
   • Allowed values for each field (e.g., regular expressions for email formats, allowed step types).
   • Data type constraints (string, number, boolean, array, object) for each field.
   • Allowed properties for custom steps or components, if onboard supports them.
2. Schema Validation (of onboard Configuration): Integrate a schema validation library into your application. Before onboard processes its configuration, the validator must check the configuration file against the defined schema. If the configuration is invalid (doesn't match the schema), the application must reject it and log a detailed error. This prevents attackers from injecting malicious configurations.
3. Input Sanitization (within onboard Flows): For any user-provided input collected within the onboard flow itself (e.g., form fields presented by onboard), sanitize the input to remove or encode potentially harmful characters. Use a well-vetted sanitization library appropriate for the context (HTML, text, etc.). This is distinct from general input sanitization; it's specifically for input handled by onboard.
4. Custom Validation Function Sandboxing (if onboard supports them): If onboard allows defining custom validation functions within its configuration, run these functions in a sandboxed environment (e.g., a Web Worker in JavaScript) to isolate them from the main application context. This prevents malicious code within a custom onboard validation function from accessing sensitive data or manipulating the DOM outside of onboard's intended scope.
5. Custom Validation Function Auditing (if onboard supports them): Manually review the code of all custom validation functions defined within the onboard configuration for potential vulnerabilities. This is a critical step, as these functions are part of the onboard flow's logic.
6. Custom Validation Function Rate Limiting (if onboard supports them): Implement rate limiting for custom validation functions used by onboard to prevent attackers from using them for denial-of-service. This limits the execution frequency of these onboard-specific functions.

Threats Mitigated:

• Configuration Injection (Severity: High): Attackers could inject malicious code or unexpected data types into the onboard configuration file itself, potentially hijacking the entire onboarding flow, altering its logic, or gaining control of how onboard interacts with the application.
• Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) (Severity: High): Attackers could inject malicious JavaScript code into user input fields presented by onboard, which could then be executed in the context of other users' browsers. This is specific to XSS vulnerabilities within the onboard flow.
• Denial-of-Service (DoS) (Severity: Medium): Attackers could use custom validation functions within onboard or malformed input to onboard to trigger computationally expensive operations.
• Bypassing Onboarding Steps (Severity: Medium): Attackers could manipulate input provided to onboard to bypass required steps in the onboarding flow defined by onboard.

Impact:

• Configuration Injection: Risk reduced from High to Low (with proper schema validation and enforcement of the onboard configuration).
• Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): Risk reduced from High to Low (with proper input sanitization of data handled by onboard).
• Denial-of-Service (DoS): Risk reduced from Medium to Low (with rate limiting and sandboxing of custom validation functions within onboard).
• Bypassing Onboarding Steps: Risk reduced from Medium to Low (with robust input validation and server-side state validation, specifically validating the state transitions managed by onboard).

Currently Implemented:

• Example: Schema validation for the onboard configuration file is implemented using jsonschema. Input sanitization for onboard-collected data is partially implemented.
• (Fill this in based on your project.)

Missing Implementation:

• Example: Sandboxing of custom validation functions (if used within onboard) is not implemented. The input sanitization function for onboard data needs to be reviewed and potentially replaced.
• (Fill this in based on your project.)

Mitigation Strategy: Secure State Management (Specifically for onboard's State)

Description:

1. Server-Side State Validation (of onboard's State): Do not rely solely on client-side state managed by onboard to track the user's progress. The client-side state is easily manipulated. Maintain a parallel state on the server and validate each step transition managed by onboard against the server-side state. This prevents attackers from manipulating onboard's flow.
2. Signed/Encrypted Client-Side State (if onboard stores state client-side): If onboard itself stores any state on the client-side (e.g., in cookies or local storage), ensure that this onboard-managed state is:
   • Signed: Use a cryptographic signature (e.g., HMAC) to prevent tampering with the onboard-specific state.
   • Encrypted: If the onboard-managed state contains sensitive information, encrypt it.
3. Short-Lived State (for onboard's identifiers): If onboard uses any internal tokens or identifiers to track progress, ensure these are short-lived. This minimizes the window of opportunity for attackers to misuse them.

Threats Mitigated:

• State Manipulation (within onboard) (Severity: High): Attackers could manipulate the client-side state managed by onboard to bypass steps, replay steps, or inject invalid data, potentially gaining unauthorized access or corrupting data by interfering with the onboard flow.
• Bypassing onboard Logic (Severity: High): Directly related to state manipulation, attackers could circumvent the intended flow and logic defined within onboard.

Impact:

• State Manipulation (within onboard): Risk reduced from High to Low (with server-side validation of onboard's state transitions and signed/encrypted client-side state if onboard uses it).
• Bypassing onboard Logic: Risk reduced from High to Low.

Currently Implemented:

• Example: Server-side validation of onboard's state transitions is partially implemented.
• (Fill this in based on your project.)

Missing Implementation:

• Example: Client-side state used by onboard is not signed or encrypted. Server-side validation is incomplete and doesn't cover all onboard steps.
• (Fill this in based on your project.)

Mitigation Strategy: Conditional Logic and Template Review (within onboard's Configuration)

Description:

1. Conditional Logic Review: If onboard uses any form of conditional branching or dynamic step generation within its configuration, meticulously review the logic. Ensure there are no unintended paths or vulnerabilities that could be exploited by manipulating input data passed to onboard. Look for:
   • Logic flaws that allow skipping steps.
   • Conditions that can be manipulated to reveal hidden steps or data.
   • Conditions that lead to unexpected or insecure states.
2. Template Injection Prevention: If onboard uses any templating system to render content within the onboarding flow, ensure that user input passed to onboard is properly escaped or sanitized to prevent template injection attacks. This is crucial if onboard allows dynamic content generation based on user input. Use a templating engine with built-in auto-escaping features, and thoroughly test for injection vulnerabilities.
3. External Service Interaction Review (if configured within onboard): If onboard is configured to interact with external services (e.g., for email verification), ensure that these integrations are secure within the onboard configuration. Verify that:
   • API keys are not exposed in the onboard configuration (use environment variables or a secure configuration management system).
   • Responses from external services are validated before being used by onboard.
   • Appropriate error handling is in place for failures in external service interactions within the onboard flow.

Threats Mitigated:

• Logic Flaws (within onboard) (Severity: High): Errors in onboard's conditional logic could allow attackers to bypass security checks or access unauthorized features.
• Template Injection (within onboard) (Severity: High): If onboard uses templates, attackers could inject malicious code into the templates, leading to XSS or other vulnerabilities.
• Insecure External Service Interactions (configured via onboard) (Severity: Medium to High): Vulnerabilities in how onboard interacts with external services could be exploited.

Impact:

• Logic Flaws (within onboard): Risk reduced from High to Low (with thorough review and testing of onboard's conditional logic).
• Template Injection (within onboard): Risk reduced from High to Low (with proper escaping and sanitization in onboard's templating).
• Insecure External Service Interactions (configured via onboard): Risk reduced from Medium/High to Low (with secure configuration and validation of external service interactions within onboard).

Currently Implemented:

• Example: Basic review of onboard's conditional logic has been performed.
• (Fill this in based on your project.)

Missing Implementation:

• Example: Template injection prevention is not fully implemented for onboard's dynamic content. External service interactions within onboard need a security review.
• (Fill this in based on your project.)