Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
140 lines (104 loc) · 8.49 KB

File metadata and controls

140 lines (104 loc) · 8.49 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for sparkle-project/sparkle

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code via Malicious Sparkle Update

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Execute Arbitrary Code via Malicious Sparkle Update ├── 1. Compromise Update Delivery Mechanism [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 1.1. Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack on Update Channel │ │ ├── 1.1.1. Intercept and Modify Appcast XML [HIGH RISK] │ │ │ ├── 1.1.1.1. Change Update URL to Malicious Server [CRITICAL] │ │ │ └── 1.1.1.2. Modify Update Package Hash (DSA/EdDSA/SHA256) [CRITICAL] │ │ └── 1.1.2. Intercept and Replace Update Package [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 1.2. Compromise Appcast Hosting Server [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 1.2.1. Gain Unauthorized Access (e.g., weak credentials, server vulnerability) [CRITICAL] │ │ ├── 1.2.2. Modify Appcast XML (as in 1.1.1.1, 1.1.1.2) [CRITICAL] │ │ └── 1.2.3. Replace Legitimate Update Package with Malicious One [CRITICAL] │ └── 1.3. Compromise Developer's Code Signing Key [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 1.3.1. Theft of Private Key (e.g., phishing, malware on developer machine) [CRITICAL] │ └── 1.3.2. Compromise of Key Storage (e.g., insecure cloud storage, weak password) [CRITICAL] └── 3. Social Engineering of the User ├── 3.1. Phishing Attack to Distribute a Modified Application [HIGH RISK] │ └── 3.1.1. Convince user to download and install a "special" version with a compromised Sparkle configuration. [CRITICAL]

  • Description: This is the overarching strategy of manipulating the update process to deliver malicious code. It's the most likely avenue of attack.
  • Sub-Vectors:
  • Description: Intercepting and modifying the communication between the application and the update server.
  • Sub-Vectors:
  • Description: The attacker intercepts the appcast XML file and changes its contents.
  • Sub-Vectors:
  • Description: The attacker modifies the URL in the appcast to point to a server they control. This is a critical step because it redirects the entire update process.
  • Likelihood: Medium (if HTTPS is used, but CA compromise or user tricked) / High (if HTTP is used)
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
  • Description: The attacker changes the cryptographic hash of the update package in the appcast. This allows them to provide a malicious package that Sparkle will accept (because the hash matches the modified appcast).
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
  • Description: Instead of modifying the appcast, the attacker directly intercepts and replaces the downloaded update package with a malicious one. This requires bypassing or manipulating the hash check.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
  • Description: Gaining control of the server that hosts the appcast XML file.
  • Sub-Vectors:
  • Description: The attacker exploits a vulnerability or uses weak credentials to gain access to the server. This is a critical first step.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Low to High
  • Skill Level: Intermediate to Expert
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
  • Description: Once the server is compromised, the attacker modifies the appcast file to point to a malicious update or change the hash. This is critical for controlling the update process.
  • Likelihood: High (if 1.2.1 is successful)
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Description: The attacker replaces the legitimate update package on the server with a malicious one. This is a critical step to deliver the malicious payload.
  • Likelihood: High (if 1.2.1 is successful)
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Description: Obtaining the private key used to sign updates. This allows the attacker to sign malicious updates that Sparkle will trust.
  • Sub-Vectors:
  • Description: The attacker steals the private key through various means, such as phishing, malware, or physical theft. This is a critical step.
  • Likelihood: Low to Medium
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Medium to High
  • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard
  • Description: The attacker gains access to the location where the private key is stored, even if they don't directly steal the key file. This is a critical step.
  • Likelihood: Low to Medium
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Low to High
  • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard
  • Description: Bypassing technical controls by manipulating the user.
  • Sub-Vectors:
  • Description: Tricking the user into downloading and installing a modified version of the application that contains a compromised Sparkle configuration or a malicious update.
  • Sub-Vectors:
  • Description: The attacker uses social engineering techniques to persuade the user to install a malicious version of the application. This is a critical step.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Low to Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium