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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for nicklockwood/icarousel

Attack Surface: Malicious Data Source

Attackers inject malicious content into the data source used to populate the iCarousel.

  • iCarousel Contribution: iCarousel displays the provided data, acting as the direct conduit for the malicious content to reach the user or application. This is a direct involvement because iCarousel is the component rendering the potentially malicious data.
  • Example: An attacker injects a JavaScript payload (XSS) into a text field that is then displayed within an iCarousel item. Another example: attacker injects URL to the malicious website.
  • Impact: Code execution (XSS), data theft, phishing, application compromise, denial of service (if the malicious data consumes excessive resources).
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on how the data is used and the lack of sanitization).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers: Implement strict input validation and sanitization for all data used to populate the iCarousel, regardless of source. This is paramount. Use output encoding/escaping appropriate for the context (e.g., HTML encoding for text, URL encoding for URLs). Consider using a Content Security Policy (CSP) to restrict the types of content that can be loaded. Validate data types rigorously. Never trust data from external sources.
    • Users: (Limited direct mitigation; relies entirely on developer implementation).

Attack Surface: Malicious Custom Views (If Applicable)

If the application allows user-controlled input to influence the creation or configuration of custom views within the iCarousel, attackers could inject malicious code.

  • iCarousel Contribution: iCarousel directly displays and renders these custom views, making it the immediate point of execution for any injected malicious code.
  • Example: If a custom view renders user-provided HTML without sanitization, an attacker could inject a <script> tag containing malicious JavaScript (XSS).
  • Impact: Code execution (XSS), data theft, phishing, application compromise.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical (if user-provided content is used in custom views without any sanitization).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers: Treat custom views as completely untrusted if they incorporate any user-provided data. Implement rigorous sanitization and validation of all data used in the creation and configuration of custom views. Use output encoding/escaping as appropriate (HTML encoding, etc.). Apply the principle of least privilege – only grant the custom view the absolute minimum necessary permissions. Assume any user-influenced part of the custom view is a potential attack vector.
    • Users: (No direct mitigation; relies entirely on developer implementation).