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Attack Tree Analysis for nicklockwood/icarousel

Objective: Compromise Application User via iCarousel

Attack Tree Visualization

  • Attack Goal: Compromise Application User via iCarousel [CN]
      1. Exploit Vulnerabilities in iCarousel Library Code [CN]
      • 1.1. Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities [CN]
      1. Exploit Insecure Application Usage of iCarousel [CN] [HR]
      • 2.1. Insecure Data Handling Passed to iCarousel [CN] [HR]
        • 2.1.1. Displaying Untrusted Content without Sanitization [HR]

Attack Tree Path: Attack Goal: Compromise Application User via iCarousel [CN]

  • This is the overarching objective. Success means the attacker has achieved some level of compromise affecting the application user through vulnerabilities or misuse related to the iCarousel library.

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Vulnerabilities in iCarousel Library Code [CN]

  • Attack Vector Category: Exploiting inherent flaws within the iCarousel library's code itself.
  • Focus: Identifying and leveraging bugs in iCarousel's implementation.
  • Potential Outcomes: Code execution, application crash, denial of service, information disclosure (depending on the specific vulnerability).

Attack Tree Path: 1.1. Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities [CN]

  • Attack Vector Category: Memory safety issues within iCarousel.
  • Specific Attack Vectors:
    • Buffer Overflow in Data Handling:
      • Action: Provide excessively large or malformed data (images, views) to iCarousel.
      • Mechanism: Overwhelm iCarousel's data processing, causing it to write beyond allocated memory buffers.
      • Potential Impact: Code execution if attacker can control overwritten memory, application crash, denial of service.
    • Use-After-Free Vulnerabilities:
      • Action: Manipulate carousel state (rapid scrolling, view recycling) to trigger use-after-free.
      • Mechanism: Exploit flaws in iCarousel's object lifecycle management, accessing memory that has been freed.
      • Potential Impact: Code execution if attacker can control freed memory, application crash, denial of service.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Insecure Application Usage of iCarousel [CN] [HR]

  • Attack Vector Category: Exploiting vulnerabilities arising from how the application uses iCarousel, rather than flaws in iCarousel itself.
  • Focus: Identifying insecure coding practices in the application's integration with iCarousel.
  • Potential Outcomes: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Path Traversal, Denial of Service, Information Disclosure.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1. Insecure Data Handling Passed to iCarousel [CN] [HR]

  • Attack Vector Category: Specifically targeting the data that the application provides to iCarousel for display or processing.
  • Focus: Exploiting lack of input validation and sanitization in application code when feeding data to iCarousel.
  • Potential Outcomes: XSS, Path Traversal, Denial of Service, Information Disclosure.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1. Displaying Untrusted Content without Sanitization [HR]

  • Attack Vector Category: Failing to properly sanitize untrusted content before displaying it within iCarousel views.
  • Specific Attack Vectors:
    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Untrusted HTML/JavaScript:
      • Action: Inject malicious HTML or JavaScript code into data displayed by iCarousel (especially if using web views within carousel items).
      • Mechanism: If the application renders HTML content provided by users or external sources without sanitization, injected scripts can execute in the user's browser/webview context.
      • Potential Impact: Session hijacking, cookie theft, redirection to malicious sites, defacement, malicious actions performed on behalf of the user.
    • Path Traversal via Untrusted URLs/File Paths:
      • Action: Inject path traversal sequences (e.g., ../../sensitive_file) into URLs or file paths used by iCarousel to load resources.
      • Mechanism: If the application uses user-controlled data to construct file paths for iCarousel to load resources (images, etc.) without proper validation, attackers can access files outside the intended directory.
      • Potential Impact: Information disclosure, access to sensitive files on the user's device or server.