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Attack Tree Analysis for mortimergoro/mgswipetablecell

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code or DoS via mgswipetablecell Vulnerabilities

Attack Tree Visualization

                                     +-------------------------------------------------+
                                     |  Attacker Goal: Execute Arbitrary Code or DoS  |
                                     |  via mgswipetablecell Vulnerabilities          |
                                     +-------------------------------------------------+
                                                        |
          +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
          |                                                                                                                |
+-------------------------+ [CN]                                                                           +-------------------------+ [CN]
|  1. Exploit Delegate    |                                                                                |  2. Exploit Button      |
|     Callback Issues     |                                                                                |     Handling Issues     |
+-------------------------+                                                                                +-------------------------+
          |
+-----------------+-----------------+                                                                    +-----------------+
| 1.a. Inject     | 1.b. Trigger    |                                                                    | 2.a. Inject     |
| Malicious Code  | Unexpected     |                                                                    | Malicious Code  |
| via Delegate    | Delegate Calls | [HR]                                                                    | via Button      |
| Parameters      |                 |                                                                    | Callback        |
| [HR][CN]        |                 |                                                                    | [HR][CN]        |
+-----------------+-----------------+                                                                    +-----------------+
          |                                                                                                                |
+-----------------+                                                                                        +-----------------+
| 1.a.i. Bypass   |                                                                                        | 2.a.i. Bypass   |
| Input Validation| [HR][CN]                                                                               | Input Validation| [HR][CN]
+-----------------+                                                                                        +-----------------+
          |
+-----------------+
| 1.a.i.1. Craft  | [HR]
| Malformed Input |
+-----------------+

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Delegate Callback Issues [CN]

  • Description: This is the primary entry point for attacks leveraging the delegate mechanism of MGSwipeTableCell. The library relies heavily on delegates to handle events and actions. Weaknesses in how the application or the library handles these delegates can be exploited.
  • Why Critical: This node is the foundation for several high-risk attack paths. If an attacker can influence or control delegate calls, they gain significant control over the application's behavior.

Attack Tree Path: 1.a. Inject Malicious Code via Delegate Parameters [HR][CN]

  • Description: The attacker crafts malicious input that is passed as a parameter to a delegate method. If the application doesn't properly sanitize this input, the malicious code can be executed within the application's context.
  • Why High-Risk: This is a direct path to code execution, which has a high impact (data theft, system compromise).
  • Why Critical: Successful execution of this step achieves the attacker's primary goal (code execution).
  • Example: If a delegate method displays user-provided text in a UILabel without escaping, an attacker could inject HTML/JavaScript (if the label renders HTML) or potentially Objective-C/Swift code if the input is used in a dynamic context.

Attack Tree Path: 1.a.i. Bypass Input Validation [HR][CN]

  • Description: The attacker finds a way to circumvent any input validation checks performed by the application or the library. This could involve exploiting flaws in the validation logic, finding edge cases, or using encoding techniques to obfuscate the malicious payload.
  • Why High-Risk: This is a necessary step for successful code injection. Without bypassing validation, the attack is likely to be blocked.
  • Why Critical: This enables the core attack (code injection).
  • Example: If the application only checks for the presence of certain characters (e.g., < and >) but doesn't properly handle HTML entities (e.g., &lt; and &gt;), an attacker could bypass the validation.

Attack Tree Path: 1.a.i.1. Craft Malformed Input [HR]

  • Description: The attacker carefully constructs the malicious input, taking into account the specific vulnerability and the expected format of the delegate parameters.
  • Why High-Risk: This is the final step in preparing the attack payload.
  • Example: The attacker might craft a string containing JavaScript code, encoded using HTML entities, designed to be executed when the delegate method processes the input.

Attack Tree Path: 1.b. Trigger Unexpected Delegate Calls [HR]

  • Description: The attacker manipulates the application's state or network requests to cause delegate methods to be called at unexpected times, with unexpected frequencies, or with incorrect parameters.
  • Why High-Risk: While less likely to lead to code execution, this can cause a denial-of-service (DoS) by overwhelming the application or triggering unintended behavior. It can also lead to data inconsistencies.
  • Example: An attacker might repeatedly trigger a delegate method responsible for updating a database, potentially leading to data corruption or a resource exhaustion DoS.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Button Handling Issues [CN]

  • Description: This is the entry point for attacks targeting the swipeable buttons provided by MGSwipeTableCell. Vulnerabilities in how these buttons are created, managed, or how their callbacks are invoked can be exploited.
  • Why Critical: Similar to delegate issues, this node opens up avenues for attacks that directly leverage the core functionality of the library.

Attack Tree Path: 2.a. Inject Malicious Code via Button Callback [HR][CN]

  • Description: Identical in principle to 1.a, but the injection point is the callback function associated with a button action. The attacker crafts malicious input that is passed to the button's callback handler.
  • Why High-Risk: Direct path to code execution, high impact.
  • Why Critical: Achieves the attacker's primary goal (code execution).
  • Example: If a button's callback displays user-provided data without sanitization, an attacker could inject malicious code.

Attack Tree Path: 2.a.i. Bypass Input Validation [HR][CN]

  • Description: Identical in principle to 1.a.i, but targeting the input validation for button callbacks.
  • Why High-Risk: Necessary for successful code injection via button callbacks.
  • Why Critical: Enables the core attack (code injection).
  • Example: Same as 1.a.i, but the vulnerable input validation is within the button's callback handler.