attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for mutualmobile/mmdrawercontroller

Objective: To gain unauthorized access to sensitive application data or functionality by exploiting vulnerabilities or weaknesses introduced by the mmdrawercontroller library within the target application. This could manifest as information disclosure, privilege escalation (within the app's context), or disruption of application functionality.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via mmdrawercontroller [HIGH-RISK PATH - Potential for Security Bypass & Data Disclosure]
├── Bypass Security Checks via Drawer [CRITICAL NODE - High Impact, Medium Likelihood] [HIGH-RISK PATH - Security Bypass]
│   ├── Drawer State Dependent Security Flaws [CRITICAL NODE - High Impact, Low Likelihood, Low Detection Difficulty]
│   └── Unintended Access to Protected UI [CRITICAL NODE - Medium to High Impact, Medium Likelihood, Medium Detection Difficulty] [HIGH-RISK PATH - Information Disclosure/Privilege Escalation]
└── Abuse Intended Functionality of Drawer Mechanism [HIGH-RISK PATH - Potential for UI Redress & Data Disclosure]
    ├── UI Redress/Clickjacking (Overlay Attacks)
    │   ├── Overlay Malicious Elements via Drawer [CRITICAL NODE - Medium to High Impact, Low Likelihood, Medium Detection Difficulty]
    └── Information Disclosure via Drawer Content [CRITICAL NODE - Medium to High Impact, Medium Likelihood, Low Detection Difficulty] [HIGH-RISK PATH - Data Disclosure]
        ├── Drawer Content Exposes Sensitive Data [CRITICAL NODE - Medium to High Impact, Medium Likelihood, Low Detection Difficulty]
        └── Developer Misconfiguration Places Sensitive Data in Drawer [CRITICAL NODE - Medium to High Impact, Medium Likelihood, Low Detection Difficulty]

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Application via mmdrawercontroller [HIGH-RISK PATH - Potential for Security Bypass & Data Disclosure]:

• Description: The overarching goal representing the highest risk, as successful attacks along this path lead to application compromise. This path encompasses vulnerabilities that can bypass security measures or disclose sensitive data.

Attack Tree Path: Bypass Security Checks via Drawer [CRITICAL NODE - High Impact, Medium Likelihood] [HIGH-RISK PATH - Security Bypass]:

• Description: A critical node and high-risk path because it directly targets and potentially circumvents application security mechanisms. Success here leads to unauthorized access or actions.
• Attack Vectors:
  • Drawer State Dependent Security Flaws [CRITICAL NODE - High Impact, Low Likelihood, Low Detection Difficulty]:
    • Description: Exploiting situations where application security logic incorrectly relies on the drawer's state (e.g., assuming security checks are only needed when the drawer is closed).
    • Attack Vectors:
      • Bypassing authentication or authorization checks by manipulating the drawer state.
      • Accessing restricted functionalities or data when the drawer is in a specific state that the application incorrectly considers "safe".
  • Unintended Access to Protected UI [CRITICAL NODE - Medium to High Impact, Medium Likelihood, Medium Detection Difficulty] [HIGH-RISK PATH - Information Disclosure/Privilege Escalation]:
    • Description: Leveraging the drawer mechanism to gain access to UI elements or functionalities that are intended to be protected or hidden.
    • Attack Vectors:
      • Drawer revealing hidden UI elements due to incorrect layering or view hierarchy management.
      • Drawer state transitions or animations unintentionally exposing protected UI elements.
      • Accessing administrative or privileged functionalities through the drawer that were not intended to be accessible in that context.

Attack Tree Path: Abuse Intended Functionality of Drawer Mechanism [HIGH-RISK PATH - Potential for UI Redress & Data Disclosure]:

• Description: A high-risk path focusing on misusing the intended features of the drawer to perform malicious actions, specifically UI Redress/Clickjacking and Information Disclosure.

  • UI Redress/Clickjacking (Overlay Attacks):

    • Overlay Malicious Elements via Drawer [CRITICAL NODE - Medium to High Impact, Low Likelihood, Medium Detection Difficulty]:
      • Description: Exploiting potential vulnerabilities (likely in the application's content loading within the drawer, not mmdrawercontroller itself) to overlay malicious UI elements on top of legitimate application UI within the drawer.
      • Attack Vectors:
        • Injecting malicious HTML/JavaScript into the drawer content if the application allows dynamic content loading without proper sanitization.
        • Using CSS or other UI manipulation techniques to overlay deceptive elements within the drawer's view.

  • Information Disclosure via Drawer Content [CRITICAL NODE - Medium to High Impact, Medium Likelihood, Low Detection Difficulty] [HIGH-RISK PATH - Data Disclosure]:

    • Description: Exploiting the drawer to access or reveal sensitive information that is unintentionally placed or exposed within the drawer's content.
    • Attack Vectors:
      • Drawer Content Exposes Sensitive Data [CRITICAL NODE - Medium to High Impact, Medium Likelihood, Low Detection Difficulty]:
        • Description: Sensitive information (credentials, API keys, internal data) is directly placed in the drawer's UI elements or data sources.
        • Attack Vectors:
          • Hardcoding sensitive data directly into drawer layouts or code.
          • Unintentionally displaying sensitive data in drawer lists, tables, or text fields.
      • Developer Misconfiguration Places Sensitive Data in Drawer [CRITICAL NODE - Medium to High Impact, Medium Likelihood, Low Detection Difficulty]:
        • Description: Configuration errors or poor coding practices lead to sensitive data being inadvertently loaded or displayed in the drawer.
        • Attack Vectors:
          • Incorrectly configured data bindings or data sources in the drawer leading to exposure of sensitive data.
          • Configuration files or settings containing sensitive information being accidentally loaded and displayed in the drawer.