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Attack Tree Analysis for mwaterfall/mwphotobrowser

Objective: Compromise Photo Access/Integrity/Availability via MWPhotoBrowser

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Compromise Photo Access/Integrity/Availability via MWPhotoBrowser ├── 1. Unauthorized Access to Photos │ ├── 1.1. Bypass Photo Source Authentication/Authorization [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 1.1.1. Exploit Weaknesses in MWPhotoBrowser's Delegate Methods [CRITICAL] │ │ │ ├── 1.1.1.1. Improper Handling of photoAtIndex: (if caching sensitive data without proper encryption/access control) [HIGH RISK] │ │ │ ├── 1.1.1.3. Vulnerability in Custom Photo Source Implementation (if the app uses a custom MWPhoto subclass or data source) │ │ │ │ ├── 1.1.1.3.1. Logic Errors in Data Fetching/Validation [HIGH RISK] │ │ │ │ ├── 1.1.1.3.2. Exposure of API Keys/Tokens within the Custom Source [CRITICAL] │ │ ├── 1.1.2. Intercept Network Traffic (if MWPhotoBrowser fetches photos over the network without proper security) │ │ │ ├── 1.1.2.1. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attack (if HTTPS isn't enforced or certificate validation is weak/bypassed) [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 1.1.3. Exploit Local Data Storage Vulnerabilities (if photos are cached insecurely) │ │ │ ├── 1.1.3.1. Access Unencrypted Cached Images on Device Storage [HIGH RISK] ├── 3. Denial of Service (DoS) Specific to Photo Browsing │ ├── 3.1.2. Resource Exhaustion │ │ │ ├── 3.1.2.1. Trigger Excessive Memory Allocation (e.g., by providing a huge number of photos or very large images) [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 3.3 Freeze UI │ ├── 3.3.1 Long operation on main thread │ │ ├── 3.3.1.1 Decoding large image on main thread [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 3.3.1.2 Synchronous network request on main thread [HIGH RISK]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Unauthorized Access to Photos

  • 1.1. Bypass Photo Source Authentication/Authorization [HIGH RISK]

    • Description: This is the overarching attack vector for gaining unauthorized access. The attacker aims to circumvent the mechanisms that control who can see which photos.
    • Sub-Vectors:
      • 1.1.1. Exploit Weaknesses in MWPhotoBrowser's Delegate Methods [CRITICAL]
        • Description: The delegate methods are the application's interface to MWPhotoBrowser. Flaws here are critical.
        • Sub-Vectors:
          • 1.1.1.1. Improper Handling of photoAtIndex: (caching) [HIGH RISK]
            • Description: The application uses photoAtIndex: to provide MWPhotoBrowser with photo data. If the application fetches sensitive photos and then caches them insecurely (without encryption or proper file system permissions), an attacker with device access (physical or via another vulnerability) can retrieve these cached images.
            • Likelihood: Medium
            • Impact: High
            • Effort: Low
            • Skill Level: Intermediate
            • Detection Difficulty: Medium
          • 1.1.1.3. Vulnerability in Custom Photo Source Implementation
            • Description: If the application uses a custom MWPhoto subclass or a custom data source, vulnerabilities in this custom code can be exploited.
            • Sub-Vectors:
              • 1.1.1.3.1. Logic Errors in Data Fetching/Validation [HIGH RISK]
                • Description: The custom photo source might have flaws in how it fetches data from a backend or validates user input. For example, it might fail to properly check user permissions before returning a photo, or it might be vulnerable to path traversal attacks if it uses user-supplied data to construct file paths.
                • Likelihood: Medium
                • Impact: High
                • Effort: Medium
                • Skill Level: Intermediate
                • Detection Difficulty: Medium
              • 1.1.1.3.2. Exposure of API Keys/Tokens within the Custom Source [CRITICAL]
                • Description: Hardcoding API keys, access tokens, or other secrets directly into the custom photo source code is a critical vulnerability. If an attacker can obtain the application's binary (e.g., through a jailbroken device or by downloading it from a third-party app store), they can easily extract these secrets and use them to access the photo source directly.
                • Likelihood: Low
                • Impact: Very High
                • Effort: Very Low
                • Skill Level: Novice
                • Detection Difficulty: Easy
      • 1.1.2. Intercept Network Traffic
        • Sub-Vectors:
          • 1.1.2.1. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attack (no HTTPS or weak validation) [HIGH RISK]
            • Description: If MWPhotoBrowser fetches photos over the network and the application does not enforce HTTPS or uses weak certificate validation, an attacker can perform a MitM attack. This involves positioning themselves between the application and the server (e.g., by controlling a Wi-Fi hotspot) and intercepting the communication. The attacker can then view the unencrypted photo data.
            • Likelihood: Medium
            • Impact: High
            • Effort: Medium
            • Skill Level: Intermediate
            • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • 1.1.3. Exploit Local Data Storage Vulnerabilities
        • Sub-Vectors:
          • 1.1.3.1. Access Unencrypted Cached Images on Device Storage [HIGH RISK]
            • Description: Even if network communication is secure, if the application caches photos locally without encryption, an attacker who gains access to the device (physically or through another vulnerability) can access these cached images. This is similar to 1.1.1.1, but focuses on the general caching mechanism, not just caching within the delegate method.
            • Likelihood: Medium
            • Impact: High
            • Effort: Low
            • Skill Level: Intermediate
            • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 2. Denial of Service (DoS)

  • 3.1.2. Resource Exhaustion

    • Sub-Vectors:
      • 3.1.2.1. Trigger Excessive Memory Allocation [HIGH RISK]
        • Description: The attacker attempts to make the application (specifically the MWPhotoBrowser component) allocate so much memory that it crashes or becomes unresponsive. This could be done by providing a very large number of photos to display or by providing extremely large image files. If the application doesn't have limits on the number or size of images it handles, it's vulnerable to this.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: Medium
        • Effort: Medium
        • Skill Level: Intermediate
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium

  • 3.3 Freeze UI

    • Sub-Vectors:
      • 3.3.1 Long operation on main thread
        • Sub-Vectors:
          • 3.3.1.1 Decoding large image on main thread [HIGH RISK]
            • Description: If a very large image is decoded directly on the main UI thread, it will block the thread, causing the application's user interface to freeze until the decoding is complete. This creates a poor user experience and can be considered a form of DoS.
            • Likelihood: Medium
            • Impact: Low
            • Effort: Low
            • Skill Level: Novice
            • Detection Difficulty: Easy
          • 3.3.1.2 Synchronous network request on main thread [HIGH RISK]
            • Description: Similar to image decoding, if a network request to fetch a photo is made synchronously on the main thread, the UI will freeze until the request completes (or times out). This is especially problematic with slow or unreliable network connections.
            • Likelihood: Medium
            • Impact: Low
            • Effort: Low
            • Skill Level: Novice
            • Detection Difficulty: Easy