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Attack Tree Analysis for bcosca/fatfree

Objective: Gain unauthorized access to application data/functionality or disrupt service via F3 vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Visualization

Attacker's Goal: Gain unauthorized access to application data/functionality or disrupt service via F3 vulnerabilities.
├── 1.  Exploit Template Engine (Template) Vulnerabilities  [HIGH RISK]
│   ├── 1.1  Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Template Injection [HIGH RISK]
│   │   ├── 1.1.1  Insufficient Input Sanitization in Template Variables [CRITICAL]
│   │   └── 1.1.2  Exploiting `raw` filter misuse [CRITICAL]
│   ├── 1.2  Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) [HIGH RISK]
│   │   └── 1.2.1  User-controlled input directly influencing template file selection or content. [CRITICAL]
│   └── 1.3  Local File Inclusion (LFI) via Template Paths
│       └── 1.3.1  User-controlled input manipulating template paths to access arbitrary files. [CRITICAL]
├── 2.  Exploit Routing Vulnerabilities
│   ├── 2.1  Route Hijacking / Parameter Tampering [HIGH RISK]
│   │   └── 2.1.1  Manipulating route parameters to access unauthorized resources or execute unintended actions. [CRITICAL]
│   └── 2.2  Denial of Service (DoS) via Route Flooding [HIGH RISK]
│       └── 2.2.1  Sending a large number of requests to a specific route, overwhelming the application. [CRITICAL]
├── 3.  Exploit Database Abstraction Layer (DB) Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK]
│   ├── 3.1  SQL Injection (if using F3's DB layer) [HIGH RISK]
│   │   └── 3.1.1  Insufficient input sanitization in database queries. [CRITICAL]
│   └── 3.2  NoSQL Injection (if using a NoSQL database with F3)
│       └── 3.2.1  Similar to SQL Injection, but targeting NoSQL query languages. [CRITICAL]
├── 5. Exploit Session Management Vulnerabilities
    ├── 5.2 Session Hijacking [HIGH RISK]
        └── 5.2.1  Stealing a valid session ID. [CRITICAL]
    ├── 5.1 Session Fixation
        └── 5.1.1 Setting a known session ID for a victim. [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Template Engine (Template) Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK]

  • 1.1 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Template Injection [HIGH RISK]

    • 1.1.1 Insufficient Input Sanitization in Template Variables [CRITICAL]
      • Description: Attackers inject malicious JavaScript code into template variables that are not properly escaped before being rendered in the HTML output.
      • Attack Vector: User input (e.g., form fields, URL parameters) is directly used in template variables without proper sanitization or encoding.
      • Example: If a template has {{ @userInput }}, and @userInput contains <script>alert('XSS')</script>, the script will execute in the user's browser.
      • Mitigation: Consistently use F3's escaping functions (e.g., {{ @variable | esc }}) for all template variables that might contain user input. Implement a strong Content Security Policy (CSP).
    • 1.1.2 Exploiting raw filter misuse [CRITICAL]
      • Description: The raw filter in F3's template engine disables escaping, making it a prime target for XSS attacks if used improperly.
      • Attack Vector: Developers use the raw filter on user-supplied data without performing rigorous input validation before using the filter.
      • Example: {{ @userInput | raw }} with malicious @userInput will inject the raw, unescaped content.
      • Mitigation: Avoid using raw whenever possible. If it's absolutely necessary, implement extremely strict input validation before applying the raw filter. Consider alternative approaches that don't require disabling escaping.

  • 1.2 Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) [HIGH RISK]

    • 1.2.1 User-controlled input directly influencing template file selection or content. [CRITICAL]
      • Description: Attackers manipulate user input to control which template file is loaded or to inject arbitrary code into the template itself, leading to remote code execution.
      • Attack Vector: User input is used to construct the template file path or is directly embedded within the template content without proper sanitization.
      • Example: If the application uses render('templates/' . $_GET['page'] . '.html'), an attacker could supply page=../../../../etc/passwd to attempt an LFI attack, or inject template engine directives to execute code.
      • Mitigation: Never allow user input to directly determine the template file path. Use a whitelist of allowed template names. Sanitize all user input used within templates, even if it's not directly controlling the file path.

