attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for steipete/aspects

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code or Modify Application Behavior

Attack Tree Visualization

                                 [Attacker's Goal: Execute Arbitrary Code or Modify Application Behavior]
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                  [[Sub-Goal 1: Inject Malicious Aspect]]
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{1.1: Unvalidated Input} [1.2: Weak Selector] [1.3: Hook ] to Aspect Creation Matching Unintended Methods | | | ------------------ ------------------ ---------- | | | | | | [[1.1.1: Craft ]] [[1.1.2: ]] [[1.2.1: Use ]] {1.2.2: } [[1.3.1: ]] Malicious Bypass Wildcards to Target Hook Selector Selector Match More Sensitive Methods Validation Methods Methods Intended for Hooking

Attack Tree Path: {1.1: Unvalidated Input to Aspect Creation} (Critical Node)

• Description: The application allows untrusted input (e.g., from user input, configuration files, external data sources) to directly or indirectly influence the creation of Aspects, particularly the selector string. This is the most critical vulnerability because it enables several other attack paths.
• Why it's Critical: This is the root cause that enables many subsequent attacks. If input is properly validated, many of the other attack vectors become impossible or significantly more difficult.
• Attack Vectors:
  • Directly using user input in string concatenation to build a selector.
  • Failing to properly escape or sanitize user input before using it in a selector.
  • Using user input to choose from a predefined set of selectors, but the set itself contains dangerous options.
  • Reading selector configurations from an untrusted source (e.g., a database that could be compromised).
• Mitigation:
  • Never allow untrusted input to directly influence the selector string.
  • Use a strict whitelist of allowed selectors.
  • Use parameterized selectors (e.g., selector templates with placeholders) instead of string concatenation.
  • Implement robust input validation and sanitization, considering all possible attack vectors (e.g., character encoding tricks, SQL injection-like attacks).
  • Treat all external data sources as potentially untrusted.

Attack Tree Path: [[1.1.1: Craft Malicious Selector]] (High-Risk Path)

• Description: The attacker crafts a selector string that matches unintended methods by exploiting weaknesses in how the selector is constructed or validated.
• Why it's High-Risk: This is a direct consequence of unvalidated input and is relatively easy to achieve with intermediate skills.
• Attack Vectors:
  • Injecting special characters (e.g., ;, *, ?) to alter the selector's meaning.
  • Using character encoding tricks to bypass validation.
  • Exploiting regular expression vulnerabilities (if the selector uses regex).
  • Using long strings or unusual characters to trigger buffer overflows or other low-level vulnerabilities (less likely, but possible).
• Mitigation: (Same as for 1.1: Unvalidated Input)

Attack Tree Path: [[1.1.2: Bypass Selector Validation]] (High-Risk Path)

• Description: The attacker finds a way to circumvent the application's selector validation logic, allowing them to inject a malicious selector.
• Why it's High-Risk: Even if validation exists, attackers will actively try to bypass it. This path represents the attempt to bypass, making it high-risk even if the individual bypass is difficult.
• Attack Vectors:
  • Finding logic errors in the validation routine.
  • Exploiting character encoding issues.
  • Using unexpected input types or formats.
  • Triggering edge cases or boundary conditions that the validation doesn't handle.
• Mitigation:
  • Thoroughly test the validation routine with a wide range of inputs, including malicious ones.
  • Use a well-vetted validation library or framework.
  • Consider using a "deny-list" approach to explicitly block known malicious patterns.
  • Regularly review and update the validation logic.

Attack Tree Path: [1.2: Weak Selector Matching]

• Description: The application uses selectors that are overly broad or match unintended methods, even without malicious input.
• Why it's High-Risk (in combination with its children): Weak selectors create a larger attack surface, making it easier for an attacker to find a way to inject malicious code.

Attack Tree Path: [[1.2.1: Use Wildcards to Match More Methods]] (High-Risk Path)

• Description: The application uses wildcards (e.g., *, ?) in selectors, allowing them to match a wider range of methods than intended.
• Why it's High-Risk: Wildcards are easy to misuse and can significantly increase the attack surface.
• Attack Vectors:
  • Using * to match all methods.
  • Using prefix* to match all methods starting with a particular prefix.
  • Using *suffix to match all methods ending with a particular suffix.
• Mitigation:
  • Avoid wildcards unless absolutely necessary.
  • If wildcards are required, use them with extreme caution and ensure they only match the intended methods.
  • Use the most specific selectors possible.

Attack Tree Path: {1.2.2: Target Sensitive Methods} (Critical Node)

• Description: The application uses selectors that match sensitive methods (e.g., methods related to authentication, authorization, data access, or system administration).
• Why it's Critical: Hooking sensitive methods provides a direct path to high-impact vulnerabilities, such as privilege escalation or data breaches.
• Attack Vectors:
  • Identifying sensitive methods by their names (e.g., login, authorize, deleteUser).
  • Analyzing the application's code to understand which methods perform sensitive operations.
• Mitigation:
  • Carefully review all selectors to ensure they don't match sensitive methods unintentionally.
  • Consider using a "deny-list" approach to explicitly prevent sensitive methods from being hooked.
  • Implement strong authorization checks within sensitive methods, even if they are hooked.

Attack Tree Path: [1.3: Hook Unintended Methods]

• Description: The attacker is able to hook methods, either those intended for hooking or not. The vulnerability lies in the content of the injected Aspect code.

Attack Tree Path: [[1.3.1: Hook Methods Intended for Hooking]] (High-Risk Path)

• Description: The attacker injects malicious code into the before, instead, or after blocks of an Aspect that is legitimately hooking a method.
• Why it's High-Risk: This is the core attack surface of Aspects. Since hooking is the intended functionality, injecting malicious code into the hook is a primary concern.
• Attack Vectors:
  • Injecting code that performs unauthorized actions (e.g., stealing data, modifying data, escalating privileges).
  • Injecting code that disrupts the application's normal operation (e.g., causing denial of service).
  • Injecting code that exploits vulnerabilities in other parts of the application.
• Mitigation:
  • Carefully review the code within each Aspect's blocks.
  • Assume that an attacker can inject code into these blocks, and design accordingly.
  • Use strong input validation, output encoding, and other defensive programming techniques within the Aspect's code.
  • Limit the privileges of the code running within the Aspect.
  • Consider using a code analysis tool to identify potential vulnerabilities.