Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
39 lines (32 loc) · 5.77 KB

attack-surface.md

File metadata and controls

39 lines (32 loc) · 5.77 KB

Attack Surface Analysis for mortimergoro/mgswipetablecell

Attack Surface: Input Validation and Injection Vulnerabilities

  • Description: The application fails to properly validate or sanitize data used within the callback functions triggered by swipe actions on table cells. This is the most critical area because mgswipetablecell directly facilitates the execution of this potentially vulnerable code.
  • mgswipetablecell Contribution: The library provides the mechanism (swipe buttons and callbacks) where user-provided or cell-derived data is processed. The library's core functionality is to execute developer-provided code in response to user interaction.
  • Example: A cell displays a user-provided comment. A swipe button triggers a callback that uses this comment directly in a SQL query: db.execute("DELETE FROM comments WHERE comment = '" + cell.commentText + "'"). If cell.commentText is '; DROP TABLE comments; --, the entire comments table is deleted. This is a direct consequence of how mgswipetablecell is used.
  • Impact: Data corruption, data loss, unauthorized data access, potentially remote code execution (depending on the injection type).
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the context and data handled).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer: Implement strict input validation within callback blocks. Use parameterized queries (e.g., db.execute("DELETE FROM comments WHERE comment = ?", cell.commentText)) for all database interactions. Escape/encode data appropriately for network requests and UI display. Use whitelisting of allowed values where possible. Avoid string concatenation for building queries or commands. This is paramount for any code executed within the mgswipetablecell callbacks.
    • User: (No direct mitigation; relies entirely on the developer's secure coding practices).

Attack Surface: Denial of Service (DoS) via Memory Exhaustion (related to callback actions)

  • Description: The application becomes unresponsive or crashes due to excessive memory consumption specifically triggered by actions within mgswipetablecell callbacks. This differs from general memory leaks; it's about the actions the library enables.
  • mgswipetablecell Contribution: The library's callbacks provide a mechanism to execute potentially resource-intensive operations in response to user swipes. If these operations are not carefully managed, they can lead to DoS.
  • Example: A swipe button triggers a callback that downloads a large file from a URL provided in the cell's data. An attacker could populate the table with many cells, each referencing a very large file. Repeatedly swiping and triggering these downloads could exhaust memory or network resources, leading to a DoS. This is a direct result of the callback functionality provided by mgswipetablecell.
  • Impact: Application crash, unavailability of service.
  • Risk Severity: High (if callbacks can trigger resource-intensive operations).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer: Implement rate limiting or throttling within the callback functions. Limit the size of data that can be processed or downloaded within a callback. Use asynchronous operations and background queues to prevent blocking the main thread. Carefully manage memory allocation and deallocation within the callbacks. Avoid performing any long-running or blocking operations directly within the callback.
    • User: (Limited direct mitigation; relies on developer implementation).

Attack Surface: UI Manipulation / Phishing (Direct Vulnerability in Library)

  • Description: A vulnerability within mgswipetablecell itself allows an attacker to manipulate the appearance or behavior of swipe buttons, bypassing the developer's intended configuration. This is distinct from the developer misusing the library; it's about a flaw in the library's code.
    • mgswipetablecell Contribution: If the library has vulnerabilities in its rendering or event handling logic, it could be directly exploited to alter button appearance or redirect actions.
    • Example: A hypothetical vulnerability in mgswipetablecell allows an attacker to inject CSS (if it uses web views internally) or manipulate native UI elements to change the text of a "Delete" button to "Save," even if the developer correctly configured it as "Delete." This is a direct vulnerability in the library.
    • Impact: Unintended data modification, data loss, potentially account compromise.
    • Risk Severity: High (if such a vulnerability exists).
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: This is difficult to mitigate directly if the vulnerability is in the library itself. The best approach is to:
        • Use a well-maintained and actively developed library: Check the library's GitHub repository for recent activity, issue reports, and security advisories.
        • Perform a security audit of the library's code (if feasible): This is a more advanced step, but if the application is highly sensitive, it might be necessary.
        • Report any suspected vulnerabilities to the library maintainers: Contribute to the security of the open-source project.
        • Consider alternative libraries: If a serious vulnerability is found and not patched promptly, consider switching to a more secure alternative.
      • User: (No direct mitigation; relies on the developer choosing a secure library and keeping it updated). Keep the application updated.