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Attack Tree Analysis for marcuswestin/webviewjavascriptbridge

Objective: Compromise Application via WebViewJavascriptBridge Exploitation

Attack Tree Visualization

Root: Compromise Application via WebviewJavascriptBridge Exploitation ├───[AND] Exploit Communication Channel Vulnerabilities │ └───[OR] 1. Message Injection Attacks │ └─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] 1.1. Inject Malicious Javascript Payloads via Bridge │ └─── [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit Insecure Message Handling in Native Code ├───[AND] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Native Handler Vulnerabilities │ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] 4. Input Validation Flaws in Native Handlers │ ├─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] 4.1. Command Injection in Native Handlers │ │ └─── [CRITICAL NODE] Pass Malicious Input to System Commands │ ├─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] 4.2. Path Traversal in Native Handlers │ │ └─── [CRITICAL NODE] Access Unauthorized Files/Directories │ └─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] 4.3. SQL Injection in Native Handlers (if DB interaction) │ └─── [CRITICAL NODE] Manipulate Database Queries ├───[AND] [HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Javascript Bridge Vulnerabilities │ └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] 6. XSS in WebView Context leading to Bridge Abuse │ ├─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] 6.1. Stored XSS in WebView Content │ │ └─── [CRITICAL NODE] Inject Malicious Javascript that Calls Bridge Functions │ ├─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] 6.2. Reflected XSS in WebView Content │ │ └─── [CRITICAL NODE] Craft URL to Inject Malicious Javascript │ └─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] 6.3. DOM-based XSS in WebView Content │ └─── [CRITICAL NODE] Manipulate DOM to Inject Malicious Javascript

Attack Tree Path: 1. Message Injection Attacks - 1.1. Inject Malicious Javascript Payloads via Bridge - Exploit Insecure Message Handling in Native Code

  • Vulnerability: Insecure Message Handling in Native Code. Native handlers that process messages received from Javascript via the bridge lack proper input validation and sanitization. They directly use the received data in sensitive operations without checking for malicious content.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Attacker gains the ability to execute Javascript within the WebView (e.g., through XSS or by controlling the WebView's loaded content).
    • Malicious Javascript uses window.WebViewJavascriptBridge.callHandler() to send a message to a vulnerable native handler.
    • The message payload contains malicious commands or data crafted to exploit vulnerabilities in the native handler (e.g., command injection, path traversal, SQL injection).
    • The native handler, due to lack of input validation, processes the malicious payload, leading to code execution or unauthorized actions.
  • Impact: High - Potential for remote code execution within the application's context, data breach, unauthorized access to device resources, and full application compromise.
  • Mitigation: Implement strict input validation and sanitization in all native handlers. Treat all data received from Javascript as untrusted. Use parameterized queries, avoid system commands with user input, and carefully handle file paths.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Native Handler Vulnerabilities - 4. Input Validation Flaws in Native Handlers - 4.1. Command Injection in Native Handlers - Pass Malicious Input to System Commands

  • Vulnerability: Command Injection. Native handlers execute system commands based on input received from Javascript without proper sanitization.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Attacker injects malicious Javascript into the WebView.
    • Malicious Javascript calls a native handler, providing a payload designed to be interpreted as system commands.
    • The native handler directly uses this payload in a system command execution (e.g., using Runtime.getRuntime().exec() in Android or similar functions in iOS).
    • The attacker-controlled commands are executed on the device with the application's privileges.
  • Impact: Critical - Remote code execution on the device, full control over the application and potentially the device itself, data exfiltration, and system disruption.
  • Mitigation: Avoid executing system commands directly from native handlers. If absolutely necessary, use secure alternatives, carefully sanitize input using whitelists, and employ robust escaping techniques.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Native Handler Vulnerabilities - 4. Input Validation Flaws in Native Handlers - 4.2. Path Traversal in Native Handlers - Access Unauthorized Files/Directories

  • Vulnerability: Path Traversal. Native handlers access files based on input from Javascript without proper path validation, allowing access to files outside the intended directories.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Attacker injects malicious Javascript into the WebView.
    • Malicious Javascript calls a native handler that is supposed to read or write files, providing a malicious file path (e.g., "../../../../etc/passwd").
    • The native handler uses this path directly without proper validation.
    • The attacker gains access to sensitive files outside the intended application directory, potentially including system files or other application data.
  • Impact: High - Data breach, access to sensitive application data and potentially system files, privilege escalation, and information disclosure.
  • Mitigation: Always validate and sanitize file paths received from Javascript. Use whitelists of allowed directories and filenames. Employ secure path manipulation functions to prevent traversal attacks.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Exploit Native Handler Vulnerabilities - 4. Input Validation Flaws in Native Handlers - 4.3. SQL Injection in Native Handlers (if DB interaction) - Manipulate Database Queries

