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Threat Model Analysis for wenchaod/fscalendar

Threat: Supply Chain Attack (Malicious Library Modification)

  • Threat: Supply Chain Attack (Malicious Library Modification)

    • Description: An attacker compromises the FSCalendar repository (GitHub) or the package distribution channel (npm, if applicable). They inject malicious code into the library, such as a backdoor or data exfiltration routine. Developers unknowingly integrate the compromised version.
    • Impact:
      • Complete application compromise.
      • Data theft (dates, events, potentially user data).
      • Execution of arbitrary code on the client-side or server-side (depending on how FSCalendar is used).
    • Affected Component: The entire FSCalendar library (all modules and functions).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers:
        • Use package managers with integrity checks (e.g., npm audit, yarn audit). Verify checksums/hashes against known good values.
        • Pin FSCalendar to a specific, verified version in package.json (and package-lock.json or yarn.lock). Avoid using version ranges (e.g., ^1.2.3) that automatically update to potentially compromised versions.
        • Regularly review dependency updates for suspicious changes. Examine changelogs and diffs carefully.
        • Consider using a private package repository (e.g., Verdaccio, Nexus) to host a vetted copy of FSCalendar.
        • Implement Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tools to identify known vulnerabilities in dependencies.

Threat: API Tampering (Unintended State Modification)

  • Threat: API Tampering (Unintended State Modification)

    • Description: An attacker discovers and exploits publicly exposed FSCalendar methods or properties that allow them to bypass intended restrictions or modify the calendar's internal state in an unauthorized way. For example, they might be able to:
      • Disable date range limitations.
      • Modify event data without proper authorization (if FSCalendar handles event data directly, rather than just displaying it).
      • Trigger unexpected calendar behavior.
    • Impact:
      • Data corruption (if the tampered state is persisted).
      • Disruption of calendar functionality.
      • Potential for unauthorized actions if FSCalendar's internal state influences other application features.
    • Affected Component: FSCalendar's public API (exposed methods and properties). Specific functions would depend on the vulnerability, but could include methods related to date selection, event management (if applicable), or configuration.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers:
        • Thoroughly review the FSCalendar API documentation and source code to identify all publicly accessible methods and properties.
        • Implement strict input validation and sanitization for all data passed to FSCalendar methods. Use a whitelist approach (allow only known-good values) rather than a blacklist.
        • Minimize the exposure of FSCalendar's API to the client-side. Create a server-side wrapper or intermediary layer to handle interactions with the calendar and enforce business logic before calling FSCalendar methods.
        • Use a linter and static analysis tools to identify potential security issues in the code that interacts with FSCalendar.
        • Regularly conduct security audits and penetration testing, specifically targeting the interaction with FSCalendar.

Threat: Code Injection in Event Handlers/Rendering

  • Threat: Code Injection in Event Handlers/Rendering

    • Description: FSCalendar allows developers to define custom event handlers (e.g., for date selection, event clicks) and custom rendering functions (e.g., for calendar cells). If these handlers or functions do not properly sanitize user-provided data that is then passed to FSCalendar, an attacker can inject malicious JavaScript code that FSCalendar will then execute.
    • Impact:
      • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks.
      • Execution of arbitrary code in the user's browser.
      • Data theft (cookies, session tokens, user input).
      • Redirection to malicious websites.
    • Affected Component: Custom event handlers (e.g., didSelect, didDeselect) and custom rendering functions (e.g., cellFor, titleFor, subtitleFor) within FSCalendar, specifically where user-provided data is used without proper sanitization.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers:
        • Rigorously sanitize all user-provided data before using it within custom event handlers or rendering functions that are passed to FSCalendar. Use a dedicated sanitization library (e.g., DOMPurify) that is specifically designed for preventing XSS. Sanitize before passing data to FSCalendar.
        • Avoid using eval(), new Function(), innerHTML, outerHTML, or document.write() with user-provided data within these handlers.
        • Use template literals or a templating engine that automatically escapes output, and ensure that the output is then safely passed to FSCalendar.
        • Implement a strict Content Security Policy (CSP) to prevent the execution of inline scripts and untrusted code. This is a defense-in-depth measure.

Threat: Sensitive Information Disclosure (through FSCalendar API or rendering)

  • Threat: Sensitive Information Disclosure (through FSCalendar API or rendering)

    • Description: While primarily an application-level concern, if FSCalendar itself has vulnerabilities that leak data through its API or rendering process, this constitutes a direct threat. This is less likely than improper usage, but still possible. For example, a poorly designed API method might expose more event data than intended.
    • Impact:
      • Privacy violations.
      • Exposure of confidential information.
      • Potential for identity theft or other malicious activities.
    • Affected Component: FSCalendar's data handling and rendering logic. Specifically, any functions that access or display event data, and any API methods that return event data.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers:
        • Review FSCalendar's code and documentation thoroughly for any potential information leakage vulnerabilities. Pay close attention to API methods that return data.
        • Perform security testing, including fuzzing of FSCalendar's API, to identify any unexpected data exposure.
        • If a vulnerability is found in FSCalendar, report it to the library maintainers responsibly and update to a patched version as soon as it becomes available.
        • As a defense-in-depth, always assume that FSCalendar might have undiscovered vulnerabilities, and implement application-level security controls (authentication, authorization, encryption) to protect sensitive data.