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Attack Tree Analysis for swisspol/gcdwebserver

Objective: Compromise application using gcdwebserver by exploiting vulnerabilities within gcdwebserver.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application Using gcdwebserver [CRITICAL NODE]
├───[AND] Exploit gcdwebserver Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[OR] Exploit Web Server Functionality [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───[AND] Path Traversal Vulnerability [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   ├─── Manipulate URL to access files outside web root [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   │   └─── Read sensitive application files (configuration, source code, data) [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   ├───[AND] Directory Listing Vulnerability (if enabled) [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   ├─── Enumerate application structure and files [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   │   └─── Identify sensitive files and endpoints [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Information Disclosure [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │       └─── Reveal application logic, dependencies, or sensitive data [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   ├───[AND] Denial of Service (DoS) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   ├─── Resource Exhaustion [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   │   ├─── Send excessive requests [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   │   │   └─── Overload server resources (CPU, Memory, Network) [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   └───[AND] Information Disclosure via Error Messages [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │       ├─── Trigger errors by sending malformed requests [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │       └─── Analyze verbose error messages [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │           └─── Reveal internal paths, configurations, or software versions [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   └───[OR] Exploit Misconfiguration [CRITICAL NODE]
│       ├───[AND] Insecure Default Configuration [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│       │   ├─── Default web root accessible to sensitive files [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       │   │   └─── Path Traversal becomes easier [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       │   ├─── Directory listing enabled by default [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       │   │   └─── Information Disclosure [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       │   └─── Verbose error logging enabled by default [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       │       └─── Information Disclosure [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       ├───[AND] Lack of authentication/authorization for sensitive endpoints [HIGH RISK PATH]
│       │   └─── Unauthorized access to application functionalities [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Path Traversal Vulnerability [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Attack Vector:
    • Manipulate URLs by inserting sequences like ../ to navigate outside the intended web root directory.
    • Attempt to access sensitive files such as configuration files, source code, or data files.
  • Impact:
    • Read sensitive application files: Exposure of confidential information, including database credentials, API keys, and application secrets.
    • Execute arbitrary code (if application logic is vulnerable): If the application processes files accessed via path traversal (e.g., includes or executes them), it can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE), allowing complete system compromise.
  • Mitigation:
    • Strictly validate and sanitize user-provided input used to construct file paths.
    • Use secure path manipulation functions provided by the programming language.
    • Never directly concatenate user input into file paths.
    • Consider using a whitelist approach for allowed file paths.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Directory Listing Vulnerability (if enabled) [HIGH RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vector:
    • Access directories without index files when directory listing is enabled in gcdwebserver.
    • Enumerate the application structure and files exposed by the directory listing.
    • Identify sensitive files and endpoints based on the revealed file names and directory structure.
  • Impact:
    • Information Disclosure: Leakage of application structure, file names, and potentially sensitive files. This information can be used to plan further attacks and identify vulnerable endpoints.
    • Reveal application logic, dependencies, or sensitive data: Exposed files might contain configuration details, code snippets, or other sensitive information.
  • Mitigation:
    • Disable directory listing in gcdwebserver configuration.
    • Ensure that index files (e.g., index.html) are present in directories that should be accessible.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Denial of Service (DoS) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Attack Vector:
    • Resource Exhaustion via Excessive Requests: Send a large volume of requests to the server to overwhelm its resources (CPU, memory, network bandwidth).
    • Overload server resources (CPU, Memory, Network): Cause the server to become unresponsive due to resource depletion.
  • Impact:
    • Application unavailability: The server becomes unresponsive, making the application inaccessible to legitimate users.
    • Service disruption: Disruption of business operations and user experience.
  • Mitigation:
    • Implement rate limiting at the application level or using a reverse proxy.
    • Configure resource limits for the server (e.g., connection limits, timeouts).
    • Review gcdwebserver's code for potential resource-intensive operations and optimize them or implement safeguards.
    • Consider using a more robust web server or a CDN for production deployments.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Information Disclosure via Error Messages [HIGH RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vector:
    • Trigger errors in the web server by sending malformed requests or requests that cause exceptions.
    • Analyze verbose error messages returned by the server.
  • Impact:
    • Reveal internal paths, configurations, or software versions: Verbose error messages can expose sensitive information like internal file paths, software versions, configuration details, or even snippets of source code.
    • Information Disclosure: This information can aid attackers in understanding the system's internals and planning further, more targeted attacks.
  • Mitigation:
    • Configure gcdwebserver to log errors appropriately but avoid displaying verbose error messages to end-users in production.
    • Implement custom error pages that provide minimal information to the user while logging detailed errors for administrators.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Insecure Default Configuration [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Attack Vector:
    • Exploit insecure default settings of gcdwebserver if they are not changed by the application deployer.
    • Rely on default configurations that are vulnerable.
  • Impact:
    • Default web root accessible to sensitive files: If the default web root is set to a directory containing sensitive application files, it makes Path Traversal attacks easier and more impactful.
    • Directory listing enabled by default: Leads to Information Disclosure as described in point 2.
    • Verbose error logging enabled by default: Leads to Information Disclosure as described in point 4.
  • Mitigation:
    • Review gcdwebserver's default configuration and change any insecure defaults before deploying the application.
    • Specifically, ensure directory listing is disabled, the web root is correctly set to the intended public directory, and error logging is configured securely for production.

Attack Tree Path: 6. Lack of authentication/authorization for sensitive endpoints [HIGH RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vector:
    • Access sensitive application endpoints or functionalities that lack proper authentication and authorization mechanisms.
    • Bypass intended access controls due to missing or insufficient security measures.
  • Impact:
    • Unauthorized access to application functionalities: Gain access to restricted features, administrative panels, or sensitive operations without proper credentials.
    • Unauthorized access to application data: Access and potentially manipulate sensitive data that should be protected by authentication and authorization.
  • Mitigation:
    • Implement robust authentication and authorization at the application level.
    • Ensure that all sensitive endpoints and functionalities require proper authentication and authorization checks before access is granted.
    • Follow the principle of least privilege when designing and implementing access controls.