attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for slackhq/slacktextviewcontroller

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code OR Exfiltrate Sensitive Data (via slacktextviewcontroller)

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      Attacker's Goal:
                      Execute Arbitrary Code OR Exfiltrate Sensitive Data
                                    (via slacktextviewcontroller)
                                                |
                      -----------------------------------------------------------------
                      |                                                               |
        1. Input Validation/Sanitization Bypass [!]                                2. UI/UX Manipulation (Partial)
                      |                                                               |
        ------------------------------                                  ------------------------------------
        |                            |                                                 |
1.1 XSS/     (omitted)       1.3 Data Leakage                                   (omitted)        2.2 Autocomplete
Injection [!]                (via Unintended                                                    Manipulation [!]
(via crafted                 Autocompletion/
input)                       Suggestions) [!]
        |                            |
1.1.1 Bypass                 1.3.1 Trigger
escaping                     unintended
mechanisms [!]               autocompletion
--->                         by suggesting
                             sensitive data.
                                                                                     |
                                                                                -----------------
                                                                                |               |
                                                                            2.2.1 Poison    2.2.2 Trigger
                                                                            autocomplete  unintended
                                                                            data          autocompletion
                                                                            --->          with malicious
                                                                                          suggestions.

Attack Tree Path: 1. Input Validation/Sanitization Bypass [!] (Critical Node)

• This is the overarching category for attacks that exploit weaknesses in how the application (or, less likely, the library) handles user-provided input. It's the foundation for many other attacks.
• Attack Vectors:
  • Failure to properly escape or sanitize user input before displaying it or using it in other operations.
  • Insufficient input validation, allowing unexpected characters or data formats.
  • Vulnerabilities in the library's internal text processing logic.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1 XSS/Injection [!] (Critical Node)

• This attack aims to inject malicious scripts (typically JavaScript) into the application, which are then executed in the context of other users' browsers or the application itself.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Injecting <script> tags with malicious code.
    • Using event handlers (e.g., onload, onerror) to execute JavaScript.
    • Exploiting vulnerabilities in how the application handles URLs or other data that can be used to inject scripts.
    • Bypassing character escaping mechanisms using techniques like double encoding or Unicode encoding.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1 Bypass escaping mechanisms [!] (Critical Node) ---> (High-Risk Path)

• This is the specific step of crafting input that circumvents any attempts by the application or library to neutralize potentially harmful characters or code.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Using unusual Unicode characters that are not properly handled.
    • Double encoding characters (e.g., %253C for <).
    • Exploiting specific parsing logic within the library's text rendering.
    • Finding edge cases or vulnerabilities in the escaping functions used by the application.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3 Data Leakage (via Unintended Autocompletion/Suggestions) [!] (Critical Node)

• This attack focuses on extracting sensitive information through the autocompletion feature.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Providing carefully crafted input that triggers the display of previously entered data, usernames, passwords, or other sensitive information.
    • Exploiting vulnerabilities in the autocompletion logic to reveal data that should not be suggested.
    • Manipulating the autocompletion data source to include sensitive information.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.1 Trigger unintended autocompletion by suggesting sensitive data

• This is the specific action of causing the autocompletion feature to display sensitive information.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Typing partial usernames or email addresses to trigger suggestions.
    • Entering specific characters or patterns known to trigger the display of sensitive data.
    • Exploiting timing or race conditions in the autocompletion logic.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2 Autocomplete Manipulation [!]

• This attack focuses on manipulating the autocompletion feature to either leak data or trick the user.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Injecting malicious suggestions into the autocomplete data.
    • Triggering the display of malicious suggestions.
    • Bypassing any filtering of autocomplete suggestions.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2.1 Poison autocomplete data ---> (High-Risk Path)

• This involves injecting malicious suggestions into the data source used by the autocompletion feature.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Exploiting vulnerabilities in the application that allow modification of the autocomplete data.
    • If the autocomplete data is stored client-side, manipulating it directly.
    • If the autocomplete data is user-specific, poisoning one user's data to affect others (if suggestions are shared).

Attack Tree Path: 2.2.2 Trigger unintended autocompletion with malicious suggestions

• This is the step of causing the application to display the attacker's poisoned autocomplete suggestions to the user.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • Crafting input that matches the attacker's malicious suggestions.
    • Exploiting timing or race conditions to ensure the malicious suggestions are displayed.
    • Manipulating the user interface to make the malicious suggestions more prominent.