Objective: Compromise Application using ios-runtime-headers
Attack Goal: Compromise Application using ios-runtime-headers [HIGH RISK FOCUS]
└───[OR]─> Exploit Vulnerabilities Introduced by ios-runtime-headers Usage [HIGH RISK FOCUS]
├───[OR]─> 1. Incorrect Runtime API Usage [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
│ └───[OR]─> 1.1. Memory Corruption via Runtime APIs [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
│ ├───[AND]─> 1.1.1. Identify vulnerable runtime API usage in application code (e.g., incorrect memory management, buffer overflows when interacting with runtime objects)
│ └───[AND]─> 1.1.2. Craft input or trigger application state to exploit memory corruption vulnerability via runtime API calls
└───[OR]─> 2. Exploiting Vulnerabilities in Application Logic Exposed by Runtime Headers [HIGH RISK FOCUS]
├───[OR]─> 2.1. Accessing Private APIs via Headers (If Used) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
│ ├───[AND]─> 2.1.1. Application uses ios-runtime-headers
to access private or undocumented iOS APIs.
│ └───[AND]─> 2.1.2. Exploit vulnerabilities within these private APIs or their interaction with the application. (Note: Private APIs are inherently riskier and less tested).
└───[OR]─> 2.2. Bypassing Security Checks via Runtime Manipulation [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
├───[AND]─> 2.2.1. Application implements security checks that rely on assumptions about object states or method behavior.
└───[AND]─> 2.2.2. Use runtime APIs (exposed by headers) to manipulate object states or method behavior to bypass these security checks. (e.g., modify object properties, swizzle methods to return different values).
- Description: The attacker analyzes the application's source code to pinpoint instances where runtime APIs from
ios-runtime-headers
are used in a way that could lead to memory corruption. This includes looking for:- Incorrect memory allocation or deallocation when working with runtime objects.
- Buffer overflows when copying data to or from runtime structures.
- Type mismatches or incorrect casting leading to memory access errors.
- Use-after-free vulnerabilities due to improper object lifecycle management in runtime contexts.
- Example Scenarios:
- Using
object_copy
or similar functions without correctly sizing buffers, leading to buffer overflows. - Incorrectly managing the retain/release cycle of Objective-C objects obtained through runtime APIs, causing use-after-free.
- Casting a runtime object to an incorrect type and then accessing its members, leading to memory corruption.
- Using
Attack Tree Path: Attack Vector 1.1.2: Craft input or trigger application state to exploit memory corruption vulnerability via runtime API calls
- Description: Once a vulnerable code path (1.1.1) is identified, the attacker crafts specific inputs or manipulates the application's state to trigger the memory corruption vulnerability during runtime API calls. This might involve:
- Providing overly long strings or data to functions that interact with runtime objects, triggering buffer overflows.
- Manipulating object relationships or application logic to create conditions for use-after-free when runtime objects are involved.
- Exploiting race conditions or timing issues to trigger memory corruption during concurrent runtime operations.
- Exploitation Goal: Successful exploitation of memory corruption can lead to:
- Arbitrary code execution, allowing the attacker to gain full control of the application and potentially the device.
- Denial of service by crashing the application.
- Data breaches by reading sensitive information from memory.
Attack Tree Path: Attack Vector 2.1.1: Application uses ios-runtime-headers
to access private or undocumented iOS APIs
- Description: The attacker determines if the application utilizes
ios-runtime-headers
to interact with private or undocumented iOS APIs. This can be identified through:- Code review of the application source code, looking for usage of symbols or functions that are known to be private iOS APIs (often identifiable by naming conventions or lack of public documentation).
- Runtime analysis of the application, monitoring API calls and identifying calls to private frameworks or functions.
- Static analysis tools that can detect the usage of private APIs.
- Risk Factor: Using private APIs is inherently risky because:
- Private APIs are not publicly documented, making it harder for developers to understand their behavior and potential vulnerabilities.
- Apple can change or remove private APIs without notice, leading to application instability and potential security issues.
- Private APIs are often less rigorously tested and may contain undiscovered vulnerabilities.
Attack Tree Path: Attack Vector 2.1.2: Exploit vulnerabilities within these private APIs or their interaction with the application
- Description: If the application uses private APIs, the attacker attempts to identify and exploit vulnerabilities within these APIs or in the way the application interacts with them. This involves:
- Reverse engineering the private APIs to understand their functionality and identify potential weaknesses (e.g., buffer overflows, logic errors, authentication bypasses).
- Analyzing the application's code to find vulnerabilities in how it uses the private APIs (e.g., incorrect parameter passing, improper error handling, insecure data handling).
- Exploitation Goal: Exploiting vulnerabilities in private APIs can have significant impact due to the often privileged nature of these APIs and their potential access to sensitive system functionalities. This can lead to:
- System-level compromise, potentially gaining control beyond the application sandbox.
- Data breaches by accessing sensitive system data or bypassing security restrictions.
- Application instability or denial of service by triggering crashes or unexpected behavior in private APIs.
Attack Tree Path: Attack Vector 2.2.1: Application implements security checks that rely on assumptions about object states or method behavior
- Description: The attacker analyzes the application's security mechanisms to identify security checks that are based on assumptions about the state of Objective-C objects or the behavior of Objective-C methods. This could include checks that:
- Examine object properties to determine authorization or access rights.
- Rely on the return values of specific methods for authentication or validation.
- Assume certain method calls will always have specific side effects or behaviors.
- Vulnerable Security Check Examples:
- Checking a user object's "isAdmin" property for authorization.
- Validating user input by relying on a method to sanitize data, assuming it always performs sanitization correctly.
- Assuming a method will always return a specific error code if authentication fails.
Attack Tree Path: Attack Vector 2.2.2: Use runtime APIs (exposed by headers) to manipulate object states or method behavior to bypass these security checks
- Description: The attacker leverages runtime APIs from
ios-runtime-headers
to manipulate object states or method behavior in order to bypass the identified security checks (2.2.1). This can be achieved through techniques like:- Object Property Modification: Using runtime APIs to directly modify object properties that are used in security checks (e.g., changing "isAdmin" property to
true
). - Method Swizzling: Replacing the implementation of a security-critical method with a malicious implementation that always returns a successful result or bypasses the intended security logic.
- Dynamic Object Creation/Manipulation: Creating or manipulating objects at runtime to circumvent security checks that rely on specific object types or configurations.
- Object Property Modification: Using runtime APIs to directly modify object properties that are used in security checks (e.g., changing "isAdmin" property to
- Exploitation Goal: Successfully bypassing security checks can lead to:
- Unauthorized access to restricted functionalities or data.
- Privilege escalation, gaining higher levels of access than intended.
- Circumvention of authentication or authorization mechanisms.
- Data breaches by accessing protected resources.