  • Vulnerability: SQL Injection. Native handlers that interact with databases construct SQL queries using input from Javascript without proper parameterization, leading to SQL injection vulnerabilities.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Attacker injects malicious Javascript into the WebView.
    • Malicious Javascript calls a native handler that performs database queries, providing malicious SQL code within the input.
    • The native handler constructs SQL queries by directly concatenating this input into the query string.
    • The injected SQL code is executed by the database, allowing the attacker to manipulate database queries, bypass authentication, extract data, modify data, or even drop tables.
  • Impact: High - Data breach, data manipulation, unauthorized access to sensitive information stored in the database, potential for data loss and application compromise.
  • Mitigation: Always use parameterized queries or prepared statements when interacting with databases in native handlers. Never construct SQL queries by directly concatenating user-provided input.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Exploit Javascript Bridge Vulnerabilities - 6. XSS in WebView Context leading to Bridge Abuse - 6.1. Stored XSS in WebView Content - Inject Malicious Javascript that Calls Bridge Functions

  • Vulnerability: Stored XSS. The WebView loads content that is vulnerable to stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). An attacker can inject malicious Javascript that is persistently stored and executed whenever the WebView loads the compromised content.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Attacker finds a stored XSS vulnerability in the WebView content source (e.g., a forum, blog, or user-generated content platform loaded in the WebView).
    • Attacker injects malicious Javascript code into the vulnerable content.
    • When a user loads the WebView content, the malicious Javascript executes.
    • The malicious Javascript uses window.WebViewJavascriptBridge.callHandler() to call native functions and exploit vulnerabilities in the native application via the bridge.
  • Impact: High - Application compromise via the Javascript bridge, potential for data theft, unauthorized actions, and remote control of the application.
  • Mitigation: Implement robust Content Security Policy (CSP) for the WebView. Sanitize and validate all user-generated content displayed in the WebView to prevent stored XSS. Regularly audit and patch WebView content for XSS vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 6. Exploit Javascript Bridge Vulnerabilities - 6. XSS in WebView Context leading to Bridge Abuse - 6.2. Reflected XSS in WebView Content - Craft URL to Inject Malicious Javascript

  • Vulnerability: Reflected XSS. The WebView loads content that is vulnerable to reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). An attacker can craft a malicious URL that, when loaded in the WebView, injects Javascript code into the page.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Attacker identifies a reflected XSS vulnerability in a webpage loaded in the WebView (e.g., a search page that reflects search terms without proper encoding).
    • Attacker crafts a malicious URL containing Javascript code in a parameter that is reflected in the webpage.
    • Attacker tricks a user into opening this malicious URL in the WebView (e.g., via phishing or social engineering).
    • When the WebView loads the URL, the injected Javascript executes.
    • The malicious Javascript uses window.WebViewJavascriptBridge.callHandler() to call native functions and exploit vulnerabilities in the native application via the bridge.
  • Impact: High - Application compromise via the Javascript bridge, potential for data theft, unauthorized actions, and remote control of the application.
  • Mitigation: Properly encode and sanitize all data displayed in the WebView that originates from user input or URL parameters. Avoid directly embedding user input into HTML without proper escaping.

Attack Tree Path: 7. Exploit Javascript Bridge Vulnerabilities - 6. XSS in WebView Context leading to Bridge Abuse - 6.3. DOM-based XSS in WebView Content - Manipulate DOM to Inject Malicious Javascript

  • Vulnerability: DOM-based XSS. Javascript code within the WebView manipulates the Document Object Model (DOM) based on user input without proper sanitization, leading to DOM-based XSS vulnerabilities.
  • Attack Scenario:
    • Attacker finds a DOM-based XSS vulnerability in the Javascript code of the WebView content. This often involves insecure handling of URL fragments, document.referrer, or other client-side data sources.
    • Attacker crafts a malicious URL or manipulates the DOM in a way that injects malicious Javascript code into the WebView's page through DOM manipulation.
    • The injected Javascript executes within the WebView context.
    • The malicious Javascript uses window.WebViewJavascriptBridge.callHandler() to call native functions and exploit vulnerabilities in the native application via the bridge.
  • Impact: High - Application compromise via the Javascript bridge, potential for data theft, unauthorized actions, and remote control of the application.
  • Mitigation: Carefully review and secure all Javascript code in the WebView that manipulates the DOM based on user input. Use secure DOM manipulation techniques and avoid using innerHTML or similar unsafe methods with untrusted data. Regularly audit Javascript code for DOM-based XSS vulnerabilities.