attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for romaonthego/residemenu

Objective: To compromise application that use given project by exploiting weaknesses or vulnerabilities within the project itself.

Attack Tree Visualization

• Attack Goal: Compromise Application via ResideMenu Vulnerabilities
  • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 1.1. Overlay Attacks / UI Redressing [CRITICAL NODE]
    • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 1.1.1. Inject Malicious Views on Top of Menu [CRITICAL NODE]
      • 1.1.1.1. Exploit insecure view hierarchy management in ResideMenu
      • 1.1.1.2. Leverage timing issues during menu transitions to inject views
  • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 2.1. Menu State Confusion [CRITICAL NODE]
    • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 2.1.1. Desynchronize Menu State with Application State [CRITICAL NODE]
      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 2.1.1.1. Force menu to be open when application logic expects it closed (or vice versa) [CRITICAL NODE]
      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 2.1.1.2. Bypass security checks based on menu state assumptions [CRITICAL NODE - Critical Security Impact]
  • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 2.2. Insecure Menu Item Handling [CRITICAL NODE]
    • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 2.2.1. Vulnerable Action Handling for Menu Items [CRITICAL NODE]
      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 2.2.1.1. Menu item actions susceptible to injection attacks (if dynamically constructed) [CRITICAL NODE - Critical Security Impact]
      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 2.2.1.2. Lack of proper input validation when menu items trigger actions [CRITICAL NODE - Critical Security Impact]
  • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 3.1. Misuse of ResideMenu API [CRITICAL NODE]
    • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 3.1.1. Incorrect Configuration Leading to Security Issues [CRITICAL NODE]
      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 3.1.1.2. Overly permissive menu access control leading to unauthorized actions [CRITICAL NODE - Critical Security Impact]
    • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 3.1.2. Insecure Handling of Menu Callbacks/Events [CRITICAL NODE]
      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 3.1.2.1. Vulnerabilities in application code handling ResideMenu events [CRITICAL NODE - Critical Security Impact]
      • [HIGH-RISK PATH] 3.1.2.2. Race conditions or improper synchronization in event handling logic [CRITICAL NODE - Critical Security Impact]

Attack Tree Path: 1.1. Overlay Attacks / UI Redressing

Attack Vector:

• Objective: To trick users into interacting with a malicious UI element disguised as a legitimate part of the application's ResideMenu or content.
• Method:
  • Injecting Malicious Views: The attacker finds a way to inject a new view (e.g., a transparent or semi-transparent overlay) on top of the ResideMenu's view hierarchy. This could be achieved by:
    • Exploiting vulnerabilities in how ResideMenu manages its view hierarchy, allowing external views to be added at a higher z-index.
    • Leveraging timing windows during menu transitions or animations to inject a view before the UI stabilizes.
  • Obscuring Legitimate UI: The injected view is designed to visually mimic or overlay legitimate UI elements, such as menu items, buttons, or input fields.
• Exploitation:
  • Phishing: The overlay could present a fake login prompt or request for sensitive information, capturing user credentials when they interact with the seemingly legitimate UI.
  • Malicious Actions: The overlay could make it appear as if the user is clicking a safe menu item, but instead, they are triggering a malicious action controlled by the attacker (e.g., initiating a transaction, granting permissions, downloading malware).
  • UI Redressing/Clickjacking: Even if the overlay is transparent, it can redirect user clicks to unintended actions. For example, making a seemingly harmless area of the screen actually click on a hidden malicious button.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1. Menu State Confusion

Attack Vector:

• Objective: To manipulate or desynchronize the application's understanding of the ResideMenu's state (open or closed) compared to the actual UI state.
• Method:
  • Forcing State Changes: The attacker attempts to programmatically or through UI manipulation force the ResideMenu to be in a state (e.g., open) that the application logic does not expect. This could involve:
    • Exploiting race conditions in state management logic within ResideMenu or the application's integration.
    • Sending crafted events or API calls to ResideMenu to alter its internal state.
  • Manipulating State Assumptions: The attacker identifies application code that makes security decisions or controls access based on assumptions about the ResideMenu's state.
• Exploitation:
  • Security Bypass: If security checks are based on the assumption that the menu is closed during certain operations, forcing the menu to be open (or vice versa) might bypass these checks, allowing unauthorized actions.
  • Unintended Functionality: Desynchronized state can lead to unexpected application behavior, potentially revealing vulnerabilities or allowing access to features that should be restricted based on menu state.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2. Insecure Menu Item Handling

Attack Vector:

• Objective: To exploit vulnerabilities in how the application handles actions triggered by ResideMenu menu items, particularly if menu items are dynamically generated or process user input.
• Method:
  • Injection Attacks: If menu item actions are constructed dynamically using user-controlled data or external sources, attackers can inject malicious code or commands. This could include:
    • Command Injection: Injecting shell commands if menu actions involve executing system commands.
    • Path Traversal: Injecting file paths to access or manipulate files outside of intended directories.
    • SQL Injection (less likely in direct ResideMenu context, but possible if menu actions interact with databases): Injecting SQL queries if menu actions involve database interactions.
  • Lack of Input Validation: If the application does not properly validate or sanitize input received from menu item selections or associated data, it can be vulnerable to various attacks.
• Exploitation:
  • Code Execution: Successful injection attacks can allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the device or server.
  • Data Breach: Vulnerabilities can be exploited to access or modify sensitive data stored by the application.
  • Unauthorized Actions: Attackers can trigger actions through menu items that they are not authorized to perform, potentially gaining elevated privileges or access to restricted features.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1. Misuse of ResideMenu API

Attack Vector:

• Objective: To exploit vulnerabilities arising from incorrect or insecure usage of the ResideMenu API within the application's code.
• Method:
  • Incorrect Configuration: Developers might misconfigure ResideMenu in a way that introduces security weaknesses. This includes:
    • Overly Permissive Access Control: Setting up menu access control in a way that grants unauthorized users access to sensitive menu items or actions.
    • Exposing Configuration Data: Storing or transmitting menu configuration data insecurely, potentially revealing sensitive information or allowing manipulation.
  • Insecure Event Handling: Vulnerabilities can occur in the application's code that handles events or callbacks from ResideMenu. This includes:
    • Race Conditions in Event Handling: Improper synchronization in event handling logic can lead to race conditions, allowing attackers to manipulate the order or timing of events to bypass security checks or trigger unintended actions.
    • Vulnerabilities in Callback Logic: If the application's callback functions that respond to ResideMenu events are not implemented securely, they can be exploited (e.g., injection vulnerabilities in callback handlers).
• Exploitation:
  • Unauthorized Access: Misconfiguration or insecure event handling can lead to unauthorized users gaining access to restricted menu items or application features.
  • Application Compromise: Vulnerabilities in API usage can be exploited to compromise the application's functionality, data integrity, or security.
  • Data Breach: Insecure API usage can potentially lead to data leaks or unauthorized access to sensitive information.