Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
59 lines (50 loc) · 6.14 KB

attack-surface.md

File metadata and controls

59 lines (50 loc) · 6.14 KB

Attack Surface Analysis for slackhq/slacktextviewcontroller

Attack Surface: 1. Unvalidated Text Input (Direct Handling within STVC)

  • Description: While the use of unvalidated input is the ultimate vulnerability, SlackTextViewController is the direct point of entry for this input. The control's internal handling of the raw input before handing it off to the application is relevant.
  • How SlackTextViewController Contributes: It is the mechanism that receives and initially processes the user's text input. Any lack of internal sanitization within STVC contributes directly.
  • Example:
    • If STVC internally used the input to construct a URL without proper encoding (even before the application sees it), this would be a direct vulnerability. (This is hypothetical - we're focusing on what STVC does internally).
    • If STVC had a buffer overflow vulnerability in its text handling routines, triggered by a specially crafted, excessively long input string.
  • Impact:
    • Potentially, vulnerabilities within STVC itself related to text handling (e.g., buffer overflows, format string bugs – though unlikely in modern, memory-safe languages).
    • Denial of Service (DoS) if extremely large inputs can crash or hang STVC directly.
  • Risk Severity: Critical (if internal vulnerabilities exist), High (for DoS).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Rely on STVC's Internal Security: Assume that the SlackTextViewController developers have implemented reasonable internal security measures. However, do not rely on this alone.
    • Fuzz Testing (Targeting STVC): Perform fuzz testing specifically targeting the SlackTextViewController component itself, with a wide variety of inputs, to try to trigger internal errors. This is more advanced testing.
    • Monitor for STVC Security Updates: Pay close attention to security updates and advisories specifically for SlackTextViewController. Apply updates promptly.
    • Set reasonable maximum length: Set reasonable maximum length limits on the input field to prevent excessively large inputs.

Attack Surface: 2. Malicious Autocomplete Suggestions (Direct Source)

  • Description: If SlackTextViewController's autocomplete feature is used, and the source of the suggestions is directly controlled by or accessible to an attacker, this is a direct vulnerability.
  • How SlackTextViewController Contributes: The autocomplete functionality, if configured to use an untrusted source, is the direct attack vector.
  • Example:
    • If STVC were configured to load autocomplete suggestions from a local file that an attacker could modify.
    • If STVC had a built-in (and enabled by default) feature to fetch suggestions from an insecure, attacker-controlled URL.
  • Impact: Injection of malicious content (commands, scripts) directly into the input field via suggestions.
  • Risk Severity: High.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Trusted Suggestion Source (Configuration): Ensure that SlackTextViewController is configured to use only a trusted and secure source for autocomplete suggestions. This is a configuration issue, but directly related to STVC's functionality.
    • Disable Autocomplete (If Unnecessary): If autocomplete is not essential, disable it entirely to eliminate this attack vector.
    • Validate Suggestions (Within STVC Configuration): If possible, configure STVC (if it offers such options) to perform some basic validation of suggestions before displaying them.

Attack Surface: 3. Pasteboard Vulnerabilities (Direct Acceptance)

  • Description: SlackTextViewController directly accepts pasted input. While the content is the ultimate issue, the acceptance of pasted data is a direct function of STVC.
  • How SlackTextViewController Contributes: It provides the mechanism for accepting pasted input, bypassing any keyboard-level restrictions.
  • Example:
    • An attacker copies malicious content to the clipboard, and STVC accepts it without any internal pre-processing or filtering.
  • Impact: Allows for the introduction of malicious content (same as unvalidated typed input, but bypassing keyboard restrictions).
  • Risk Severity: High.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Internal Paste Handling (If STVC Provides): If SlackTextViewController offers any options for pre-processing or filtering pasted content internally, enable and configure these options.
    • Limit Paste Size (Within STVC): If STVC allows setting limits on the size of pasted content, set a reasonable limit to mitigate DoS attacks.
    • Rely on STVC's Internal Security: Assume that the SlackTextViewController developers have implemented reasonable internal security measures for pasteboard.

Attack Surface: 4. Dependency Vulnerabilities (Direct Inclusion)

  • Description: SlackTextViewController itself is a dependency, and any vulnerabilities within it are directly included in the application.
  • How SlackTextViewController Contributes: It is the dependency; its code is directly incorporated.
  • Example:
    • A buffer overflow vulnerability is discovered in SlackTextViewController's text rendering code.
  • Impact: Depends on the specific vulnerability within STVC (could be anything from DoS to remote code execution).
  • Risk Severity: Variable (Critical to High, depending on the vulnerability).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Regular Updates: Keep SlackTextViewController updated to the latest version. This is the primary defense.
    • Monitor Advisories: Monitor security advisories specifically for SlackTextViewController.
    • Vulnerability Scanning (Targeting STVC): Use tools that can specifically analyze the SlackTextViewController code (if source code is available) for vulnerabilities.