  • 1.3 Local File Inclusion (LFI) via Template Paths

    • 1.3.1 User-controlled input manipulating template paths to access arbitrary files. [CRITICAL]
      • Description: Attackers manipulate user-supplied input that is used to construct template file paths, allowing them to access files outside the intended template directory.
      • Attack Vector: Similar to SSTI (1.2.1), but the goal is to read arbitrary files on the server rather than execute code within the template engine.
      • Example: If the application loads templates based on user input without proper validation, an attacker could try to access /etc/passwd or other sensitive files.
      • Mitigation: Never allow user input to directly construct template paths. Use a whitelist of allowed template directories and filenames. Implement strict path validation to prevent directory traversal attacks (e.g., using ../).

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Routing Vulnerabilities

  • 2.1 Route Hijacking / Parameter Tampering [HIGH RISK]

    • 2.1.1 Manipulating route parameters to access unauthorized resources or execute unintended actions. [CRITICAL]
      • Description: Attackers modify URL parameters or other route data to bypass access controls or trigger unintended behavior in the application.
      • Attack Vector: The application relies solely on route definitions for security, without performing additional authorization checks within the route handlers.
      • Example: If a route is defined as /user/{id}, an attacker might change the {id} to access another user's data.
      • Mitigation: Implement strict input validation and authorization checks within each route handler. Don't rely solely on route definitions for security. Use parameterized queries for database interactions within route handlers.

  • 2.2 Denial of Service (DoS) via Route Flooding [HIGH RISK]

    • 2.2.1 Sending a large number of requests to a specific route, overwhelming the application. [CRITICAL]
      • Description: Attackers send a massive number of requests to a particular route, consuming server resources and making the application unavailable to legitimate users.
      • Attack Vector: The application lacks rate limiting or other DoS protection mechanisms.
      • Example: Repeatedly requesting a resource-intensive route (e.g., one that performs complex database queries or image processing) can overwhelm the server.
      • Mitigation: Implement rate limiting on all routes, especially those that perform resource-intensive operations. Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to mitigate DDoS attacks.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Database Abstraction Layer (DB) Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK]

  • 3.1 SQL Injection (if using F3's DB layer) [HIGH RISK]

    • 3.1.1 Insufficient input sanitization in database queries. [CRITICAL]
      • Description: Attackers inject malicious SQL code into database queries through user input, allowing them to read, modify, or delete data, or even execute arbitrary commands on the database server.
      • Attack Vector: User input is directly concatenated into SQL queries without proper sanitization or parameterization.
      • Example: $db->exec("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '" . $_GET['username'] . "'"); is vulnerable if $_GET['username'] is not properly sanitized.
      • Mitigation: Always use parameterized queries or prepared statements. Never construct SQL queries by concatenating user input.

  • 3.2 NoSQL Injection (if using a NoSQL database with F3)

    • 3.2.1 Similar to SQL Injection, but targeting NoSQL query languages. [CRITICAL]
      • Description: Attackers inject malicious code into NoSQL queries, exploiting vulnerabilities in the NoSQL database's query language.
      • Attack Vector: User input is used to construct NoSQL queries without proper sanitization.
      • Example: Similar to SQL injection, but the injected code would be specific to the NoSQL database being used (e.g., MongoDB, CouchDB).
      • Mitigation: Use appropriate sanitization and validation techniques for the specific NoSQL database. Avoid dynamic query construction with user input. Use the database driver's built-in mechanisms for safe query building.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Exploit Session Management Vulnerabilities

  • 5.2 Session Hijacking [HIGH RISK]

    • 5.2.1 Stealing a valid session ID. [CRITICAL]
      • Description: An attacker obtains a legitimate user's session ID, allowing them to impersonate the user and gain access to their account.
      • Attack Vector: Session IDs are exposed through insecure channels (e.g., HTTP, URLs), or are predictable, or are vulnerable to sniffing on an insecure network.
      • Example: An attacker might use a packet sniffer on an unencrypted Wi-Fi network to capture session cookies.
      • Mitigation: Use HTTPS for all communication. Set the HttpOnly and Secure flags on session cookies. Implement session timeout mechanisms. Use strong, randomly generated session IDs.

  • 5.1 Session Fixation

    • 5.1.1 Setting a known session ID for a victim. [CRITICAL]
      • Description: Attacker sets session ID for victim, and when victim authenticates, attacker uses the known session ID to hijack the account.
      • Attack Vector: Application accepts session identifiers from URL parameters or POST data without proper validation or regeneration after authentication.
      • Example: Attacker sends a link with a predefined session ID to the victim. When the victim logs in, the attacker uses the same session ID to access the victim's account.
      • Mitigation: Regenerate session IDs after authentication. Use F3's built-in session management features correctly. Ensure session IDs are not exposed in URLs or other insecure locations.