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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for mamaral/onboard

Threat: Session Hijacking during Onboarding

  • Description: An attacker intercepts or guesses the session token used by onboard to track the user's progress through the multi-step onboarding process. This token might be stored in a cookie, local storage, or passed as a URL parameter. If the token is predictable or weakly protected by the onboard library itself, the attacker can take over the onboarding session.
  • Impact: The attacker can complete the onboarding process on behalf of the legitimate user, potentially setting a password they control or associating the account with their own email address.
  • Affected Component: sessionManagement module (or a similar component responsible for handling user sessions during onboarding). This likely involves functions for generating, validating, and storing session tokens within onboard.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Library: onboard must use cryptographically secure random tokens for session identifiers. Avoid predictable patterns.
    • Library: onboard should provide secure storage options for session tokens. If using cookies, it should recommend or enforce setting the HttpOnly and Secure flags. If using local storage, onboard should document the security implications.
    • Library/Frontend (Integration): Developers integrating onboard must ensure they are using the library's session management features correctly and securely.

Threat: Bypassing Email Verification (Due to onboard Logic Flaw)

  • Description: A flaw in onboard's internal logic allows an attacker to manipulate the client-side code or API calls to bypass the email verification step without directly exploiting a backend vulnerability. This implies a failure in onboard's state management or control flow.
  • Impact: The attacker can create accounts with unverified email addresses, which can be used for spam, abuse, or impersonation.
  • Affected Component: accountCreation module and emailVerification module (specifically, the interaction and state management within onboard).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Library: onboard's code must be thoroughly reviewed and tested to ensure that the email verification step cannot be bypassed through client-side manipulation. State transitions should be carefully controlled.
    • Library: onboard should provide clear documentation and examples on how to securely integrate the email verification flow with the backend.
    • Library/Frontend (Integration): Developers integrating onboard must follow the library's documentation and best practices to ensure the email verification step is correctly implemented.

Threat: Password Reset Token Brute-Forcing (Due to Weak onboard Token Generation)

  • Description: If onboard itself is responsible for generating password reset tokens, and it uses a weak algorithm or insufficient entropy, an attacker can attempt to guess the token sent to a user's email address.
  • Impact: The attacker gains full control of the user's account.
  • Affected Component: passwordReset module (specifically, the function responsible for generating password reset tokens within onboard).
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Library: onboard must use a cryptographically secure random number generator (CSPRNG) to generate password reset tokens. The tokens must be long enough to prevent brute-force attacks (e.g., at least 128 bits of entropy).
    • Library: onboard should provide configuration options to control the length and format of password reset tokens.
    • Library/Frontend (Integration): Developers integrating onboard should ensure they are using the library's recommended settings for token generation.

Threat: Improper Handling of API Keys/Secrets (within onboard)

  • Description: If onboard itself requires API keys or secrets to communicate with third-party services (e.g., email providers, and onboard handles these directly), and these are hardcoded into the client-side JavaScript or improperly managed by onboard, they can be exposed.
  • Impact: Attackers can use the exposed keys to access the third-party services, potentially sending spam, incurring costs, or accessing sensitive data.
  • Affected Component: Any module within onboard that interacts with external services (e.g., emailVerification, socialLogin - if implemented and if onboard manages the credentials directly).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Library: onboard should never hardcode secrets in client-side code.
    • Library: onboard should provide a secure mechanism for developers to provide API keys and secrets, without exposing them in the client-side code. This might involve using a configuration object that is passed to onboard during initialization, but not stored in a way that is accessible to the browser. Ideally, onboard should not handle third-party credentials directly, but instead rely on the backend to act as a proxy.
    • Library/Frontend (Integration): Developers integrating onboard must follow the library's documentation and best practices for handling API keys and secrets.