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Threat Model Analysis for mutualmobile/mmdrawercontroller

Threat: Unauthorized Drawer Opening/Manipulation via External Input

  • Description: A malicious application (or a compromised website via deep linking) sends crafted URL scheme requests or IPC messages. These messages exploit a lack of validation in the application's handling of these external inputs, directly targeting the MMDrawerController API to force the drawer to open or change its content. The attacker leverages the application's integration with MMDrawerController to bypass intended access controls.
  • Impact:
    • Exposure of sensitive information displayed within the drawer.
    • Unauthorized access to features accessible only through the drawer.
    • Potential injection of malicious content if the drawer dynamically loads data based on the external input that controls MMDrawerController.
  • Affected Component: The application's implementation of URL scheme handlers and IPC mechanisms that directly interact with MMDrawerController methods. Specifically, code that receives external requests and then calls MMDrawerController's open(_:animated:completion:), closeDrawer(animated:completion:), or methods that update the drawer's content based on that external input. The vulnerability lies in how the application uses MMDrawerController in response to untrusted data.
  • Risk Severity: High (Potentially Critical if sensitive data or critical functionality is exposed).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict Input Validation: Rigorously validate all data received via URL schemes or IPC before passing it to any MMDrawerController methods. Check data types, lengths, formats, and expected values. Reject any invalid input.
    • Authentication and Authorization: Before allowing external requests to manipulate the MMDrawerController, verify the requesting application's identity (if possible) and ensure it has the necessary permissions. This is crucial for any IPC or URL scheme that controls the drawer.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Avoid using external control (URL schemes/IPC) for sensitive MMDrawerController operations. Prefer internal application state management for critical actions, minimizing the attack surface.
    • Secure Coding Practices: Follow secure coding guidelines to prevent injection vulnerabilities, especially when handling external input that affects the drawer's content or state.

Threat: Denial of Service (DoS) via Rapid State Changes Targeting MMDrawerController

  • Description: An attacker (malicious app or user with debugging tools) repeatedly and rapidly triggers state changes specifically on the MMDrawerController (opening/closing). This is done by exploiting any available interface (URL scheme, IPC, or even direct UI manipulation if possible) to call MMDrawerController's open/close methods in rapid succession. The attack focuses on overwhelming the library's animation and state management.
  • Impact:
    • The application becomes unresponsive or crashes due to excessive resource consumption (CPU, memory) caused by MMDrawerController's rapid animation cycles and any associated content updates triggered by those state changes.
    • User experience is severely degraded.
  • Affected Component: The MMDrawerController itself, specifically its animation logic and state management functions. The attack targets the core functionality of the library related to opening and closing the drawer. The application code that calls MMDrawerController's open/close methods is the vector, but the vulnerability is in how the library handles (or fails to handle) rapid state transitions.
  • Risk Severity: High (if it leads to a reliable application crash).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Rate Limiting (Applied to MMDrawerController Calls): Implement rate limiting specifically on calls to MMDrawerController's open/close methods. Prevent the drawer from being opened or closed more than a certain number of times within a given time period. This protects the library directly.
    • Debouncing (Applied to MMDrawerController Calls): Use debouncing techniques to ignore rapid, successive open/close requests to MMDrawerController. Only process the first or last request in a series of rapid events, preventing the library from being overwhelmed.
    • Performance Optimization (of Drawer Content): While not directly mitigating the MMDrawerController attack, optimizing the drawer's content and rendering can reduce the impact of rapid state changes. This is a secondary mitigation.
    • Asynchronous Operations (for Drawer-Triggered Actions): Ensure that any network requests or long-running operations triggered by MMDrawerController's state changes are handled asynchronously and don't block the main thread, reducing the likelihood of a complete freeze.